


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1 September 1993



**FOREIGN
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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-93-092

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ALGERIA

'Severe' Water Shortages; Plans To Conserve

93AF0761B Algiers EL WATAN in French 17 Jul 93
pp 1, 2

[Article by Nordine Grim: "Water Resources in Algeria: Severe Shortage On the Horizon"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] All the serious forecasting studies devoted to the problem of water in Algeria agree that this resource is becoming scarcer, to the point that as early as the end of this decade many localities will find it difficult to satisfy people's needs.

Many cities in the western part of the country have already had a foretaste of the dramatic effects of a lack of water, with respect to both the quality of citizens' daily lives and the output of industrial and agricultural activities.

The economic and social development and the demographic growth recorded in our country since its independence have indeed led to an ever growing demand for water in the face of supply, which has increased in decidedly smaller proportions, and which, furthermore, has been reduced by the effects of pollution and waste.

Today the inadequacy of supply versus demand can be seen in practically all of Algeria's cities, which are experiencing constraints both in supplying drinking water to people and industries and in the area of irrigating farm lands.

Although much time has been lost, today it is possible, according to these same studies, to keep the supply-demand relationship for water within tolerable proportions provided a certain number of steps are taken beginning now.

That is precisely the aim of the interministerial directive dated 29 June 1993 on the subject of water conservation in industry and on protecting water resources from industrial pollution which the Equipment Ministry has just issued.

This long, 13-page directive is organized around two basic thrusts (preserving and protecting water from over-consumption and industrial pollution) and sets out specific steps which the various parties involved must undertake to achieve these objectives.

In the area of water conservation by industrial units, the parties concerned are urgently asked to undertake a certain number of steps including the following:

- Precisely determining, with the help of industrial partners, levels of water consumption absolutely necessary for the effective operation of their units;
- Evaluating and assessing water losses and leaks inside the industrial site and in the production process as well as studying the reasons for these losses and methods to be used to put an end to them;
- Analyzing every possible way of reducing water consumption in each industrial unit, in particular by

means of recycling processing waters and studying material and technical ways which can eventually be implemented to ensure such recycling, including an evaluation of necessary investments;

- In the case of washing equipment and production areas, which requires large quantities of water which often pollute the environment, in certain cases dusting with compressed air may be substituted.

With regard to protecting water resources from pollution, which has already affected more or less seriously nine dams, four groundwater areas, and six waterways, the steps to be taken basically consist of the following:

- Assessment by each industrial unit of the condition of their premises with regard to pollution produced by their refuse;
- Analysis of every possible means of eradicating, or, failing that, of reducing the pollution. As part of this, water purification plants [currently] not functioning will need to be restarted or new ones acquired.

This interministerial directive entrusts the responsibility for this major task to wilaya commissions and a national commission.

The first commission, under the wali's authority, brings together a range of concerned parties immediately affected by the problem of water, and has as its mission carrying out a census of every unit consuming water or polluting it and, in collaboration with industrial partners, studying the steps to be taken to economize water use and combat pollution.

For its part, the national-level commission, chaired by the Equipment Minister, will have as its mission to draw up, based on reports from the wilaya commissions, short- and medium-term action plans for water conservation in industry and in the fight against industrial pollution. In case a legal void is detected in enforcing this directive, the commission will be able to suggest complementary texts.

However the problem does arise of knowing if it was wise to entrust the management of such an important issue to commissions that cease to operate whenever there is the slightest change of staff at the national executive or wilaya level. Would it not be preferable to entrust this issue to the National Hydraulic Resources Agency (ANRH) and the National Environmental Protection Agency (ANPE), which are more stable and in particular are better qualified, on which it would only have been necessary to confer, legislatively, those public power prerogatives which they currently lack?

Finally let us note that this interministerial directive forces the setting up of real explanatory campaigns to bring to the public's attention this major problem linked to water resources, which will very probably be the predominant constraint on 21st century Algeria.

The Anticipated Steps

Interministerial circular 3.93 dated 29 June 1993 on the subject of water conservation in industry and the protection of water resources against industrial pollution sets out general action guidelines from the Ministry of Equipment on the subject of mobilizing surface and underground waters. It deals with:

- Giving new impetus to the construction of 11 dams being built, four of which are practically done;
- Helping to rapidly complete five dams which are in the process of being completed;
- Launching construction work on five to six new dams and on nine major intakes to supply major cities (360 km of pipes). The rate at which these new construction projects are being launched should be maintained in coming years;
- Expanding hillside reservoirs but by bringing in hydraulics experts for site selection so as to avoid mistakes made in the past;
- Launching about 50 studies for new dams;
- Equipping and putting into production the 1,200 drillings already made but that have experienced delays in starting up service;
- Systematizing hydraulic research nationwide;
- On the country's west coast, launching the study and the construction of capacities needed to desalinize sea water, particularly for industrial needs.

All of these projects have as their goal, within 15 years, mobilizing some 8 billion cubic meters of water (as contrasted with 3.5 currently) in the northern part of the country alone. This directive states, however, that despite the major increase in water supplies anticipated from all of these investments, we will witness a growing reduction in the availability of water per inhabitant, owing to demographic growth, and ever increasing needs by agriculture and industry, aggravated by the effects of the drought, waste, and pollution.

Problems With Fishing Sector Impact Economy

93AF0766A Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 6 Jul 93 p 4

[Article by Ahmed Boudrouma: "What Are the Solutions?"]

[Text] Algeria's fishing sector has been plagued by steadily worsening problems since independence. The result is an complex state of affairs that is detrimental to the fishing industry, commercial fishermen, and the nation's economy.

The problems are well-known in the province of Skikda, which has a sizable maritime rim extending over more than 110 km of coastline. It is the only province to boast three fishing ports: Stora, La Marsa, and Collo.

Skikda's fishing industry is hamstrung by countless difficulties, which prevent a rational harvesting of fishing resources totaling some 18,000 metric tons of biomass. The difficulties are readily visible at the fishing ports.

Every day, a good number of fishermen have to contend with a variety of bureaucratic requirements that have discouraged quite a few.

No longer could anyone ignore the many constraints weighing on the sector. Consequently, the governor of Skikda province, Mr. Aoued Benabdellah, arranged to meet with the fishermen in an effort to determine the extent of their problems and offer his assistance toward improving the current state of affairs.

A meeting with representatives of the fishermen, a delegation from the fisheries office, and other industry operators was held at the provincial government office on 29 June 1993.

The national fishing office delegate, Mr. Zouaoui, described conditions within his office, pointing out the instability it has experienced as a result of being shuffled from the Transportation Ministry to the Equipment Ministry and, finally, to the Agriculture Ministry.

This periodic uprooting prevented the office from giving due attention to the fishing sector, leaving the industry abandoned to its own devices. Moreover, traditional practices ingrained in the fishermen and a lack of organization compounded the problem of bureaucracy, heightening the sector's difficulties to the point of creating a disastrous situation: Fishermen have come to look to the government for assistance; in return, the government has been unable to refrain from issuing regulations, decrees and circulars directing the industry.

This was the beginning of the decline of the fishing profession. The fishing office delegate remarked sarcastically that our fishermen have developed an aid-dependent mind-set almost to the point of demanding that the state supply them with bait.

Turning to technical matters, the delegate complained of the lack of studies indicating that the continental shelf is unsuitable for trawling. The only data available to his office were gathered in 1982 and are no longer valid.

In addition, the delegate noted that the structure of the fishing fleet is ill-suited to the available stocks of fish. This is explained by the fact that fishermen continue to cling to their traditions. Aging low-powered trawlers also contribute to the deteriorating state of affairs: 2,400 individuals produce an annual catch of 6,400 metric tons of fish, one-third of which is sold outside the province. Support agencies such as ECOREP [National Enterprise for Fishing Boat Construction and Repair and for Supplying and Manufacturing Fishing Gear] and ENAPECHE [expansion not given] have been prevented by a variety of factors from playing their full role. To name one factor, the sheer scope of the tasks assigned to them placed a strain on both agencies.

During the discussion, a ship operator from Stora spoke of the expectations of fishermen and the obstacles they must contend with. He gave a frank assessment of the situation by contrasting operations at port of Tabarka.

The industry suffers from a shortage of skilled personnel rather than managers, he said. Mechanics trained at the two schools in El-Kala and Collo have no knowledge of how to operate costly equipment such as radar and depth sounding equipment. He deplored the lack of equipment for small repairs and inadequate supplies of water and electricity at the ports.

He noted that the shortage of space at the small port of Stora is another source of frustration to fishermen, particularly since the port of Skikda was closed to fishing activities, leaving the fishermen to fend for themselves and uncertain of which agency to turn to. He cited the need to expand the port of Stora, which has become too cramped. He also noted that fishing sheds have been closed, leaving some fishermen without needed access to sheds, and asked that the issue be reviewed. The ship operator received thanks from the governor of the province who was pleasantly surprised by his remarks. "He has given us a working plan and that is what makes progress possible, that is what places solutions within reach."

With assurances of his complete willingness to help the fishermen, the governor asked officials to study each of the questions raised in the discussion and to arrange a follow-up meeting with the fishermen. He indicated that he is prepared to meet with them at a work-site location at a time of their choosing.

"Reform of the fishing sector is necessary. Like any reform effort, it is going to be painful because it will create difficulties for certain interests. Nonetheless, we will go ahead with it and I give free rein to the people of the profession," the governor said. He asked the fishing office delegate to draw up a plan for immediate action.

Development Goals, Plans for South Detailed

93AF0766E Algiers MAG 7 in French 25 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] Following a working visit to the provinces of Tindouf, Adrar, Tamanrasset, and Illizi during which he spoke with a large number of residents, Prime Minister Belaid Abdesselam met with the governors of the provinces he visited and presided over a meeting of the council of ministers in Djanet on 15 July.

The ministerial council meeting was devoted to the special program aimed at the southern border provinces of Algeria. It is part of the government's general plan and is consistent with the policy guidelines of the Higher State Council.

The meeting was a follow-up to the council of government meeting on 7 July during which the broad outlines of the special program for the south were approved.

After an analysis of what had been learned in the course of the working visit, the council of ministers studied measures to be included in the special program to ensure that the concerns expressed by citizens and representatives of the local populations during the prime minister's visit are effectively addressed.

Projects and Their Implementation

Economic and social development goals were defined for the provinces that were visited.

1. In the near term, problems in the following areas will be addressed:

- the supply and distribution of food products and construction materials, and the stabilization of the market that was disrupted by the withdrawal of certain state-run companies;
- health-care services that are to be improved by making profitable use of infrastructure that is already operational; (Medical specialists will be assigned, medical equipment will be repaired, and medications will be made available at affordable prices.)
- improvement of the plan for travelers' transportation;
- the enhancement of capacities to carry out development projects in sectors of need; and
- the drafting and enactment of tax and other incentives to businesses active in the southern border areas.

2. The goal for the intermediate term is to provide the southern border areas with additional social and educational establishments and economic infrastructure.

2.1. A set of projects has been approved in the areas of urban and rural housing, health, education and training, youth, culture, drinking water supply, electrification, and postal service and telecommunications.

These projects are to be launched during the 1993 fiscal year and are estimated to cost 6 billion dinars [DA]. The funds are earmarked as follows:

Distribution of Program Funding
(in millions of Algerian DA)

Province	PSD*	PCD**	Subtotal
Illizi	1,819	440	2,259
Tamanrasset	980	450	1,430
Adrar	1,125	440	1,565
Tindouf	196	100	296

*[expansion not given]

**[Communal Development Program]

The programs involve all sectors under decentralized management, including rural housing subsidies (2,600 housing units costing DA420 million) and water, sewerage, and electricity hook-ups for subsidized housing units (DA220 million to service 2,000 units).

2.2. In addition to the specific projects defined for 1993, the special program includes supplemental funding of DA7.5 billion for projects that will soon be defined in the following areas:

- housing, with an estimated funding of DA2.75 billion for:
 - 500 low-income housing units and 250 substandard housing units in Tamanrasset (750 units in all)
 - 700 low-income urban housing units and 250 substandard housing units in Illizi (950 units in all)
 - 700 low-income urban housing units and 250 substandard housing units in Adrar (1,050 units in all)

all-terrain vehicles (460 vehicles at a cost of DA500 million);

administrative buildings (DA1 billion);

special infrastructure (DA500 million);

rural electrification (DA1 billion); and

postal service and telecommunications (DA1.2 billion)

2.3. In addition to the above-mentioned activities, the special development program calls for activities in the following areas to be scheduled and carried out in later phases as resources permit:

- national highways
 - repair and modernization of 1,400 km of highway
 - construction of 1,550 km of highway extensions in the south
- airports
 - resurfacing of the runway at the Bordj Badji Mokhtar Airport (Adrar)
 - resurfacing of the runway at the Bordj Omar Idriss Airport (Illizi)
 - construction of an airport at Inzaouatine (Tamanrasset)
 - reconstruction of the runway at Tindouf Airport
 - extension of the In-Amenas runway
 - investments in terminal improvements, runway maintenance, airport security, and navigation aids at all airports in the four provinces
- water resources
 - the transfer of water from In Salah to Tamanrasset (670 km)

- a supplemental program involving SONEGAS [National Electricity and Gas Company] totalling DA1.74 billion.

3. In addition to state-funded investments, the special program for the south calls for the promotion and encouragement of productive economic activities.

3.1. Development of agriculture in the Saharan region: In addition to the expansion of palm groves scheduled to be performed in the near term, the special program calls for activities in the intermediate and long term to develop 12,000 hectares, which have already been studied.

Efforts to reconstitute herds of camels will be undertaken.

Concurrently, as part of a national project, technical studies will be conducted on the large-scale development of agricultural land in the Greater South.

3.2. As a complement to social and infrastructure development activities and in order to ensure integration and cohesion, the special program also seeks to develop local potential, particularly in mining and hydrocarbons.

The aim of this facet of the program is to respond to the needs of the local market and to provide jobs. Local workers, young people in particular, will be given priority in hiring. In concrete terms, this concern will be addressed by providing aid for building an economic base consisting of small and medium-sized enterprises in such fields as agro-industry, the manufacture of construction materials (processing of lime for building purposes, stonecutting, the manufacture of bricks, cement, and earthenware) and processing and packaging industries (milk and milk products, canned fruits and vegetables, flour milling).

3.3. [Text illegible] through the promotion of trade between the southern provinces and neighboring countries.

Promoting Trade With Neighboring Countries

The opportunities made available in these sectors will be supported by state assistance under the policy of regional promotion and by provisions of the investment code and will benefit public and private, national and foreign enterprises.

The council approved measures to monitor the implementation of the special development program. In particular, it decided to institute a special mechanism for periodic progress reports.

The council of ministers was pleased to note the fraternal and neighborly relations that exist between the provinces they visited and bordering countries. In keeping with the Higher Council of State's desire to strengthen regional cooperation, the council adopted measures aimed at favoring increased travel and trade across Algeria's southern border, within an organized framework.

The council wished to express its sincere thanks to the populations of the four provinces for welcoming the governmental delegation and for effectively contributing toward the identification of problems and the search for solutions.

'Urgent' Steps Needed To Save Grain Harvest

93AF0761A Algiers EL WATAN in French 18 Jul 93
pp 1, 3

[Article by Omar Berbiche containing the text of an appeal to producers issued by the Ministry of Agriculture: "The Drought: Speculation on Barley"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The drought raging in the western part of the country, where entire areas have been declared total disasters, has seriously compromised the optimistic forecasts for this year's grain harvest.

This situation, which has been experienced by farmers with concern, has prompted officials in charge of the sector to take another look at the declining figures while at the same time, thanks to a rational and optimal use of funds, trying to maximize losses linked to the delay in harvesting which promotes the phenomenon of letting a crop go to seed.

If urgent steps are not taken to limit the effects of the drought, it would appear that next year's grain harvest runs the risk of suffering negative fallout. The problem of seeds is indeed an acute one owing to the declines in harvesting and volumes of expected harvested crop. But it is especially in the area of barley seed that the worry on the part of agriculture officials is greater.

[This is] owing on the one hand to the significant drop in cereal acreage and, on the other hand, to low prices earned for this product as compared with the encouragement prices determined by the government for hard and soft wheat. The result: the tension observed with respect to this product this year has made producers resort to the practice of withholding their produce for speculative purposes.

The result: the barley seed delivered to CCLS's (Special Cooperatives for Grains and Dry Legumes) has not been arriving in generous quantities. In the eastern part of the country, speculators have not waited for the barley to mature before turning up. The practice of selling a crop while it is still in the field has regained its respectability.

Currently the harvest carried out by the OAIC (Interprofessional Grain Office) is not exceeding the 10 percent threshold of goals set by that agency, its director general, Mr. Bouzid Hamiche, stated. Consumer prices for barley have reached speculative thresholds which will not fail to have consequences for prices for livestock feed and, as part of a cumulative effect, on the market for meat.

The combined effects of the drop in production and the withholding have meant that it was imperative to resort to imports so as to offset the deficit recorded this year. It should be pointed out that, until recently, Algeria had attained self-sufficiency with regard to barley. Today the country has practically gone back to square one. But for agriculture officials, the immediate objective is solving this real technical problem whose solution requires the

active contribution of growers to save next year's harvest, which runs the risk of being seriously compromised.

It so happens, in fact, that the varieties of barley imported at special prices are not adapted to Algeria's climatic conditions and so cannot be used as seed for next year's harvest.

What is to be done? The minister of agriculture has just come up with a stratagem for getting around this snag. In a communique made public yesterday, an appeal was made aimed at producers who have supplies of barley to raise their consciousness to deliver their crop to the CCLS's to offset imported barley, which will be aimed at consumers. The quantities thus collected will be released for seeding for the upcoming growing season. Transport charges will be paid for by the CCLS's.

What happened this year seems to have given food for thought to those in charge of the agriculture sector, who just a few days ago decided to raise the price for barley seed to prod producers into getting reinvolved in this activity, because it was not profitable in comparison with other grains, whose production prices were raised substantially over the past few years. By way of comparison, the price of a quintal of hard wheat went from 500 Algerian dinars [DA] in 1990 to DA1,025 Algerian in 1992, or an increase on the order of 205 percent. By contrast, a quintal of barley went from DA230 Algerian in 1991 to DA470 Algerian in 1992.

Agriculture Ministry: Appeal to Producers

For hard and soft wheat, the seed harvest is proceeding satisfactorily and this will make it possible to satisfy all producers' needs for fall grain planting, including those areas affected by the drought, thanks to transfer operations initiated by stockpiling agencies with links to the profession.

However, poor barley deliveries will not make it possible to ensure sufficient coverage for seed requirements for next season owing to producers' continuing to withhold [their product].

The major increase in barley prices decreed by the Agriculture Ministry and the awareness campaign led by the agricultural profession and the UNPTA [National Union of Peasants and Agricultural Workers] to encourage deliveries of barley by producers have not produced the anticipated result. We remind [producers] that only local varieties of barley are adapted to our growing conditions and that we do not anticipate using imported barley for sowing as we follow the recommendations of the agricultural profession. That is why the minister of agriculture is informing grain producers of these new measures to promote deliveries of local varieties of barley to safeguard the seed campaign:

- Each producer who, under usual transport and delivery conditions, delivers a quantity of barley produced by him will receive in compensation, from

the CCLS closest to his place of residence, an equivalent quantity of imported barley;

- The Agriculture Ministry appeals to grain producers to contribute to safeguarding the next seed campaign by making a larger delivery from their barley production.

Five Officers Promoted to Major General

93AF0754C Algiers *LIBERTE* in French 4 Jul 93 p. 2

[Article: "Appointment of Five Major Generals"; first paragraph is *LIBERTE* introduction]

[Text] *The Higher State Council [HCE] met at the office of the presidency of the Republic yesterday under the chairmanship of Ali Kafi, according to a communique from the presidency of the HCE.*

At the suggestion of Minister of Defense Khaled Nezzar, the president of the HCE, Ali Kafi, signed a number of decrees promoting active officers in the ANP [People's National Army] to higher rank, according to a communique from the Higher State Council.

The communique emphasizes that in that connection, it should be noted that for the first time, officers recruited after independence and trained in Algeria have been promoted to the rank of general.

The new major generals are Mohamed Ghenim, secretary general of the Ministry of Defense; Mohamed Mediene ("Tewfik"), head of the ministry's Intelligence and Security Department; Mohamed Touati and Taghit Abdelmadjid, advisers to the minister of defense; and Salah Ahmed Gaid, commander of the 2d Military Region in Oran.

The following colonels were promoted to general: Snain Lamari, chief of internal security; Fodhil Saidi, chief of external security; and Kamel Abderrahmane, chief of Armed Forces security.

Cherif Fodhil, chief of staff of special units, and Ahmed Boustila, Gendarmerie chief of staff, were also promoted to general, as was M'Djahed Abdelaziz, commander of an armored division.

The two last-named men are under 50 years of age, thus becoming the youngest generals in the Algerian Armed Forces.

Ben Abdallah Salim, chief of the Directorate of External Relations (DRE), who was once President Boumediene's pilot; Ben Slimane, Air Force chief of staff; Senhadji Ahmed, chief of military engineering; Salah Abdelmadjid, chief of the Logistics Department; Tafer Hassan, commander of the Infantry Division; Abderazak Bendjalti, adviser to the HCE; and Saci, military attache in Paris, were also promoted to general. The ANP now has 13 major generals on active duty, including Minister of Defense Khaled Nezzar, and six who are retired. President Ali Kafi also presented a report on the official visit to Egypt, which he described as productive and positive, and on Algeria's participation in the 29th summit meeting of the Organization of African Unity in Cairo.

FIS Members Arrested for Drug Trafficking

93WD0777Z Algiers *EL MOUDJAHID* in French 28 Jul 93 p. 2

[Article by APS: "FIS 'Drug-Tourists' in Netherlands"—first paragraph is *EL MOUDJAHID* introduction]

[Text] The French daily *FRANCE-SOIR* reported on Monday that some 10 activists in the banned FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] were among a group arrested by the Dutch police for drug trafficking and later sent back to France. They were on a visit to the Netherlands from France's Nord Pas-de-Calais region where they reside. Also among the group were "antidrug vigilantes" from the "Biscottes" district of the city of Lille.

With its reputation for permissiveness towards drugs and attractive prices (it is said that a stick of hashish can be had for the price of a pack of cigarettes), the Netherlands draws a growing number of "drug tourists" who travel there to simply to buy drugs. In a crackdown on the "drug tourists," the Rotterdam police recently arrested more than 300 drug users and dealers who are also car thieves from the Nord Pas-de-Calais.

This unsavory group was detained for several hours by the police before being sent back to France by train. According to a list of names, which was provided—for the first time—by the Rotterdam police to their counterparts in Lille, some 10 FIS activists were among them: including the imam of a mosque in suburban Lille; several leaders of the vigilante movement against drug dealers, which recently filled the headlines and was the talk of the "Biscottes" district; and an official from an antidrug association in Roubaix.

According to *FRANCE SOIR*, the Dutch police have launched the crackdown on "drug tourists" in an effort to "curb" the entry of drugs and foreign buyers into the country and to lessen the number of stolen cars that now fill police garages.

"Drug tourists" from the metropolitan area of Lille make the two-hour drive to Rotterdam in stolen cars, which they abandon on arriving at the European port city. After making their purchases, they steal a Dutch vehicle for the return trip to France.

French police and customs officials say that since the start of the year, nearly 2,700 individuals in possession of drugs have been intercepted as they crossed the border on their return from the Netherlands and 726 kg of various narcotics (an estimated 10 percent of the traffic and valued at 79 million francs) have been seized.

MIA Said Unorganized; Major Leaders Profiled

93AF0781C Algiers *ALGERIE ACTUELLE* in French 3 May 93 p. 8

[Article by Ali Brahimi: "An Overrated Dimension"]

[Text] *Fables are being fed to the public in order to better conceal the horrors committed.*

The plan was to call this article "Portraits of Top MIA [Armed Islamic Movement] Leaders." A completely natural reaction when the talk on the street is all about a veritable army that is well-structured and well-supplied logistically! An army that provides news of the battles it wages against the enemy in the form of tracts stuck up here and there on the walls of a few mosques and signed by people calling themselves general or commander—leading one to think that there is a flawless organization.

At the headquarters of the National Gendarmerie, the viewpoint and the convictions are completely different. In the opinion of someone authorized to speak for the Gendarmerie, what is known as the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) actually consists of no one but cranks predisposed to crime and leading tiny groups of from three to 10 members each. For several years, the people in question have been so persuaded—or have so persuaded themselves—of the rightness of what they think and what they believe in that they believe and make others believe that they have the right to take up arms to achieve what they want.

In fact, and contrary to what is being noised about, the movement in question is far from being distinguished by organization at the regional—much less national—level. The only tie existing among the various groups is ideological in nature and can be summed up partly in the ideas spread by the dissolved FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. The tie is also maintained by the tracts written in Algeria or brought in from abroad and by what sometimes appears in the foreign press.

Tiny Groups

That lack of organization leads one National Gendarmerie officer to say that a leader of one of those tiny groups, no matter how well-known he is or how high the rank he has bestowed on himself, would have trouble getting his orders obeyed if he left the sector in which he lives and which, in fact, he would find it difficult to leave.

Incredible stories have sometimes circulated in the general public concerning certain well-known names. In Lakhdaria, for example, there was a rumor at one time that Abdelkader Chebouti and four members of his group had been killed. A few days later the report was denied, and the residents of that locality in the Bouira Governorate started talking about a divine phenomenon thanks to which Chebouti had not been killed during the clash—even though he had been present—because God had intervened on his behalf. The rumor mill was unable to explain why the other four terrorists had not been aided by the same divine force, but it could certainly have found an explanation, and it would not have been the first time. In Afghanistan back during the Soviet military presence, it was said and even written that Afghan mujahedin could cause enemy tanks to disintegrate simply by throwing a handful of sand at them.

Those fables are being fed to the public in order to better prepare it to be insensitive to the horrors committed by the terrorists and especially by the leaders of known

groups. The aura of heroism surrounding someone like Abdelhak Layada would certainly have disappeared if the public had known that once when he and two of his companions were surrounded in the house where his family lives, he managed to escape while wounding a captain in the Gendarmerie who had him in his sights but could not force himself to pull the trigger because "hero" Layada was using his sister-in-law as a shield—his sister-in-law, who was holding her baby in her arms.

Here are portraits of a few terrorists whose names are making the rounds and who are considered to have an often inordinate amount of importance but who have not yet been arrested.

Khatir Benhmida Boudali ('Mossaab')

Born on 6 November 1965, "Mossaab" is behind almost all the assassinations and attacks in Constantine. Every terrorist arrested in that city has talked about him.

A native of Hassi-El-Ghella (Ain Temouchent), the two towns where he received his primary and secondary education, he passed his baccalaureate in mathematics in 1984. He enrolled in the Emir Abdelkader University of Islamic Sciences in Constantine, where he completed his studies in 1987. In that same year, he left Algeria for a long stay in Syria on his own. There he confirmed his membership in the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which he is thought to have joined in 1985.

He returned to Algeria in 1990 and began to distinguish himself immediately by forcibly taking over the post of imam at the El-Ansar Mosque in Constantine, and he was already an influential member of the Islamic Trade Union in that city, hence his very probable relationship with Omar Leulmi, the top leader of that union who was killed recently.

While visiting his family in Hassi-El-Ghella in December 1990, he preached a virulent sermon at the Mohamed Abdou Mosque in which he attacked the state institutions. Arrested on 9 December and brought to court, he was ordered committed to prison. On the 16th of that same month, he was tried. The result was a two-month suspended sentence, so he was released. He returned to Constantine and resumed his sermons at the El-Ansar Mosque.

During May and June 1991, he participated actively in preparing and carrying out the FIS insurrectional strike.

On 6 December 1992, the military court in Constantine issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of undermining state security and murder. And it was for the same reasons that the Constantine Special Court issued a second warrant for his arrest on 13 February 1993.

Abdelkader Chebouti

The "general" is a native of Ouezra in the Medea Governorate. A man with a very average education (two years of secondary school), he once lived in Bougara and officiated as imam in the Blida area. His "adventure" began with Mustapha Bouiali, the head of an Islamic

group that had taken up arms in the early 1980's. Actually, all Chebouti did at first was provide Bouiali and Meliani with a place to stay, but he ended up joining the group and becoming, it is said, the leader's right-hand man. In 1987, Bouiali was killed in the Larbaa area and Chebouti was captured.

Following a trial that began more than once (the court in Blida having disqualified itself), he was convicted and jailed in Oran. Theoretically, that was the end of Chebouti, because everyone expected him to be executed. But lo and behold, Chebouti is still active, the reason being that he was pardoned in July 1989. As far as people in the street are concerned, he is now the "general": the supreme commander of the Armed Islamic Movement. As far as the security services are concerned, he is simply the leader of a group who is cut off from all the others.

Abdelhak Layada

He was born in Algiers, but his parents came from Maadhidh in the M'Sila Governorate. Abdelhak's family is not what one would call poor. Living in a big house with a parabolic antenna, it owns an auto parts business. Having completed his primary education, Abdelhak left school and went to work in the family store. He later became a sheet metal worker and then decided to buy and sell used cars. That was his last occupation before taking up arms and going underground.

It was while he was hiding in the family home with two of his companions that he was surrounded by the Gendarmerie. One of his companions was killed, the other was wounded, and he managed to escape by using his sister-in-law as a shield, a circumstance enabling him to wound a Gendarmerie officer. At present, he is either active or in hiding in the area from Baraki to Eucalyptus.

Following the death of Moh Leveille, he took over as leader of the group. In January 1993, he combined three different groups, took the name of Commander Abou Adlane, and proclaimed himself head of the armed Islamic groups.

Note: Women's participation in terrorism is practically nonexistent. Of the 3,800 terrorists arrested, only three have been women. The first of them lived in Chlef, where she provided terrorists with lodging for pay. The second woman, in Kolea, was part of a group of ex-convicts, and she with her group had turned to terrorism. The third, in Blida, was arrested because she was hiding in her home a weapon belonging to one of her relatives.

Terrorists Set Fires To 'Destroy' Economy

93AF0781B Algiers EL WATAN in French 6 Jul 93 p 1

[Commentary: "Scorched Earth"]

[Text] The terrorists have declared total war on Algeria. Following the assassination of police officers, ordinary citizens, government employees, and intellectuals, they have decided to enter a new phase. That new phase consists quite simply of destroying the country's

economy in order to bring it to its knees, thus transforming it into vulnerable prey for all those who dream of carving it up.

The terrorists recently attacked a tire warehouse and set it on fire. That was not the first such incident.

Moreover, the civil defense services are not ruling out the possibility that the many fires suddenly breaking out in the Tizi-Ouzou Governorate were of criminal origin.

Only low-income families would suffer from a weakening of the national economy. True, that is last of the terrorists' worries. It is truly necessary not to be an Algerian and to have lost one's soul to pursue such a criminal objective. Fierce enemies of Algeria, and they alone, could wish for Algeria's destruction.

Israeli Uzi submachine guns are being taken from terrorists who are killed or arrested. They carry no numbers, the purpose being to prevent the security services from identifying the country through which they passed. This is a well-known method used by the Israeli military industry.

Israel is known for its ambition to have permanent superiority over the Arab world. A democratic Algeria can only frustrate its designs. And every weapon is acceptable for keeping Algeria in obscurantism. And for carrying out that design, there is nothing better than having people advocating obscurantism. Algerian extremists are in that group. Hence their scorched earth policy.

Nation's Security Situation Said Under Control

93AF0754E Algiers LIBERTE in French 1 Jul 93 p 3

[Commentary by Zoubir Ferroukhi: "Situation Genuinely Under Control"; first paragraph is LIBERTE introduction]

[Text] The security situation is improving day by day, according to the minister of interior. The constant alertness of the security services is the main reason.

The Algerian security services, police, and gendarmes, backed by the Defense Forces, have certainly had to acquire such a level of competence and experience in the fight against violence and terrorism—being forced as they are every day to stay on constant alert—that we can not only pay them the honor due them but also thank God that the security situation has not plunged us into the depths of blood and terror—something that is usually the result when the weapon of violence begins to be used as the only means of persuasion. One thing is certain in any case: the formulation and implementation of a rigorous security plan and the steady tightening of the net repressing violence have managed to keep within necessary limits the deterioration of the situation in Algeria and the fear that citizens feel for their lives.

Prepared to confront the worst of situations, especially in a changing environment where the unpredictable and the horrifying—and often the two combined—are waiting at the corner, the men in those services are

finding it increasingly difficult to remain comfortable in their jobs when they themselves are the main targets. It is obvious, then, that the Algerian security services have a tremendously difficult task in that they must guarantee the safety of the citizens while at the same time—and contrary to what one might expect in such circumstances—ensuring their own even though they are not necessarily directly involved in security operations. The job of keeping order—never exactly a sinecure—is an arduous and unpleasant task.

Besides generating a kind of breeze of consolation and optimism in that it comes from the top official in charge of that struggle, yesterday's statement by Minister of Interior Mohamed Hardi that the security situation is "genuinely under control" seems to reflect precisely the expected degree of realism. Hardi ruled out the idea that violence had been eliminated and was very careful to say that it was certainly going to continue "until," he said, "all the citizens concerned join the fight."

To sum up, it can be said that while the situation is relatively satisfactory compared to what it might have been, there is no question of pretending that the phenomenon of violence has been contained and even less that its end is in sight either in space or in time. The citizens can see that every day and every hour. Incidentally, some sociologists warned long ago that violence might be an uncontrollable epiphenomenon proper to a given society and the problems engendered by that society. It is a kind of vicious circle, in which the members of the said society are called upon to help control the phenomenon, but to do so by first solving the problems upstream. And the minister of interior merely makes his activity a part of that logic by emphasizing that in order to end the violence, the citizens must get more involved. Cooperation with the security services has been noted here and there. Unfortunately, it seems that awareness of the danger involved in turning to violence to settle things has not taken root in the minds of everyone in Algeria. At times one would think one were in a place on the planet where violence is just a part of everyday life, with this simple and cynical question being the logical result of all reasoning: whose turn is it now? Like a horror film where one image after another passes in front of a spectator who is naive and passive but no less thirsty for blood.

So what is to be done? The marchers in Algiers on 22 March showed the full magnitude of that question when compact groups of them stopped for long periods in front of the central police station on Amirouche Boulevard to chant "The police 'are ours'" and other equally significant slogans at the top of their voices.

In the final analysis, one can only rely on the selflessness and spirit of sacrifice of the security services. More than in any other country, this has been realized by Algerian citizens—they being among the rare citizens in the world who applaud upon seeing tanks and armored vehicles parked at the corner in their neighborhoods. An unprecedented circumstance? Not at all! Algerian citizens thirst for peace, that is all. In short, "the security situation is

improving day by day," as the minister of interior said. But, that being said, how far are we from the end of the tunnel, Mr. Minister?

Incidents of Sabotage Reportedly Increasing

93AF0754B Algiers EL WATAN in French 5 Jul 93 p 4

[Article by F. Metaoui: "Acts of Sabotage: New Outbreak"; first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text:] (APS)—Acts of sabotage against government agencies seem to have increased in intensity in recent days. Last Friday [2 Jul] in Eucalyptus, a neighborhood that is a particularly hot spot, a fire of criminal origin occurred at the parking lot belonging to the water distribution firm.

Fifteen trucks and 10 vehicles were damaged. Damage is estimated at over 800 million centimes. The two watchmen, Berrahal and Mostfaoui, were taken hostage by the attackers (who numbered 30, according to some sources) and then released in a forest.

In the municipality of Bir Ben Abed in Medea, the headquarters of the APC [People's Communal Assembly] were ransacked and set on fire. Besides the damage done inside the building, three trucks and one bus were also damaged. In the Dellys area, according to the National Gendarmerie command, five armed individuals set fire to a warehouse belonging to the National Textile Products Supply Company.

Three weeks ago in Collo, the parking lots belonging to three municipalities in the hills were set on fire.

In that instance, considerable damage was done in Cheraia, Zitouna, and Beni-Zid. Four people in Saida were arrested early in June when they were caught in the act of sabotaging equipment belonging to the postal and telecommunications service. The damage done to the amplifiers caused interruptions in communications between several governorates.

Besides the acts of sabotage, holdups are now occurring as well. Since the start of summer, a new outbreak of armed holdups of state-owned firms and citizens seems to be taking place in several regions of the country, especially in Kabylie and the eastern part of the country. For example, six citizens residing in the municipalities of Sendjes (Chlef) and Texanna (Jijel) were assaulted on Saturday and robbed of their shotguns.

In Boumehala (Tizi-Ouzou), six other citizens were attacked by armed individuals who forced them to hand over their guns. Similar incidents have occurred recently in Ain-Azel, Meram (Setif), and Chlef. In Hamadania (on the road between Blida and Medea), the shopping center was the object of an attack during which sizable quantities of goods were stolen.

At the end of last month, the post office in Draa El-Mizan and the branch office of CASSAP (the agricultural supply cooperative) in Draa Ben-Khedda were held up. Official sources say that interestingly, thefts have been taking place in a number of places forming a belt around the Sidi Ali Bounab Forest. According to those

same sources, that region has become a hideout for terrorist groups in the Alger Governorate.

Fire Damage to Electric Lines Assessed

93AF0761C Algiers EL WATAN in French 15 Jul 93
p 5

[Article by Mouloud Makhoul: "Fires at El-Kala: 60 Million Algerian Dinars in Losses"]

[Text] Damages caused by fires on 4 and 5 Jul 1993 on electric lines on the interdrilling network of the Bouteldja pick-up area are huge, according to a preliminary assessment by the National Electricity and Gas Company [SONELGAZ].

It appears that 135 km of electric lines were damaged and put out of service (section 54.6 and 34.4 M.M2) and where the Bourdim line serving the four El Kala pick ups are concerned, 36 km of electric lines were damaged and put out of service (section 54.6 and 34.4 MM2).

These pick-ups taken together supply most of the city of Annaba (30 pick-ups), El Kala (four pick-ups), and the Mouassia irrigation area (two pick-ups), making for 36 pick-ups (450 P/s, for the city of Annaba; 120 P/s for El Kala; and 90 P/s for the Mouassia irrigation area), or a total of 660 P/s. [sentence as published]

With its intervention team, the EPEA [expansion not given] was able to put 10 pick-ups back in service, while the El Tarf wilaya hired a specialist company to repair the 36 km of electric lines serving the four El Kala pick-ups (under normal conditions, the repair work will be done on Tuesday, 13 Jul 1993, and it is anticipated that the city of El Kala will be supplied with drinking water on Wednesday, 14 Jul 1993).

The efforts made by SONELGAZ, the two hydraulic directorates (El Tarf and Annaba), the two industrial directorates (El Tarf and Annaba), and the EPEA during these difficult times were emphasized. Furthermore during the period 5-13 Jul 1993, the EPEA in El Kala started up the two pumping stations at the Dehmet Er-Rihani well and the source of Lake Oubeira; it also dispatched water trucks and the truck belonging to the El Kala National Park, which had been mobilized especially for the El Kala AEP [?Potable Water Supply].

The estimate of damages was put by the agencies involved at 60 million Algerian dinars.

EGYPT

U.S., UN 'Plot' Against Somali Muslims Claimed

93LD0026A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 23 Jun 93 p 2

[Unattributed article: "True Nature of What Goes on in Somalia: UN Forces and U.S. Plot Against Islamic Shari'ah; Christianization and Dissemination of Dissolution Are Main Missions of United Nations"]

[Text] There is a fact, embodied in killing dozens of Somali Muslims, behind the ferocious assault launched by the United States against Muslim Somalia and behind

the UN Security Council's support for the U.S. position. So what is the true situation there?

Islamic movement sources in Somalia say that a state of stability prevailed in Somalia when an accord was developed among a number of Somali parties and when reconciliation was accomplished in Kismaayo. Afterward, peace developed among the four factions led by General Aidid and the National Salvation Front, led by Muhammed Bishr.

Several meetings were also arranged between Islamic Union representatives and General Abdallah Yusuf, head of the military wing of the Democratic Somalia Salvation Front. This was the straw that broke the UN and U.S. forces' back. In the eyes of the United States and the United Nations, led by Butrus Ghali, the meetings were concerned with more than just an alliance. Islamic Aid Agency sources in Somalia have noted this fact, stressing that there is in Somalia a suspicious scheme to stop Somalis from developing a constitutional accord derived from the Islamic Shari'ah. As evidence of this scheme, the sources have cited the fact that Dr. Katanga, who heads the UN-sponsored committee to draft a constitution and who is from Zimbabwe, held meetings which included a large number of ulema, wise men, and muftis to draft the articles of a new constitution for Somalia. When Katanga noticed that these men were determined to apply provisions of the Islamic Shari'ah, he began to put stumbling blocks in their way and brought in five women, as well as new members, in an endeavor to dissuade them from introducing Islamic Shari'ah provisions into the country's constitution. But his efforts failed. So he resorted to obstructing the committee's work with the pretext that the drafted constitution does not take human rights principles into consideration.

Meanwhile, the United Nations has appointed 18 European governors and 18 secular magistrates for Somalia. This has aroused the fear of Muslims. Mosque imams in all parts of Somalia have begun to warn in their sermons of the Western scheme being hatched against Somalia. Moreover, UN forces have been openly distributing for the past two months Bibles and leaflets lauding the virtues of Christianity to Somali Muslims. On top of this, the Italians have started their own broadcasting station in which they promote practices incompatible with the Somali people's principles. There is also a U.S. broadcasting station, at a time when the U.S. forces have destroyed Aidid's station, which warned Somalis against the United States and the United Nations. It seems from all of the aforementioned that Somalia is being subjected to a ferocious assault by the United Nations and the United States. When some people rose to oppose this assault, UN forces confronted them by sending their Muslim members to lead the ranks in the war against Somalia so they would not arouse the suspicion that Christians were killing Muslims, because in this case, both killer and victim are Muslims.

Minister on 'Infiltration' of School System

93LD0017A London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
12 Jun 93 pp 45-46

[Interview with Baha'-al-Din, prominent pediatrician, by Ayman al-Sayyad; place and date not given]

[Text] Dr. Husayn Kamil Baha'-al-Din, the well-known pediatrician, who took over as education minister in Dr. 'Atif Sidqi's government about two years ago, has suddenly come under the political limelight since he gave statements—which were extensively discussed—declaring that, while the extremist groups in Egypt had a plan to infiltrate the Education Ministry, the ministry had a plan to confront them. These statements were accompanied in the press and Parliament by accusations directed toward the education ministry that it allowed foreign experts to interfere in the school curricula and cut down religious instruction and deleted references to the Islamic battles with the Jews. AL-MAJALLAH met and had the following dialogue with the Egyptian minister, who has become a party to a large politico-media battle.

[Al-Sayyad] Do you honestly believe, as you declared, that the extremist groups have a real plan to infiltrate the education system? Is that a little exaggerated?

[Baha'-al-Din] The plan is very clear and its tools are known; it was initiated a few years ago, not today. Eventually, through this plan, the extremists are wearing the Islamic attire as a camouflage to control the state. They are exploiting religion as a means to reach worldly pursuits and seize power. The plan started by directing some deceived youth to join the college of education so that, when they graduate as teachers they would become tools for spreading these groups' ideas among the young and recruiting whomever they could from among these young students. Those observing events in Egypt would have noticed that a number of teachers were involved in the latest incidents; among those involved were students in the college of education, one of whom has been accused of killing Lieutenant Colonel Mahran, who was assassinated in Asyut.

Those behind this plan are using three tools. These are:

The first tool: Infiltration of extremist curricula that the Ministry of Education does not approve and which are not included in the education system that the experts have designed. Article 18 of the Egyptian Constitution decrees that the state should supervise all education and delenate all instruction curricula, ideas, and principles.

The second tool: Trying to impose a certain conduct and mode of dress in schools, such as enforcing the veil on six- and seven-year-old children; this is not allowed according to the Constitution, which stipulates personal freedom. Besides, from the educational aspect, the student (male or female) should be convinced and not forced to follow virtuous conduct. Besides, enforcing a certain conduct is against the teaching of Islam, which is based on persuasion. Also, we should not forget that Egypt has signed the international human rights and

children's rights agreement; this enforced conduct is in disagreement with the international agreement. By doing that, the extremist aim at gaining the neutrality of the silent majority and terrorizing officials.

The third tool: Controlling school activities by banning some of them, such as art related, recreational, and physical education activities.

The occurrence of this phenomenon is limited. However, its dangers are to be assessed according to its aims and goals and not according to its numerical density. In fact, it represents a phenomenon that these groups pursue to show off their strength.

Complete Data

[Al-Sayyad] How many schools do you believe are involved in this issue?

[Baha'-al-Din] I do not have complete data because this infiltration usually happens unannounced; sometimes it happens in far off places. We take preventative action with regard to the issues we learn about. The state is presently observing some schools where these activities are going on. As the president admitted, the state should confront this issue in a decisive manner; people should play a principle role as well.

[Al-Sayyad] It seems that many parents would like their children to join those schools. How do you explain that? How will you deal with this matter?

[Baha'-al-Din] We would like to know about the source of financing for many schools that are spending lavishly. Those schools are provided with modern education techniques and advanced potentialities which attract parents and lead them to believe that these schools offer the right environment for their children's education. Meanwhile, it is doubtful what some of these schools offer; the final impact could be disastrous for parents and children alike, as well as for the nation. Certainly, in order to be fair, we would not like to generalize. We cannot accuse all these schools. We are very precise in our judgement; we only confront those schools that deviate from the proper education system.

[Al-Sayyad] According to your estimate, when was the plan you are referring to initiated?

[Baha'-al-Din] Years ago.

[Al-Sayyad] Where were you during all these years?

[Baha'-al-Din] There was confrontation; there were attempts at countering. Presently, since terrorism, extremism, and delinquency have been stepped up and the whole plan uncovered, we have taken new confrontation measures, which we had not taken before.

[Al-Sayyad] What procedures and decisions have you developed for confrontation?

[Baha'-al-Din] First, we approved disclosing this issue to the public. It is the concern of parents; naturally, parents are keen about their children's good and about confronting, watching for, and reporting this phenomenon.

Secondly, we have disclosed this plan to all legislative, surveillance, and executive branches of the state, so that they may join us in the confrontation. I have certainly raised the issue that I advocate so that the people can become aware of that danger.

[Al-Sayyad] You have stated that outside forces are behind that plan. Don't you think this statement is exaggerated? Assuming these forces exist, what are they?

[Baha'al-Din] According to security information, it is certain that outside forces are supporting terrorism in Egypt. I can tell you about luxuriously printed and lavishly financed books which have suddenly appeared in the market to portray a claimed conspiracy against education. These books also indicate that foreign forces control education curricula in Egypt, that religious education curricula have been cut down, that history has been distorted, and other lies.

[Al-Sayyad] You stated that you would review the colleges of education admission regulations so that extremists would not infiltrate them. Some have considered that to be a kind of intellectual terrorism; they also consider it to be against the Constitution, which stipulates that under the law all citizens are equal, regardless of their intellectual inclinations.

[Baha'al-Din] With regard to the law, all citizens are equal and have the same rights. However, in order for one to join the military academy, he/she should be physically fit, which does not contradict the Constitution. In fact, as teaching is an honorable job, those choosing teaching for a career should believe in it and be ready for its challenges. Teaching has nothing to do with destruction and does not mean chaos. The major goal of the Constitution is the provision of justice, fairness, and discipline.

[Al-Sayyad] The most famous accusation you faced was your strict stand on students' wearing the veil.

[Baha'al-Din] We are against forcing students to wear the veil, especially at such a young age. From the education viewpoint, it appears to be a kind of early provocation and the introduction of certain concepts at the wrong time and at an inappropriate development stage.

Besides, religious preaching should be done in a proper way. We also oppose enforcing lifting the veil.

[Al-Sayyad] Why did you cut down religious curricula? Why did you delete references to the prophet Mohammad's victories over the Jews from social studies books? As some indicated, how much were foreign experts involved in this matter?

[Baha'al-Din] Certainly, this did not happen. The ministry books of 1981 and 1985 did not mention any invasions they claim we deleted; it is certain that we cannot delete passages that were not previously in the books. However, in order to remove any suspicion, I have ordered that all new curricula contain the Prophet's invasions.

Our books contain 295 pages of Islamic history.

The role of the American experts who were affiliated with the Center for Curricula Development was just to introduce modern techniques and scientific methods in the preparation of these curricula and books. I assure you that we never allowed—or even thought of originally—any expert from outside Egypt to contribute to the development of the Arabic language and religious instruction curricula and books.

Religious Vacuum

[Al-Sayyad] In the Shaykh of Azhar's interview with AL-MAJALLAH, he indicated that present education curricula starting from the kindergarden stage to that of the university are responsible for the religious vacuum found in the society.

[Baha'al-Din] We consult with the Shaykh of Azhar regarding our religious curricula. The shaykh responsible for religious ruling and a distinguished group of religious experts, such as Shaykh al-Ghazali, Shaykh Nimr, Ahmed 'Umar Hashim and 'Abd-al-Sabur Marzuq review them. I believe that the scientific importance of these experts, as well as their place in society, is undisputable. However, we are ready to review any part of the religious curricula that al-Azhar finds needs reviewing.

[Al-Sayyad] However, you stated in a press conference about a year ago that: "Behind each religious extremist is a failed education." Presently, we face religious extremism.

[Baha'al-Din] I stand by this statement, because either a failed education or one of low standard, which reinforces memorizing and learning by heart, thus it is a prelude for programming children's minds; it also helps in the brainwashing operation which is the major tool used by extremists for the recruitment of youths, obscuring their thoughts and later inciting them to perform terrorist operations.

Government Blamed for Opposition's Disputes

93AF0641A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
12 Jun 93 p 10

[Article by Muhammad Yusuf al-Misri: "Politicians Accuse Government of Splitting Opposition Parties, Broadcasting Disputes"]

[Text] Our political parties' condition is strange, not only because of popular isolation, with the exception of certain parties that are read about in our newspapers, and not just because of events that prove that our parties are incapable of leading the people in the direction people want to go. In that regard, we do not know of any other meaning for democracy.

However, and this is the most important point, it is because of the numerous internal disputes in our parties. It is impossible for any breakaway movement to become another party, so long as it has to go through all the actions stipulated by the Law of Political Parties, which takes two years to accomplish.

Our truly strange situation is unique among the countries of the democratic, partisan world. This stems from the fact that some of our political parties have more than one leader; this is the Labor Party's problem, for example. It has three chiefs, each of whom claim to be the legitimate head of the party. This is also the case in the Young Egypt Party. This strange picture is completed when we find that some of our political parties have no leader, because of internal disputes among their institutions, as has occurred in the Democratic People's Party.

How can we deal with this problem? What agency makes the decisions regarding these disputes, so that each party can have one legitimate, recognized leader, without being contested in his leadership or his legitimacy? What does the law say? What do we think regarding this situation? What do politicians propose to get us out of this situation, which ranges between comical and absurd?

1. We shall begin by listening to Dr. Muhammad Hilmi Murad, deputy chief of the Labor Party, which is one of the parties suffering from the problem of internal disputes not being resolved. What does Hilmi Murad say?

"In our policies, we usually begin with a simple mistake, from which complications arise with the passage of time. The complications become prodigious.

"In our case, the mistake is manifested by the absence of freedom to form political parties. It is impermissible to establish parties without going through numerous steps stipulated by the law. These steps are incompatible not only with the freedom to form parties, but also with the underlying maxim of the party system itself. Let's not talk about parties without freedom and, for the same reason, let's not mention that this problem does not exist in the truly democratic countries.

"Another thing is that the government tries, as much as it can, to stop the formation of new parties. It tries to create divisions and then supports the faction with which it reaches the best understanding. In this way, the government makes sure that the parties are never free of its message.

"If we move from this general context to deal with reality, we find that the court is the specialist in handling these disputes. However, in our opinion, and according to what we see and follow closely, the judicial authority is not aloof from the enticements of the government. We don't need to say that certain judges occupy the post of governor, while others are appointed to work in tempting administration agencies. In any case, the court rules on these disputes in accordance with the laws and regulations of political parties. That takes up a great deal of time, which prompts the faction that has reached the best understanding with administration agencies to depend on their support and assistance. That faction goes to court, but the ruling does not come quickly."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] What is the solution, doctor?

"Draw up a new, integrated constitution, in which the people's interests are protected, not the interests of any ruling regime."

2. Those were the words of the deputy chief of the Labor Party. We turn now to a senior jurist, Professor Dr. Muhammad 'Asfur, member of the Supreme Wafdist Authority, for his views on the same issue.

"It has become clear that the ruling party is unhappy with the mere existence of weak opposition parties. It tries to do more than that. It tries to fragment these parties so that they remain essentially weak.

"You want examples of this allegation. Even if one explains the defection of persons such as Dr. Hilmi al-Hadidi from the Labor Party, in exchange for a senior post that did not last in the ruling party, and Dr. Yahya al-Jamal from the National Progressive Union Grouping Party [NPUG] in exchange for the promise of a post that he did not attain in the ruling party, the only explanation is the importance that persons such as these place in their parties, and the desire to weaken these parties.

"More than that, the late President Anwar al-Sadat lent groups of majority party deputies to the Labor Party for its establishment process. Then, he withdrew these deputies when the party's opposition began to upset and anger the president."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] I would like to ask you, doctor, who decides these disputes?

"I don't think that's the correct question. The question is: What is needed to end this 'party foolishness'? The answer is the abolishment of the Law of Political Parties, because there is nothing in the democratic world by this name. This law makes the ruling party dominant in growth and continuation, while fragmenting and breaking up the other parties.

"The solution is freedom to form parties without any restriction. The only thing prohibited, in accordance with general principles in the law, would be the party's reverting to or inciting violence. Such incitement would be subject to nothing less than criminal prosecution."

3. Let us now listen to the chairman of the Nasserist Arab Democratic Party's political committee. He talks about this issue as follows:

"Let us distinguish between internal problems within the parties, and the cost to democracy to resolve them, and the problems that come to parties from outside those parties. The latter is not the topic of discussion.

"In general, the issue is the issue of practice. We don't have this, because democracy is a civilized condition and a cultural, social, humanitarian dimension. We need to practice all that. Democracy is not merely a decision. This is what we lack in various aspects of our life, not just in parties."

4. From these gentlemen, we turn to the leader of a party under formation, Professor Muhsin Lutfi al-Sayyid, a lawyer, and head of the Constitutional Liberal Party,

which is trying to obtain a judicial ruling for its establishment. It would become the 15th party in our country. Muhsin Lutfi al-Sayyid considers the issue and says:

"The misfortune of this issue is that the internal conflict in Egyptian political parties is a clash over leadership and not merely a dispute about views, which would be completely natural. Each faction vies for leadership; this is the misfortune, as I said. Look at the history of the Wafd Party. It has been split repeatedly, with several parties emerging from it. That is not a problem.

"My view is that the increase of conflict in parties is the result of our having been denied the exercise of democracy for a long time. The only solution is more democracy and more practice."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] However, the reality is that some parties have three chiefs, all claiming legitimacy. What is the solution?

"Resorting to the judiciary, because the state cannot recognize more than one chief, unless the court rules on the legitimacy of another chief."

We met with the leader of the Liberal Party, Mustafa Kamil Murad, who told AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI:

"Members of the party are the ones to decide this problem through the party's general meeting. Each party's bylaws should govern these matters, and should be applied with respect, not attacked. The law should require it.

"At the present time, there is no doubt that there are divisions among the parties' leaders who want leadership. In all cases, there are disputes that must be ruled upon by a court, in accordance with the law, and not by the parties' committee. The judge's rulings interfere in such disputes."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] Each side says that it has judicial rulings in its favor.

"But, in different branches."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] The solution?

"Return to the party's general meeting."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] Each faction says that the party's general meeting was convened and selected him as leader.

"In this case, the judgement should be in accordance with whatever the bylaws stipulate with regard to convening and selection. The bylaws, as I said, regulate all these matters."

5. Before we close the pages on this investigation, we shall listen to another prominent politician, Dr. Rafat al-Sa'id, the secretary general of the NPUG Party, who tells AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI the following:

"The difficulty that prevails in certain parties stems from restrictions on the formation of parties, since an agency called the Committee on Parties is the one who grants a license to form a party.

"So long as this license exists, the controversy will continue over who gets the license. Therefore, we discover that there is a party or, more precisely, a party's logo, being contested by three or four chiefs, because the issue is, which of them can obtain another license?

"Accordingly, those parties that do not have party mechanisms, nor the political wisdom to administer disputes in a civilized and sound manner, will soon find the disputants themselves presenting one of two options: Either break away and contest the license, or withdraw from political life."

[AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI] What is the solution, Dr. Rafat?

"The way out of this difficulty, in my opinion, is abolish the Committee on Parties and grant freedom to form parties, with the following specific conditions:

- Parties with military formations may not be formed.
- Parties may not be formed on a religious basis; all parties should be open to all Egyptians.
- Commitment to the Constitution and the positive law of the civil state.

"In this case, dissenters in any party would have the ability to establish another party. Then, the masses alone would be the judge of whether to support or oppose them."

At this point, the investigation is concluded.

Information Official on Antiterrorism Policies

93LD0017B Doha AL-SHARQ in Arabic 5 Jun 93 p 5

[Interview with Dr. Mamdun al-Biltaji, President of the Public Information Agency, by Yusuf al-Sharif; place and date not given]

[Text] In view of differences of opinions, stands, and reactions to the latest trip of President Husni Mubarak to the Gulf Cooperation Council states, the interview with Dr. Mamdun al-Biltaji is important and timely. Dr. al-Biltaji is a top source for discovering Egypt's stand vis-a-vis all the issues that were included in the Egyptian-Gulf summit negotiations. Al-Biltaji had been closely watching the negotiations and was well informed about its results, as he is the president of the Public Information Agency, which is responsible for clarifying all facts to Arab and international media.

[Al-Sharif] Undoubtedly, many important political factors and persistent national motives prompted President Mubarak to make his Gulf tour. We would like you to clarify the issues that were discussed and Egypt's stand on them.

[Al-Biltaji] Actually, the time element was a very important one in President Mubarak's trip and his brotherly discussions with his brothers—the leaders of the Gulf Cooperation Council states. This is because the trip followed a number of regional, Arab, and international changes that occurred quickly and necessitated consultations and the preparation of measures to both confront

them and adapt to them in such a manner that, while these measures would realize common national interests, they would avoid the foreseen and expected negative impact of these changes. Since the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, Arab relations have been suffering from a huge fracture. This unprecedented situation of lack of confidence among the Arab countries has led to a situation of imbalance and a short-sighted view with regard to answering a number of national questions. Who are we? What do we demand? Who is a friend? Who is a foe? Who is an ally? The previous issues are among others, on which it is crucial that we agree, in order to feel comfortable about the path of our present, future, and our fate. This must happen as a prelude to deciding the framework for healing the Arab fracture and deciding about the Arab path, contents, and mechanism.

[Al-Sharif] Was the peace dilemma on President Mubarak's priority list in the Gulf negotiations?

[Al-Biltaji] Yes. President Mubarak's Gulf trip followed the reactivation of the Middle East peace process and the convening of its ninth round of talks in Washington. Undoubtedly, developments in both the formalities and the substance of the negotiations were different from previous rounds, which had been characterized as being rigid and barren. Of these positive developments was the discussion of a number of issues, including autonomy and its powers, including the legislative power. The developments also featured some flexibility in the discussions about the future of Jerusalem and procedures to be followed. Among other positive developments in the ninth round is acceptance of Mr. Faysal al-Husayni, who is from Jerusalem, as a member of the Palestinian negotiating delegation and the lifting of the ban on Israelis' speaking with Palestinians; other principal issues for which much time and patience were needed to resolve and reach an agreement, were also discussed. All this implies the need for President Mubarak and the Gulf states' leaders to hold extensive discussions with regard to these issues in order to support the Arab negotiators, maintain national principles, and drive forward the peaceful efforts to regain the legitimate Palestinian and Arab rights, without which security, stability, and peace cannot be achieved in the region.

[Al-Sharif] How does Egypt perceive all the changes that have occurred in the policies and balances of world strategy and their impact on the issues that concern us and our regional security?

[Al-Biltaji] You must realize that life in the world has a quick pace. There are shuffling and tuning operations; operations are ongoing to formulate and create the features of a new system, the dimensions, stages, and extremities of which are not yet clear. Egypt perceives that, as an Arab nation, we must ask ourselves about our demands from this world and how to contribute positively—not from an observer's standpoint—to the future of the world and its balances. According to this attitude, it is certain that a number of prime issues, some of which

are related to the peace process and some to international relations, as well as the Arab security issue, have been included in the negotiations.

[Al-Sharif] Information has surfaced about an Egyptian vision of Arab security. What are its features?

[Al-Biltaji] With regard to the Arab security issue, we currently find it crucial and necessary to have a national direction to visualize a new method for this Arab national security. From the Egyptian viewpoint, this security should be comprehensive; meaning that it should include political consultation, economic cooperation, security harmonization, and the maximization of joint defense capabilities. Egypt fully understands the special considerations of the Gulf region and all the complexities of the surrounding regional situations; therefore Egypt endorses the above-mentioned recommendations within the framework of these situations.

[Al-Sharif] What place did the clearing of the Arab climate take on President Mubarak's Gulf tour negotiation agenda?

[Al-Biltaji] This was the second issue in the framework of the Arab security plan. It is certain that the reorganization of the Arab home, attempts to clear the Arab climate, and attempts to bypass the results and mischief of the Gulf crisis were among the issues discussed. However, the Egyptian political leadership is completely aware and conscious of the existing obstacles. Time is also needed to furnish the objective and subjective circumstances for rebuilding the confidence needed to overcome this crisis. In spite of that, the Egyptian leadership still gives its assurances that organizing the Arab home, clearing its climate, and its reconciliation represent strategic goals that should be targeted within the regional and international situation. To sum it all up, what is required is that we end this disintegration that still exists although we are in an era of economic and political blocs.

[Al-Sharif] Does that mean that the Damascus Declaration was not given priority in the discussions?

[Al-Biltaji] The Damascus Declaration and the security issue were not given top priority in the discussions; they were included in the framework of the main issues, which we discussed concerning Arab relationships, Arab security—in its broadest sense—and the peace process issue, which was extensively discussed in an attempt to create a solid Arab front supporting the Arab negotiators and consolidating their negotiating power. One of the goals of this part of the discussions was also to consolidate the good bilateral relations that bind Egypt with the Gulf states, since the present stage requires working sincerely to develop and deepen this relationship to gain common advantages and reciprocal benefits.

[Al-Sharif] Various broadcast networks and all the news agencies have reported that Egypt had handed over to the Gulf states documents that prove and condemn the fact that either individuals or groups have been financing

terrorist movements and organizations in Egypt and in other Arab states. How true is this information?

[Al-Biltaji] I am not in a position to clarify details, yet, I can state that the terrorism issue is currently among the regional security issues. Terrorism is not the concern of one nation only nor do its dangers involve one or a few countries only; it affects all the Arab and Islamic worlds. Old and current experiences confirm the truth of my statement: that terrorism is a general phenomenon, even an international one. That issue, undoubtedly, was a point that was scrutinized, reviewed, and evaluated in the discussions between President Mubarak and the Gulf states' leaders; it was discussed within the framework of an attempt to provide the best circumstances for consolidating and protecting Arab security and stabilizing the region in which we are living.

[Al-Sharif] Is Egypt's understanding of the danger of terrorism the same as that of the Gulf states?

[Al-Biltaji] First, we have to ask about the goal of this terrorism, which is backed by certain states, organizations, and doctrines? The Egyptian political belief is clear with regard to terrorism; Egypt believes that terrorism and the extremist groups—disguised in a religious robe while religion disowns them—have as their only goal the seizure of political power; they are using force and violence to achieve this goal, which is absolutely political and has nothing to do with religion.

Second: There is a trend for the terrorist groups to become increasingly coordinated regionally and internationally. If there is regional coordination and if there is foreign—either non-Arab or Arab—support and consolidation of terrorism, then the Arab regimes, which would not accept instructions from anyone or any interference in their internal affairs, must join efforts to confront such a phenomenon and other dangerous phenomena.

[Al-Sharif] Why was the style, method, and general trend of terrorism in Egypt different from that of other Arab states suffering from this same phenomenon?

[Al-Biltaji] Because of its history and the unity of its national leadership, Egypt has always been and will continue to be safe. Because the Egyptian state has had deep and solid roots with regard to being firm in preserving its traditional respect for the law, Egypt has been and will remain safe. The general public in Egypt is currently aware of the dangers of the terrorist groups. Once they uncovered themselves, public opinion rejected them, because it realized that the terrorists' goals were to hit Egypt's stability, hit and destroy its economy, and hit the livelihood of Egyptians. Another terrorist goal is to shrink the potentials that existed in Egypt, and still do, in order to hinder Egypt's playing her regional and international role.

[Al-Sharif] Our discussion about terrorism in Egypt leads us to inquire about the political leadership's stand towards terrorism and its plan to uproot it?

[Al-Biltaji] It is certain that there is Egyptian involvement and that various intermingled circumstances are

behind the terrorism phenomenon. It is also certain that there is awareness of terrorism in Egypt and also a well-developed plan for its comprehensive confrontation. This is clear from the fact that all the constitutional political powers are in agreement on checking terrorism and discovering its dimensions and the climates that produce this dangerous phenomenon. Confronting terrorism is done by means of the concentration of efforts and the spread of comprehensive spiritual, political, and media awareness. It is also done by means of the extension of services and development, especially to poorly managed regions in the economically less developed governorates. Lastly, while respecting law and democracy, confronting terrorism is achieved by means of adopting stricter security policies and stricter adherence to the law. Therefore, we can ascertain that the Egyptian society is actively and positively moving along the right path, whether it be at the state, institutional, constitutional parties, and public power levels, or at the level of individuals' spontaneous initiatives.

[Al-Sharif] According to the proverb that goes, "one hand cannot clap alone," it is clear that throughout the previous period, the National Democratic Party has been monopolizing political and popular activities in Egypt. This was especially true while the National Democratic Party was confronting the economic problem, the earthquake, and other problems alone, the opposition parties were consistently complaining that they were isolated from joining this confrontation, which also included confronting the terrorism phenomenon. Do you believe that Egypt is in need of a new national program to confront these challenges and in need of a political calling to transform Egypt to a front that unites all the different political and popular powers that believe either in the virtues of political participation or in an equal opportunity for such participation?

[Al-Biltaji] I believe that in Mubarak's Egypt there already exists a national program which stipulates the building of the modern Egyptian state that offers political and intellectual diversity, political freedom, economic development, modern technology, and social justice, which are the foundation for the legitimacy of any government and the building of the civilized Egyptian state. The program features will have deep roots when applied to the present realities of Egypt. Undoubtedly, this program needs to acquire a theoretical framework; it is also in greater need of being adopted by political powers and intellectuals. Necessary channels need to be established between the state, which leads the program, and the society for whose advancement the program is drawn.

[Al-Sharif] I know that soon after you assumed your political responsibilities as secretary general of the National Democratic Party for Cairo, you presented a working paper that attempted to visualize this national program. The question that remains concerns the starting point.

[Al-Biltaji] With regard to the program, I have presented an attempt—in theory. I have prepared a study about the

features of the national program for Mubarak's Egypt on the threshold of the 21st century. Through a working paper that was submitted to the National Democratic Party Cairo secretariat, it was advocated that all political and popular powers would study this program from the theoretical as well as the practical aspects. The program had then to be discussed and crystallized into a working program that was presented to the sixth year convention which took place last July. The essence of the political paper was based on the establishment of a democratic front against terrorism composed of all political powers and parties that believe in the ideology of this program for building the contemporary state which rejects terrorism and wishes to work jointly. This joint work would aim at studying and submitting the different views with regard to all internal and external national issues. You should know that this idea started to be embodied in the consciousness of intellectuals and politicians; this is proved by the fact that it has been taken up by different press agencies. This idea is currently in the political arena; the more support it gets, the more it would be both realized practically and gain the joint acceptance of all political powers in Egypt.

[Al-Sharif] I refer once more to the Palestinian issue in President Mubarak's Gulf discussions. Does Egypt believe there is any use in continuing the peace negotiations at the same time that the Palestinian negotiator has been placed in a position of having to bow down to the unfair Israeli conditions, its refusal of returning the deportees, and the acceleration of torment, which the Palestinian people are currently exposed to?

[Al-Biltaji] Egypt's policy with regard to the Palestinian problem should not be underestimated. Egypt's policy has been geared to persistently support the Palestinian people's rights and also to support all Palestinian and Arab opportunities for negotiation in the peace talks. Egypt's policy is also represented in that main idea regarding the Arabs' insistence on getting their full lawful rights. We should therefore not give heed to a subsidiary issue, which is not related to the main goal, though it may be very important. Egypt's stand regarding the deportees is known; Egypt believes that this resolution is in contradiction with the Geneva Convention and all human rights laws. Egypt thus believes that Israel should return the deportees, because the Palestinian lands were occupied by force; Egypt also tried by all means to hasten the return of the deportees. This last issue is clear, because Israel cannot defy international law and legality. In spite of that, we would not like the Arab negotiator to stop his peaceful struggle or to deviate to subsidiary issues. We ask neither Arabs nor non-Arabs to accept what is not consistent with their interests and principles. Egypt is persistently advocating adhering to justice and political principles. The Israeli activities inside the Gaza Strip should be stopped, and the peace process should grow and move at a quicker pace. We are therefore continuing our communications and using our good relations to serve the Arabs. Dr. 'Usama al-Baz's assignment in Washington and his discussions with the American administration are within this context; his

assignment is to learn about the different parties' stands regarding activation of the peace process, including the active contribution of the United States, which approved the principle of land for peace.

[Al-Sharif] Theoretically speaking, do you believe that since the Arab conditions and different understanding of the issue of national security and the fact that it has come to refer to just the nation's or region's security—keeping this in mind, could the Arabs still possess negotiating papers that could return to them their legitimate rights through the peace negotiations?

[Al-Biltaji] Yes. Regardless of both the deteriorating Arab conditions and Arab differences, fortunately, there is still consensus and unanimous Arab agreement regarding the ending of the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands. There is also Arab consensus about continuing to play the role of the honest, complete, and responsible partner for the return of the stolen land and the legitimate rights. Good circumstances still exist that would permit coordination of the Arab stands with a mature world opinion that would support the necessity for such a settlement. The field is open; the will of the different parties and their negotiating capabilities will be the decisive factor in a settlement in favor of righteousness and justice in this chronic crisis.

[Al-Sharif] Let me move to an issue with which both regional and world public opinion is concerned. How do you explain the continuing disagreement between Egypt and Iran? What are the Arab and Islamic endeavors for repairing the fracture in the Egyptian-Iranian relations? Do you believe that a responsible dialogue between the two countries could lay the foundation for a good relationship between them based on common interests?

[Al-Biltaji] I believe the only secret behind the inconsistency of our good relations with Iran is due to the essence of the Iranian policy which is not, at all times, coordinated with the actual stands of the policy. Egypt considers that the Egyptian-Iranian relations are governed by facts related to history and geography as well as to peace.

First: The first principle is the fact that Iran is an eternal neighbor; besides, the Iranians are historically deep-rooted and their numerous historical contributions to Islamic civilization are acknowledged. The second principle, not of less importance, is related to the principle of managing international and regional relations. There is a very clear principle in international law stipulating non-interference in the domestic affairs of others. Consequently, we are still hoping that Iran will coordinate its applied policy with the declared one which vows not to use the method of exporting ideas that aim at changing the form and nature of the regimes mostly followed in the Arab Islamic countries. With regard to this issue, Egypt asserts that, if Iran formulates a clear policy having this trend, Egypt would be one of the first countries to welcome the creation of a stable, enduring, good relationship with Iran. With regard to the issue of a dialogue between the Islamic and national views and the

possibility of absorbing their differences, I believe that there is no contradiction, whatsoever, between the two; the contrary is true. The Islamic view is the initial, the giving, and the more general to suit the region. The national view is the political application within the Islamic one. It is the support that believes in the unity of interests, destination, and confrontation of common dangers. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the two views. In fact, the two views complement each other and are interconnected within the framework of respect for diversity and religious content. Moreover, interpretations, rational and scientific thinking, as well as political activities, should be allowed. Therefore there is not any contradiction problem. The problem lies in the narrow interests of some divisionists who imagine that they are in a position to give lessons to others. Egypt is the heart of this Arab nation. The Egypt of al-Azhar, that preserved the Islamic religion, does not get lessons from anyone.

Al-Azhar Committee Issues Statement on Apostasy

93LD0030A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
9 Jul 93 p 7

[Article by Mujahid Khalaf: "Al-Azhar Fatwah Committee: Corrective Punishment for Whoever Carries Out Islamic Punishments by Himself; Deriding Shari'ah, Contesting Its Authority Are Apostasy"]

[Text] The Fatwah Committee at al-Azhar yesterday issued a statement defining the meaning of apostasy, who is an apostate, and how he should be punished.

The committee said that apostasy by an individual occurs when he denies that part of the faith that he necessarily knows—such as the fundamental doctrines and cornerstones of Islam—or when he derides them and contests their authority as a guide to thinking and behavior.

Regarding the punishment of an apostate, the committee said that scholars have maintained that the apostate should be asked to repent. Scholarly opinion differs about how long the period [of asking] should be. If the apostate returns, he exculpates himself. If he does not return, punishing him becomes obligatory. A saying of the Prophet—may God bless him and grant him peace—defines the punishment: "He who exchanges his religion, kill him." However, punishment may be imposed only if two conditions are satisfied:

First, the reality of the crime must be certain. All its circumstances must have been thoroughly investigated, and there must be confidence that there is no doubt about them. This is based on the Prophet's saying: "Avert the prescribed punishments on account of dubious circumstances." This certainty can occur only with the knowledge of special officials who have means enabling them to investigate the foundations of the crime and dispel doubts about it.

Second, if punishment becomes obligatory, it may be carried out only with the knowledge of those who investigated the reasons for it—the officials.

The statement of the Fatwah Committee deduced from this that no one may accuse a person of apostasy without true knowledge of its reality. Even if true knowledge of its reality is present, he may not carry out the punishment for it. The execution of hadd punishments specifically is not entrusted to just anyone; rather, the ruler carries them out after thoroughly investigating all the required proceedings.

The statement said that if anyone accuses someone of atheism or apostasy without true knowledge, the following saying of the Prophet holds true for him: "Whoever says to his brother, 'O you atheist,' becomes responsible for one of two things: if it is as he said, [well and good]; if not, [his words] turn against him."

The Fatwah Committee's statement describes anyone who imposes a serious punishment without permission from the ruler as having "committed a great sin for which he will be severely punished in the afterlife." The ruler may impose a cautionary punishment on him to prevent anarchy and safeguard security and order. This is because of the importance of security in enabling individuals and the community to enjoy the human rights which help their prosperity and progress.

The statement affirmed that Islam has prohibited Muslims from apostatizing from their faith. This is contained in God's word (Koran 2:217): "And whosoever of you turns from his religion, and dies disbelieving...those are the inhabitants of the Fire; therein they shall dwell forever."

The Fatwah Committee ended its statement by saying: "The Fatwah Committee of al-Azhar sees it as its duty to explain the provision of Islamic law on questions it receives, so as to set matters right and avoid the harm that would occur because of ignorance of the provisions of Islamic law."

The Fatwah Committee met yesterday under the chairmanship of Shaykh 'Atiyah Saqr to study the subject and issued this statement about it.

Lawyers Union Head on Politics, Extremism

93LD0025A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 21 Jun 93 p 5

[Interview with Mukhtar Nuha Amin, treasurer of the Lawyers Union and former National Assembly member by Muhammad 'Abd al-Hadi, in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] Mukhtar Nuh Amin, treasurer of the Lawyers Union and a former National Assembly member, is steeped in parliamentary and legislative experience. He is deeply aware of the reality of our nation and its problems. He has an astute mind and sound perception of how our problems should be solved. We had the following interview with him:

[Abd-al-Hadi] What has the Lawyers Union offered its members in its new era?

[Amin] In order to talk about achievements of the new era, we must look back at some of the financial and administrative problems from which the Union has been suffering. The first of these is investment of the Union's funds or investment returns. The second is the question of proper Union service. And the third is the Lawyers Union national performance. The Lawyers Union's priorities have been organized in this order. Several achievements have been realized in the first field, foremost of which was the allocation of four million pounds of the Union's savings to the assistance fund. This is in addition to the Union's fund and investments. With respect to financial organization, a financial regulation system worthy of the Union has been set up. This ensures correct spending and control. On the level of Union honest and correct services, several projects have been proposed, foremost of which is the book project by points [as published]. This enables the lawyer to buy books by paying 40 percent of the cost, with the balance payable over 10 months. There is also the domestic bus service. We have tried this project in Cairo, and it was greatly successful. We contracted a tourist company and bought more than six buses to carry lawyers to courts according to a fixed schedule. The lawyer rides this bus for only 25 piasters. With regard to pension annuities, a study has been prepared on this subject. I believe that it has been agreed, on the basis of the study, to increase pension annuities to about 400 pounds, as against 180 pounds. There is also the social welfare fund. It is a reckoning system under which the lawyer is paid a bonus at the end of his service. This is in addition to other projects.

[Abd-al-Hadi] There are financial differences between the Arab Lawyers Federation and the Lawyers Union in Egypt. Anything new on this subject?

[Amin] In fact, deans of the Union's branches met in al-Aman Hotel on Thursday 10 June 1993 and studied the Union's attitude toward the Arab Lawyers Federation. The meeting was attended by more than 14 local deans, and all the local branches were represented at the meeting. A unanimous statement was issued condemning the Arab Lawyers Federation's attitude and supporting the Union's stand on amendment of article nine of the Federation's law, and requesting the treasurer to study the financial situation in relation to the Federation. This was the latest development, for we have obtained the support of the Union's branches for our stand toward the Federation of Arab Lawyers.

[Abd-al-Hadi] The new professional unions law was strongly opposed after it was issued. What harm, in your opinion, has the new law caused to the professionals?

[Amin] The gravest harm this law has caused is that it created the possibility of the Union's being managed by outsiders. This is not to speak of the numerous constitutional appeals against this law. What we want to talk about is the country's interest. How can a judge, for example, manage the union of actors, and how can he manage the union of craftsmen, scientists, as well as the Lawyers Union? How can a judge be so humiliated—

which in fact is now taking place—to the extent of being treated by a colleague as a person assigned to be his servant, one time rebuking him and another holding him accountable.

Also, who would bring a judge managing a union to account? Would he be brought to account by a disciplinary board or by a general assembly?

All these issues of morality have demeaned the judiciary.

This is what hurts me, let alone the constitutional appeals. It would be stupid of me to talk about constitutional appeals while the entire judiciary is in danger. As for the constitutional appeals, they are in fact numerous, particularly those concerning lawyers, because the Lawyers Union had already obtained a ruling on the unconstitutionality of the law that appointed one council in the place of another. As lawyers, at the first elections to be held, we will, God willing, file an appeal against this law. And I believe that we are capable of winning a ruling, God willing.

[Abd-al-Hadi] What do you say about referring civilian cases to military justice?

[Amin] I believe that this is a grave mistake. With due respect to the law, military justice does not have the objective qualities of the law profession or of the judiciary mission. But in any case we respect the law and cannot appeal against a law except by official methods. I am speaking from an objective standpoint. The military judge still remains military, even when he is sitting on the platform. I mentioned an example to a journalist colleague when he asked me how can the judge be military. I said, because his name is military judge. If he accosts a more senior officer he has to salute. He should listen and obey, because this is what he was sworn to do in the military. Will he renege on his oath to obey his commanders, even if they are wrong?

Or, will he wear the robe of justice on the platform and wear the military uniform when he steps down from it? This is an extremely contradictory issue. I believe that the state made a serious mistake, because this has led it to lose its credibility before world opinion. Even if [violent] incidents take place, this does not justify fighting terrorism with similar terrorism.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Some people complain about referring certain civilian cases to military justice. They say that this is done in order to lighten the pressure on civilian courts because of the pile up of cases waiting to be heard, and that the cases referred to the military justice need to be dealt with quickly. What is your comment on this?

[Amin] The case of 'Ayn Shams gold was concluded in four or five months. The reason it took so long is that judges take vacations. Putting vacations aside, a case will wait for one, two, or three months. We are not responsible for organizing the judiciary system that gives the judge a period of 10 days out of each month to look into criminal cases. Also we are not responsible for the large number of defendants or the cases. The state must deal with its own problems. But it should not deal with its

problems at our expense by charging a military committee to judge individuals in crucial cases. This is harmful to the country's reputation.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Some cases remain before the court and a ruling is passed only after a very long time. The consequence is a great harm befalling the litigants. When, in your opinion, will this problem end?

[Amin] What's needed is quick judgment on cases and a multiplicity of departments. We demand a larger number of criminal departments.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Violent incidents are the talk of the hour. What are the causes of violence, in your opinion, and how do we deal with them?

[Amin] The question of violent incidents is a major issue that needs to be studied comprehensively and carefully. But we cannot say that there is a phenomenon without causes. This would be foolish. Or, say that the cause of the phenomenon is personal, involving those engaged in it. This is a major scientific mistake. The cause of the phenomenon is always external. I also exclude the possibility that there is an economic reason for the violence phenomenon or for extremism in general. Definitely there are other reasons. Violence flourishes in a non-democratic climate, because man does not resort to force in order to express his views, unless force is his opponent's means. On the other hand, I believe that there are direct relations between enforcement of exceptional [security] measures and the violence phenomenon. I cite President al-Sadat as an example. For nine years he ruled without resort to exceptional measures, except in 1979 which was an exception to the rule. Meanwhile, we can call the last 10 years years of continued violence, because of a series of exceptional freedom-restricting measures and laws. This means that violence is linked to freedom-restricting laws and the policy of violating freedoms. Violence is also directly linked to the general atmosphere.

Lawyer Mukhtar Nuh Amin, continuing, said in analyzing the phenomenon of violence, that the violence phenomenon has emerged in this era only, but its seeds were sown five years ago. Those who have contributed to this state of affairs are Major General Zaki Badr and, undoubtedly, Major General Halim Musa. But I believe that Major General Ahmad Rushdi is innocent; he did not contribute to this phenomenon by committing crimes. But I do not absolve these who came before him, such as Major General al-Nabawi Isma'il and Major General Hasan Abu-Basha. [all former ministers of interior]. On the basis of my experience with exceptional measures, I would say that their seeds are old but the fruits are recent.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Therefore, should, in your view, violence be treated with greater freedom and democracy? But what is your opinion in tackling violence with security measures and informational and educational programs?

[Amin] Answering the question with another question, he said: Is violence a psychological act or a mental act.

He added: We must first determine if violence is a psychological act, and whether it can be treated with articles and lectures. But if it is a mental act it will then be treated with debate. In fact, it is a psychological act, since the harsher the measures against it are, the more terrorism escalates.

I believe that there is a scientific link that should be studied. We call for studies and do not give a final opinion on the question of violence.

[Abd-al-Hadi] What is your comment on the measures that have been taken against "Egyptian" mujahiddin who returned from Afghanistan?

[Amin] I believe that the state is passing through a stage of doubts. The measures taken against those returning from Afghanistan are unjustifiable. But this is a manifestation of the stage in which the state is living at present, for it is going through a stage of suspicions—suspicion toward all those returnees, not only from Afghanistan, but also from Iran, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and from every corner. I disagree with the method of trials to which these people are being subjected.

[Abd-al-Hadi] The application of Islamic amputation laws and the establishment of a Muslim society is the dream of every Muslim. What in your opinion is the right beginning to establish such a society? Will it be the application of the Islamic amputation laws on robbery and on fornication and other such crimes?

[Amin] Islam is not only punishment for robbery and for other such crimes. These punishments came only after the state [of Islam] was established. The state means the single integral entity. There are stages to be completed prior to achieving that. Talk about hand amputation in our society in the "present circumstances" is rejected. We should not begin with amputation. In fact, the rate of those found "guilty" by the law is very high. The society needs to be restructured. This, however, does not mean that I disagree with amputating the hand of the robber and other such amputations. But I refuse the naive understanding of Islamic laws. True understanding of the Islamic laws should be comprehensive. You must first establish the complete Islamic society and then discuss amputations.

[Abd-al-Hadi] What do you say about those who reject the establishment of the Islamic society?

[Amin] He who rejects the Islamic society rejects Islam, and therefore, in my opinion, he has strayed from the path of Islam.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Some officials say that 95 percent of Islamic laws are enforced.

[Amin] This is not how I understand Islam. Islam is not a question of percentages. It is a comprehensive understanding on the basis of which a whole generation is brought up. Consequently, Islam should be the ideology of the society, beginning with a zero and then climbing up to its peak, culminating at its climax. Therefore, I say that I see nothing of Islam in this situation, neither near

it nor far from it. Islam is not a bunch of rules and laws. To give you an example, if we establish in America rules and laws similar to the Islamic rules and laws, will the American society become an Islamic society? Of course not, because the ideologies on the basis of which man was brought up are not Islamic ideologies.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Accusations are often leveled against the Islamists, while in fact they have no programs or a substitute regime. What is your comment?

[Amin] Some of those who talk about Islam have no programs. They speak in generalities, and so they harm us. While objecting to the use of the term "scientific program statement," there is an answer to every contemporary problem. If, for example, we take the World Declaration of Human Rights, we find this declaration in Islam; it consists of 86 articles all of which are derived from the Koran and the sunnah. You can easily find the articles concerning prohibition of torture and the articles on man's freedom of movement, and those concerning the right of the accused to a just trial. You can easily find all those provisions.

[Abd-al-Hadi] Some thinkers abuse the right to freedom of thought and expression and offend Islam. Do you think, as a jurist, we should be content with responding to these distorted ideas and to these offenses by simply expounding the true thinking? Or, do we need new legislation in order to curb this phenomenon? Or, will the existing legislation, if enforced, be sufficient to deter those people if enforced?

[Amin] I believe that the Constitution has laid down the basis for answering those people. There are legal provisions that consider these actions crimes. In addition to applying these provisions we should respond to the perverted thoughts by expounding the right thoughts.

[Abd-al-Hadi] If you were to send two telegrams, one to the minister of interior and the other to the minister of justice, what would you tell them?

[Amin] With regard to the minister of interior, I would suggest one thing as a starter for dialogue with the other people: to release the detainees and not to resort again to detention. He should respect the rules of the law when applying them. This would be an appetizer for the resumption of dialogue.

As for the minister of justice, I would tell him: do not go to excesses in exercising your right [as published]. Try your best so that in your era the Egyptian law will not become a military law.

[Abd al-Hadi] Is there something you want to say at the end of this dialogue?

[Amin] I believe that the state is committing a major mistake by this generalization in the confrontation. [as published] What it is doing, it is building a great wall in front of it, and then it goes on tapping on it lightly. I believe that we are under a regime that does not enjoy popular support, and yet it diversifies the types of

confrontation. The date for the reelection of the president is drawing closer. Yet his ministers create for him a thousand thousand problems which he will have to deal with in his third presidential term. One of these mistakes and errors is what is known as the case of al-Salsabil which we cannot understand. I recall that some time in the past President Mubarak opened a big hospital for the Muslim Brotherhood [MB]. President Mubarak attended this inauguration as vice president. He met with several MB personalities. I am almost certain that he knows them and they know him. But recently his advisers probably advised him to enter into a confrontation with the MB that is meaningless. Confronting peaceful organizations is a kind of confrontation of thought with force. If there is a justification in the outside world to confront violence, what acceptable justification is there to confront a peaceful organization or peaceful group, even if it advocates principles that disagree with the government views.

IRAQ

Secret Deal With Iran on Kurds, Shi'ites Claimed

93P50267A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
4 Aug 93 p 1

[Text] Sources within the Iraqi opposition claimed yesterday that a secret agreement was reached last month between Tehran and Baghdad to prevent a new uprising in southern Iraq and consequently prevent refugees fleeing into Iran from the marshes.

A spokesman from the Iranian Red Crescent said yesterday that the number of refugees from southern Iraq has risen by 40,000 and that number is increasing daily. He added that 100,000 are currently on the way, nearing border areas and intending to enter Iran within the next few weeks.

The secret agreement requires Iran to prevent a Shi'ite uprising so that Iraq will have a free hand to deal with the Iranian Kurdish rebels inside Iraqi territory. Following the signing of this agreement, Iraq recently ordered those forces hostile to Iran within Iraq to cease military operations against Iran.

Anonymous sources within the Iraqi opposition in Tehran and London report that the Shi'ites had planned an uprising for this month. This decision had been made at a gathering last month in Tehran which was attended by major opposition leaders and was headed by Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. It is reported that following the meeting, a number of veteran fighters went to southern Iraq to signal the planned uprising and to coordinate military operations.

However, towards the end of last month, Iranian authorities ordered the Iraqi opposition to delay the planned uprising until further notice.

When this news spread through southern Iraq, armed opposition groups began returning to Iran, leaving vast areas of the marshes exposed and defenseless. Then

Saddam Husayn's forces moved in and occupied the area. Iranian sources deny there is any secret agreement with Iraq.

Sudan's Al-Turabi Declares Solidarity With Country

93P50266A Baghdad ALIF BA' in Arabic 7 Jul 93 p 7

[Text] Dr. Hasan al-Turabi, the leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front and secretary general of the Arab and Islamic People's Conference, stressed that hostility against Iraq has nothing to do with Kuwait but that it is an American-Zionist plot, as has happened in the past, and Sudan is in the same trench with Iraq and stands as in the beginning, facing the common enemy.

In the course of a meeting with a delegation from the Secretariat General of the Conference of Arab People's Forces, headed by Sa'd Qasim Hamudi who visited a number of Arab countries including Sudan during the past few weeks, al-Turabi said: the battle between Iraq and America, like the one between Sudan and America, will soon determine the destiny of humanity in the Arab nation and Africa.

He added: The blockade against Iraq is in fact against the Arab Muslim nation and no Muslim is permitted to participate in a blockade against his brothers. This is forbidden in Islamic law. The blockade of Iraq has grave consequences for humanity, because of its detrimental effects on children, the elderly, the sick, and women.

Dr. al-Turabi refuted the claims of Western leaders that there are Iranians in Sudan. He stressed that he has not found a single Iranian in Sudan and that the purpose of this attack is to continue the colonial hostility against our country in collaboration with Israel.

He emphasized that the Sudan is in danger and there is an American-British plot to break off southern Sudan and destroy our national unity. He said that they intend to do in Sudan what they did in Somalia.

The leader of Sudan's National Islamic Front explained that he is in possession of documents of the utmost importance about the American-Zionist plot to destroy Iraq and cause a split between Saudi's eastern region and the Hijaz.

He pointed out that Sudan is firm and derives further strength from the Iraqi stand; and it will not bend but will resist colonial schemes aimed at imposing hegemony and guardianship over Sudan by using baseless pretexts.

Ba'th Party, Jordanian Party Plan Cooperation

93P50257A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 2 Jul 93 p 4

[Text] The Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and the Jordanian People's Democratic Party [JPDP] have established an action plan for the promotion and development of relations between the two parties for the benefit of the brotherly nations of Iraq and Jordan in strengthening the struggle of the Arab nation in achieving liberation,

progress, unity, and democracy, as well as thwarting hostile imperial, Zionist, racist, and reactionary schemes.

This plan, signed by the comrade director of the Office of Foreign Relations of Iraq's Arab Socialist Ba'th Party and Taysir al-Zibri, the first secretary of the JPDP, includes the coordination of efforts, consultations during Arab and international symposiums and conferences, and exchanges of visits and delegations to insure a continuity of dialogue between the parties.

It also includes the continuation of efforts and actions by all means for the lifting of the oppressive sanctions that have been imposed on the Iraqi nation, and the unmasking of colonial schemes to lead the Arab nation, work against its independence and territorial integrity, and plunder its wealth. Also included is support for the Palestinian uprising in the occupied Arab lands.

Broad Support for Return of Monarchy Claimed

93P50255A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Jun 93 p 14

[Text] Al-Sharif 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn expects the fall of the present regime soon and stresses that its survival is not due to internal strength but due to the weakness of the Iraqi opposition whose various divisions have not agreed on a common action strategy to overthrow the regime.

Al-Sharif 'Ali, who along with his brothers and parents are the only members of the Iraqi royal family who survived the Iraqi revolution of 1958 by finding refuge in the Saudi embassy in Baghdad before going abroad, states that the call for restoration of the constitutional monarchy in Iraq as a substitute for the present regime has supporters in every city where there is an Iraqi emigrant community and that there is evidence of broad support for monarchy within Iraq too.

In answer to a question from AL-HAWADITH about the position of Iraq's Arab neighbors on the subject of a return to monarchy, al-Sharif 'Ali said that not a single neighbor has opposed the idea and indeed the interest of these countries will be served if stability returns to Iraq. He revealed that contacts have been made with these countries and that the activities of supporters of constitutional monarchy do not alarm them.

Al-Sharif also revealed that the movement, which calls for reliance on a constitutional monarchy as a substitute for the present regime has supporters within various opposition groups under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress and that there is no contradiction between the monarchist movement and the opposition groups.

On Sunday, al-Sharif 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn attended the first celebration for supporters of constitutional monarchy who reside in London. Numerous members of the Iraqi community in Britain were present.

The celebration was held on the occasion of the announcement of the birth of a movement which, according to al-Sharif, he leads at the insistence of

diverse Iraqi groups. In his speech, al-Sharif declared those principles that form the Iraqi "national covenant" to be enforced and guaranteed by a constitutional monarchy. Among these principles are direct referendum on the form of government and its leadership, the holding of a free referendum for the establishment of a permanent constitution, a commitment to human rights, and national reconciliation based on a spirit of tolerance, forgiveness, and avoidance of revenge.

For the first plan of action, al-Sharif 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn announced the establishment of a charitable organization named "The King Faisal II Institute for the Protection of Iraqis" with the goal of giving assistance to all Iraqis in need.

Gathering In London Supports Return of Monarchy

93P50258A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
23 Jul 93 p 11

[Text] As Iraqi President Saddam Husayn was celebrating the revolution anniversary and the wedding of his son 'Udayy to the daughter of his half-brother Barzan Tikriti, Iraqis in London gathered at the Carlton Towers with the surviving members of the Iraqi royal family, who escaped the slaughter at al-Rahab palace in 1958, to console them and to recite the Koran in memory of King Faisal II.

This memorial meeting turned into a political demonstration attended by personalities from the Iraqi community in London and the United States. They discovered a great national trend in support of the call for the constitutional monarchy as a substitute for the present regime in Iraq. This call was made about two months ago and brought up the name of al-Sharif 'Ali Ibn al-Husayn as the legitimate heir to the Iraqi throne.

Present at the meeting were a number of personalities from the Iraqi opposition under the umbrella of the Iraqi National Congress, which covertly contacted al-Sharif to coordinate their positions.

ISRAEL

Future of South Lebanon Residents Discussed

93AA0132A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Jul 93
p B3

[Article by G. Zahar: "A Good Fence for War Times"]

[Text] In the village of Ramiyish, in the central sector of south Lebanon, they recall that night, a few years ago, when a Katyusha landed in the village and caused the death of a teacher and his son residing in the village. On that night, a Katyusha also landed in one of the settlements of western Galilee and caused the death of one of the residents. "In a natural way, the media related to the one killed by the Katyusha in Israel, and did not even mention one word that, on our side, too, a father and his son were killed, from exactly the same muzzle from

which the Katyusha shell was fired," says a village resident who is employed in Israel.

This week, this strange blood tie came up again, between that that had been termed the region of south Lebanon up until the period of the Lebanese war, and the security zone, in the period following what has been defined as "the departure of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from Lebanon." The IDF remains in this zone, from the Mediterranean Sea in the west to the slopes of the Hermon (Fatah land) in the east. This is a narrow strip whose width varies from between 7 and 21 km, from the northern border of the State of Israel in the south to the Litani River in the north. Its length is 71 km, and in its south there are three passages into Israeli territory, known as "the good fence." The most famous one is adjacent to Metulah, and the others are adjacent to Birnit and Rosh Haniqra.

About 100,000 Christians live in the zone and about the same number of Muslims, mostly Shiite. The Druze minority is concentrated in the small town of Hasabya, on the eastern side of the zone. Almost every time that Katyushas land in the Galilee, they also land on the Lebanese side of the border, in settlements some of which are only a few dozen meters from their Israeli neighbors. With one difference: The Lebanese have practically no shelters or other expanses protected from the Katyusha salvo.

The events of the end of last week have sharpened the fears among some of the south Lebanon residents that has long since been their legacy. At least those among them who have tied their fate to Israel and developed an economic dependency in relation to it are afraid of what peace, which they are trying to reach in Washington, will bring on its wings. Regarding them, ironically, there will not be much joy in this. Most of them are Christians with a Falangist political orientation, and a minority of them are Muslims who define themselves as nonpolitical.

"Now, we are not afraid to sleep at night," says Vadiya Jubran, age 24, from the Ramiyish village in the center of the security zone, who works at the Zoglobeq factory in Nahariya. "But, in 1982, we lived with a much greater sense of tranquility. Our region is small and is not immune from terrorist attacks and Katyushas. When Israel began the June war, 11 years ago, there was satisfaction among our residents. The departure of the IDF from our region means the entry of Hizballah people and terrorist organizations and the start of a bloodbath. We, who work in Israel, will be the first address for their bullets, because we are considered collaborators. The South Lebanon Army [SLA], with all of its honor, and we believe in our soldiers, is not capable of contending with the terrorist force by itself. Therefore, if they want to prevent the spilling of blood like there was in the civil war, Israel must remain a military presence forever in this region."

"After peace," she adds, "we will continue to work in Israel; this is what most of the people in the village want. In almost every home, there is someone who goes to

work in Israel, and the incomes of most of the families is based on working for them. Because of the tie to Israel, we cannot work in the north, in Lebanon, and I do not think that even after the peace agreement is signed, the situation will enable us to work inside Lebanon."

The good fence was opened in 1976, as part of the monetary aid that the IDF offered to residents of the security zone who found it difficult to reach Beirut and north Lebanon in the wake of the civil war. If not for the good fence, says [Walid Harash], from the village of 'Eyn Avel, who works as a waiter at the Carlton Hotel in Nahariya, our situation would be exactly like that of our Christian brothers who were slaughtered in the town of Damur. They had nowhere to run, and we found shelter with assistance from Israel.

Walid's brother, Marwan, also works at the hotel. He serves as a maintenance man. The two have worked at the hotel for five years and are considered devoted workers, and are familiar at the site. Walid tells that the Israeli guests at the hotel are inquire whether he is an "Arab from the intifadah" or an Israeli Arab, and are more than happy to hear that he is Lebanese. If they give him a few minutes, he explains to them about Lebanon and the reality there. His dream is to serve as an advocate for Israel after peace comes to the region. "There are many in Lebanon who see you Israelis as monsters," he says. "This image of you has still not been erased from the eyes of many Arabs."

Walid and Marwan are forced, like the rest of the Arabs, to return to their home at least every 15 days. Up until a few months ago, the residents of the security zone enjoyed a permit that was valid for one year, and then there was no obstacle to their remaining in Israel for more extended periods. Currently, they only have authorization from the IDF. They explain this change, among other reasons, due to the desire to open up jobs for unemployed Israelis and to cause a reduction in foreign workers, including Lebanese, in Israel. But this is about the only bad thing that the two brothers had to say about Israel.

Approximately 3,400 workers from south Lebanon are currently employed in Israel, primarily in temporary jobs, in hotels, hospitals, in the food and textile industries. An average monthly salary in Lebanon is calculated to be 180,000 Lebanese liras, an amount equivalent to less than \$100. The average cost of maintaining a home in south Lebanon is \$500 to \$700 per month, and, therefore, the employment solutions in Israel are greatly embraced, despite the risk to the employees' future. According to Walid, Syrian and Shiite intelligence have lists of all Lebanese employees in Israel, and any of them who are caught—they injure or murder them. There have already been more than a few instances where Hizballah terrorists have kidnapped Lebanese workers in Israel and murdered them.

"If south Lebanon returns to the influence of the Government of Lebanon, a slaughter and liquidation of a people will take place here," warns Walid. "Indeed, we

are prepared, and everyone has a weapon at home, and there is no man who goes to sleep without placing his weapon next to the bed; but in Israel, it is important that they know that, if they leave this region, the most drastic things will occur here. Israel must leave only after it gives all guarantees that the welfare of the people of the south will not be harmed." He tells that the army of south Lebanon is considered a safe support for residents of the south, that all of them would be mobilized if there were a threat to their security, "but, when the various organizations support Syria, Iran, and Lebanon, it would be difficult for our army to contend with them alone. Furthermore, the terrorists have amassed a lot of experience up until now. They are smarter and stronger than in the past, and they are also equipped a lot better. They have assistance from mercenaries from eastern Europe and those who have left the KGB who train them and teach them new methods of fighting. Their actions in the past year were almost all successful, and despite the blows that they absorb, they succeed in striking both us and you in every such action."

Don't you have any second thoughts about the fact that they decided to tie your fate to Israel? "We do not feel like hostages or bait," Walid replies. "We depend on our strength. Remember, too, that without Israel, our security and economic situations would be much worse. I, myself, was in the Falangist militia for three years. And a year before the Litani operation, when I was 14, I managed to train in Israel. Without these training sessions, our situation today would be many times worse. What is important is that the citizens in Israel should know that you and we are in the same boat. The terrorists and the Hizballah organization want to harm you and us to the same extent. I definitely think that Israel not only must remain here in the future, but should even expand the security zone similar to the territory in the war of June 1982. And there is another problem: The SLA is an integrated army; about two-thirds of its soldiers are Christians and one-third are Muslim. Who will guarantee us that after you leave, the Muslims will not change their skin and join their Shiite brothers in a war against us?"

In a Nahariya hospital, 'Ali 'Aqil, a SLA soldier injured last week by a bullet in his leg, was recuperating. He is a Muslim from Naqurah, and he is convinced that the SLA is capable of defending against the Hizballah forces. In contrast to Walid Harash, he does not estimate that there will be a division within the army of the south, due to the comradeship that has been created among the settlements of the security zone. "Israel is giving us security, and, as far as I am concerned, they could rule all of Lebanon," he concludes.

Early in the morning, at the point of exit from Lebanon, next to the Rosh Haniqra pass, we met Abu-Samir, from the village of 'Alma al-Sha'ab. He is employed at a laundry in the town of Shlomi, and declares that he has no fear of Hizballah activity. Nevertheless, he is afraid that the passes in the good fence will be blocked up in peace times. Now, every resident can reach Beirut, but

many do not take advantage of this capability. Our fear, he says, exists exactly like the fear of my neighbors from Birmit, Even Menahem, and Netu'a. We have a common enemy.

"The solution to the tension that has increased in the past week is for you to come in as far as the Litani region, like in 1978," says Walid Harash, "put it in order, clean it up, and return, otherwise this situation will continue, certainly as long as efforts are being made to arrive at peace. If there were no peace talks, you would have come in long ago to put things in order in the confusion. We prefer an independent Lebanon, with a strong government, and without Syria making us a puppet state. You have not done anything bad to us in our joint 17 years, you have not interfered in our lives, and you have only been concerned about us. For this, we thank you. But you must not leave without a solution."

Value of Democracy, Peace Examined

93AA0138A Tel Aviv NATIV in Hebrew
July 93 pp 43-46

[Article by Aharon Levran]

[Text] Never before has political polarization in Israel been so acute, nor has there ever been, until recently, such a palpable risk of bloodshed between Jews. Expressions of this polarization become ridiculous when one side fulminates over the implosion of the left and the squandering of national assets while another howls that "the right is antidemocratic," and so forth.

If one must zero in on the danger represented by polarization and the mother of all sins in Israel today, it would be the servile worship of a coalition that rules for the achievement of a single goal, with no exceptions—"peace"—with an almost pathological willingness to deepen the national schism while building its strength behind the rules of the democratic game. The desire to obtain "peace" at any price, despite its minor relevance to the strategic reality around us and its high risks to the nation's fate, and the disdain for contrary positions held by approximately half the nation, are now the roots of the greatest danger Israel has known, both for its future and for its democratic system.

Presenting peace and democracy as "higher values" in a society as pluralistic as Israel's requires not only a penetrating discussion of substantive matters but also a contemporary demand for fundamental questions into the roots of democracy: relations between majority and minority, the extent of one's duty to obey government authority, and so forth. We believe that the answers to these questions are not to be found in hollow clichés such as "the rule of law stands above all else," or that every other national value may be trampled for the sake of "peace." Peace and democracy are, to be sure, important goals and values, but in a Jewish state, whose existence will be threatened in any situation, they do not stand above such other values as national unity and solidarity.

Peace in Our Situation as a Supreme Value?

The achievement of peace as a supreme goal by those who have been elected in Israel raises considerations touching on its fundamental validity as seen from a normative perspective, that is, whether it is worthwhile. It may be helpful to set forth the reasons establishing not only that "peace" cannot be a supreme value but that there is no rule of logic or proof by which to realize it, and that it may be, in our situation, nothing more than an empty maxim.

A. Peace, and "real peace" in particular, does not exist among the Arab themselves. All the more so as to detested Israel, the "foreign element" that will dissolve of itself in time,¹ can there be "real peace"? Two of the most devastating wars of the past decade have been fought in the region; although we did not set them off, Israel was entangled in the latter of these even though it was not a party to it. Does not what befell Kuwait, which was burned by a neighbor that lusted for its land and wealth despite "peaceful and brotherly" relations, indicate a comparable fate for Israel?²

B. After more than 10 years, we must recognize the fact that even the "peace" with Egypt is merely a "cold peace" contingent upon continuing the process of stripping Israel of all its resources (in the "territories," its nuclear potential, etc.). It is really a matter of "no war", on the ground and in relations, and no more. Aside from the existence of some meager outward signs (embassies, Israeli tourists only), Egypt has consistently violated the core of the peace agreement—full normalization. In addition, there has been no reliable sign to date that Egypt recognizes the existence of Israel as a sovereign state. Israel does not appear on any Egyptian map, no border signs in Sinai indicate the existence of Israel, and so on. In light of all this, no wonder that official Egyptian policy remains as it was, to "return Israel to its natural size."

C. Those pursuing "peace," including Rabin, like to point to Begin's total evacuation of Sinai as a precedent. There is no connection between the two, and any linkage between them is forced. First of all, regarding Egypt, Israel, surrounded by enemies, sought to ease its defense burden, and that was possible in some way with the Egyptians because of the Sinai desert's broad barrier.

Second, for all the criticism of Begin, no one would accuse him of planning to surrender the Golan or Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Indeed, everything he did vis-a-vis Egypt was precisely for the purpose of securing the other sectors. The Golan Heights law, which was adopted just before the evacuation from Sinai, and designation of the Minister of the Interior to conduct the autonomy negotiations, are just two proofs of that. Likewise, it was not the grandeur of peace that hypnotized Begin but a realistic policy reflecting the circumstances and certain constraints.

D. Lovers of "peace" in Israel and abroad have argued the hollow formula "land for peace." The tragedy is that the proponents of this awful phrase do not fully fathom

its absurdity: the Arabs will provide us goods that they simply do not have, while we shall give land, of which they have plenty! If that isn't Kafkaesque logic, absurdity has no clear meaning.

What's more, whoever thinks that we have a surplus of land to give our enemies does not understand something very fundamental to the dispute; just as we have not reached a **critical mass** in the number of Jews living here sufficient to assure our existence in the region, so we are just barely scraping together this critical mass in territory and defensive depth.³ Every retreat from currently held territory will undermine this critical mass and endanger our existence in the long run.

E. The obvious conclusion is that there cannot be "real peace" between us and our neighbors in the coming generations or before Arab culture and their political structure undergo a revolutionary change.⁴ Nonetheless, this is not to say that Israel should not attempt to seek possibilities for some sort of **arrangements** with them.⁵ But this can be done only on two conditions: the price must be tolerable, and the arrangement must be made with someone who makes doing this worthwhile to Israel. That, perhaps, is the situation in the Syrian sector, but not with the Palestinians, with whom we are engaged in a zero-sum game (losses only, no gains). Similarly, yearnings for "real peace" cannot be mistaken for cold, hard reality, in which the existence of real peace is a remote possibility but which may still yield an opportunity to reduce friction in the dispute.

F. The absurdity of "peace" is especially obvious when it collides with other important interests:

1) The matter of Jerusalem, for example. There exists in Israel today a consensus that Jerusalem is not a subject for negotiations and that it "will never be divided."⁶ If we take matters at their face value, this means that the Arabs, for whom Jerusalem, at least the Arab part of it, holds supreme value parallel to ours, will be wholly unable to agree to "peace" with Israel unless at least part of the city comes under their control. Israel's justifiably stubborn insistence that Jerusalem shall be its united capital, therefore, will prevent "peace," which will be sacrificed on the altar of Jerusalem. In short, even today, we have a value more important than "peace." Thus, it is not a condition *sine qua non*.

2) Above all, "peace" clashes with another supreme national value, realization of Zionism. I intend to stress only two points. First, it is folly to say that because of "diplomatic relations" and "normalization" (which, as I have noted, is not the reality; we have only a poor cousin of them), we are ready to yank flourishing settlements out from under their residents. Incidentally, these settlements were founded pursuant to a point of view that did not depend on "peace." If that isn't a blow to Zionist values, for which settlement and pioneering have been guiding principles for generations, I don't know what would be. Second, there are those who find it painful to dismantle settlements; so they suggest leaving them under Arab sovereignty ("just as Arabs live under our

rule"). This approach, however, is more inane and worse even than tearing settlements down, for transferring settlements to Arab sovereignty means creation of a new diaspora by our own hands and right on our doorstep, the antithesis of Zionism and the founding of a state, which were to eradicate the curse of dispersion.⁷

3) We see a clash between "peace" and another objective in Rabin's urging the United States to take on itself "full involvement" in the political negotiations.⁸ Apart from doubts as to the wisdom of this step,⁹ what this means is an accelerated departure from direct negotiations between us and the Arabs, which has always been a supreme goal of Israeli government policy. Thus, prodding the United States to become a "full partner" means, in effect and perhaps deliberately, giving up the principle of direct negotiations, whose value is immeasurable. Only direct negotiations and relations offer a chance for perpetuating the legitimacy of Israel's existence in the region and bringing the Arabs to a reasonable compromise with us. The involvement of a third party between us and our neighbors is merely a tested prescription for preventing a solution to the dispute and for continuing it.

4) If "peace" is the highest value, then one may trample still another important national and social value, the integrity of an orderly government. What is the meaning of the continuing participation of Der'i and SHAS [Torah Observing Sephardim] in the government, and the delay in investigating him at every step, if not the willingness to appease and put on the team someone so heavily stained with corruption? Indeed, at the close of the previous administration, the left was the engine driving the protest movement for clean government; now it is as though all that has been erased. Is it now OK to wallow in the garbage, is it really true that all is permitted in the name of "peace"?

G. Since it seems that even the left has come to realize that "real peace" is impossible here (in the wake of renewed expressions of the Palestinians' searing hatred of Israel), it now offers us a new interpretation: Terror will not cease even after the establishment of peace. The tragedy is that they have never been so right, yet they ignore the absurdity of their argument. Why pay so terrible a price for a product ("peace") that is intrinsically defective and will not bring the required benefits? Does the compulsive inertia in seeing "peace" as the "supreme value" on any condition have to deprive people of the little sanity they still have? Another stupid idea of the left (A.B. Yehoshu'a is one of its most prominent proponents) has it that if it becomes clear that "the Palestinians continue harassing Israel even after satisfaction of their aspirations, we can make mincemeat of them, abolish their state and even carry out a transfer."¹⁰ So, in truth....

I have been content with just 10 reasons for demonstrating the absurdity of elevating "peace" to the "supreme value." Of course, I could provide more. It is difficult to comprehend in full the views of those who worship it at any price and on any condition unless they

are motivated by an external reason, decisive if not valid: the desire to go down in history as those who brought peace. It is reasonable to suppose that this fetish has obsessed Labor leaders since Begin surprised them with his Egyptian initiative (Begin the hawk brought peace while the "Labor doves" did not?!). The tragedy lies in this, that the precedent set by Begin, which we could, one way or another, still stomach, will be applied to other spheres that have little connection to "real peace."

Democracy as a Supreme Value

The political schism within Israel, and the danger inherent in leading her to catastrophe in pursuit of pipedreams, once again raise fundamental questions, properly so, going to the roots of democracy: the relationship between majority and minority, the extent of one's duty to obey government authority and the like. For most people, these are not troubling questions since democracy and obedience to authority come before all else (or "we would end up in anarchy"). For many others, however, these matters are not at all simple, either theoretically or applied to our special circumstances. Accordingly, it is worth recalling some iron rules of the theory of democracy:

A. For all the importance of democracy as a value and a form of government, we know that its formal rules are capable of bringing it to calamity. We have a fine example in Hitler's rise to power through democratic means, and in the democratic Weimar Republic at that. Not long ago, Hamas [Islamic Resistance Front] and Muslim zealots nearly seized power from the Algerian Government, all according to the highest democratic practices. Moreover, should there ever be, God forbid, a threat to the Jewish character of Israel, only marginal dreamers would bow down before the Moloch of democracy and agree to that. It is important to remember these matters, not in order to cast aspersions on democracy but to emphasize that even in a form of government that has no equal in the civilized world, grave dangers potentially exist. In other words, even democracy cannot be an ultimate value.

B. The idea of pluralism, and not just the formal sides, is the heart of normative democracy. The moment we worship with all our might a single value (such as peace), we actually accept the total opposite of the pluralistic idea—totalitarianism.¹¹ Worship of the Moloch "peace" and the compulsive exertions to realize it with a party that is unwilling to accept running amok towards it, distort the true roots of the "democratic spirit." True, democracy does not mean anarchy or gridlock in action, but it is also true that it is not meant to reflect ideological totalitarianism or disrespect for the opinion of a large numbers of voters. Consensus is not a dirty word, and respecting the opinions of others, even when they oppose your views, is a vital feature of harmonious democracy.

C. Every beginning student of political science knows too that no stable democracy can tolerate tyranny of the majority. The majority must lead but, just as clearly, it must not take advantage of its superiority in numbers to

act tyrannically towards the minority, that is, to impose its will in far-reaching ways if that blatantly contradicts the minority's position. No tyranny by the majority has always been one of the iron rules of orderly democracy; it is what has enabled a reasonable, pluralistic and harmonious life.¹² It is also, incidentally, the primary reason that the previous government's small majority did not attempt to impose a solution on Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, even though many people favored that.

And now to aspects of democracy under current Israeli conditions:

A. Israel is ruled today by a government that formally holds a coalition majority. But one must stress that this is not a decisive majority and that this hard-pressed majority certainly is not free of blemishes in its composition. Moreover, even with 66 Knesset members constituting a valid majority, we must recall that examination of the source of these votes in the last elections reflects more of a balance between the right and the left than a clear victory for the latter. Furthermore, a coalition that relies on the six Knesset members of SHAS, which is not exactly a Zionist party,¹³ and many of whose voters, in fact, lean towards the right's outlook, cannot behave as if it has a solid majority behind it.

B. The coalition also attained its razor-thin and artificial majority of 61 seats on the basis of five Knesset members from Arab parties. Reliance on them, however, will make a mockery of the foundations of the state, for no coalition may determine fateful and existential questions in reliance on anti-Zionist Knesset members, and certainly not Arabs.

Anyone who sees this as antidemocratic or racist does not know what he is talking about. Democracy is based on citizens fully discharging their obligations. If we prevent them from fulfilling all the necessary obligations (national and civic), they do not deserve to take an equal part in deciding the nation's fate. The Arabs of Israel (for both objective and subjective reasons) simply do not fulfill these obligations. Moreover, they candidly profess that they are divided between loyalty to their nation (the Palestinian) and their state (Israel). Citizens divided in their loyalties, it is clear, are not the same as citizens whose identification is whole. Likewise, the decisive majority of Israel's Arabs automatically prefer any policy inuring to the benefit of "our brothers," regardless of what it means to "their state" (By the way, Begin, who is often quoted by the left on this issue, said that the Arab members of the Knesset were entitled to equality "until it becomes a matter of blood between us"). Thus, to get on one's high horse and say that everyone has to be equal in Israel and the Knesset in every respect?¹⁴ The law of return, incidentally, clearly signals inequality and the priority of the Jewish majority in the state.¹⁵

C. But the critical issue for the majority in Israel today is not simply the slender advantage in Knesset members or their composition, but precisely the validity of their selection. One must say, no ifs, ands or buts, that this majority was elected by lies made to the people and

under false pretenses to some of the voters. In his book *The State of the Nation*, Professor Y. Dror laments the wretched quality of government in Israel resulting, among other things, "because leaders do not tell the public the truth and thereby undermine the legitimacy of the government."¹⁶ My argument is even more damning. Lying to the public by Labor's leaders before the elections brought them to power on the basis of false promises that can undermine the foundations of democratic values. The facts are well-known: Rabin announced at Qatzrin before the elections that "whoever comes down from the Golan Heights abandons Israel's security." It is interesting to note that he was lying through his teeth even then, for he openly spoke at the last party convention of "the need for a withdrawal, not of centimeters but of many kilometers." Number-two in the leadership, Shim'on Peres, suddenly invented a macabre motto: "Our job is to give away [the territories] and the Arabs' is to take [them]." Aside from looking silly as they changed their positions, this represents a serious retreat from the policy of "territorial compromise" (which included "give and take" and, importantly, less than total withdrawal), which has always been the pole star for Labor, even in its last party platform!

Those who rose to power on the basis of such frauds and gained a threadbare, artificial majority cannot expect that the unwilling will be moved to revel in democracy's plumage or obedience under all conditions.

D. More than anything else, even if the ruling majority were not so narrow and artificial, it would be doubtful whether, in an orderly democracy, a small majority can carry out a policy that determines the fate of the state for better or for worse. What is needed for decision in matters of fateful, existential importance is a firm majority with which the people will agree. And in a fragile democracy, matters such as these are to be decided only by a massive majority. A marginal majority, though a valid one, cannot be authorized to enforce the positions of one side on another. Why was a prestigious majority of 80 Knesset members necessary for a change in the "basic law" (which differs from regular laws in its fundamental importance and permanence), while fateful decisions do not require a majority of at least two-thirds, whether in an election or a public referendum?

E. In today's altered order of national priorities, even if the government is not forbidden to do this, problems exist respecting orderly democratic practices, to wit: creation of a breach, a break in the continuity of policy. What I mean by a breach is, in the first place, abandonment of the previous policy (in this particular instance, limited autonomy applicable only to residents, the Golan law and so forth). That too is possible, but then why rant about the remarks made by Knesset members Landau and Porat, who want to establish that a future right-oriented government won't honor the decisions of the current government, just as it has not honored the decisions of its predecessor (in addition, what is so bad about the negotiating partners knowing this in advance so they won't be harmed?).

Second, it is true that Menahem Begin, in surrendering the Sinai, also deviated from prior policy, but that was a deviation of another sort. The changes in policy (and the concessions made) were then satisfactory to the opposition, while the situation today is completely the reverse and creates not only a rupture in policy but the risk of bloodshed between Jews. This raises, one might add, another thorny matter, which is that when we deal with threats and the use of force and brutal terror by outsiders (Palestinians), it is tolerated and doesn't even sicken them too much to give in to it, but when deep frustration and despair erupt among our own people, our own flesh and blood, "We will not hesitate to use force and the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] against them"! It would be better for the government to demonstrate its capabilities and might to those who rise against us, rather than to ourselves.

The blather about obedience to authority under all conditions cannot be accepted in an orderly democracy when there is a gaping rupture in policy (and a departure even from the Labor party platform itself). The government, therefore, cannot throw out the baby with the bath water and then complain in surprise when it itself is at fault.

Instead of a Conclusion: On 'Unity of the People' as a Value and a Goal

We could discuss central national values no less important and perhaps of greater importance than the values of peace and democracy (for example, completing the still-unfinished Zionist revolution), but we shall consider just one of them—unity of the people. Unity and solidarity of the people is an essential national interest that overrides every other for the banal reason that if it does not exist, there will be no people to "make peace" or achieve any other goal. Peace cannot be made by only part of the people or be intended for only part of the people. If half the nation is not ready for peace at any price, and regards running amok for it as an intolerable surrender of critical interests, disputed actions cannot be forced on it, certainly not by spurious party maneuvers or enlisting foreign entities. A divided people cannot be an object of peace, and definitely not of a "stable peace" or perhaps even life in common.

Whoever believes that peace comes ahead of national unity will quickly sink into fraternal hatred leading to the brink of civil war. Although there are those who do not shrink from this, this is an unpardonable sin. Peace, which is problematic even under the best of conditions, cannot take priority over a national schism that may be irreversible, much less a civil war in Israel's special circumstances. It goes without saying that the strength of the nation and the state derives first and foremost from unity and not from military might or any political situation.

Moreover, if Israel were united and speaking in one voice out of a consensus, instead of in conflicting voices,

not only would she be much stronger, but it would greatly improve the chances for advancing the process of co-existence in the region.

In the absence of unity, solidarity and consensus, we shall not only fail at that but plunge into a genuine catastrophe. Before pursuing peace with our enemies, we ought first to pursue unity and focus on closing the rift within us. Perhaps the time has come for a new slogan of "Take Action Before The Disaster."¹⁸

Footnotes

¹Faysal al-Husayni in the Jordanian newspaper AL-RA'I, 12 November 1992. There was nothing new in this statement. It merely served as a recent expression of Arab intentions.

²My article "[text illegible] of Peace," MA'ARIV, 20 September 1991, and NATIV, 1/92.

³[text illegible]

⁴[text illegible]

⁵[text illegible]

⁶[text illegible]

⁷[text illegible]

⁸[text illegible]

⁹[text illegible]

¹⁰[text illegible]

¹¹The late Prof. Ya'aqov Talmon noted this phenomenon in both the French Revolution and fanatical revolutionaries of democracy.

¹²An outstanding example of a majority that does not behave tyrannically in an exceptionally harmonious democracy is Japan. Although the left there, the socialists and the communists, represent only a third of the popular vote, the liberal-democratic majority always strives to build a broad consensus, without fail in matters of critical national importance. Anyone familiar with Japan knows that, if things were otherwise, everyone there would be at each other's throats.

¹³This was recently reflected at an official state ceremony—installation of the Sephardic Chief Rabbi—at which Rabbi 'Ovadya Yosef and others openly sneered at the singing of "Hatiqva" [the national anthem] in the presence of the President of Israel.

¹⁴That is why I am opposed, incidentally, to direct election of the prime minister. The left's candidate will always have an advantage of approximately 15% (out of 18% of the total Arab minority) over his rightist rival.

¹⁵When Knesset member Ari'el Sharon said that "our fathers came here to build a Jewish state, not a democratic one," Knesset member Dan Meridor replied that that was not true "for what is the essence of Zionism if not achievement of a Jewish majority in the land of Israel" (that is, he was also thinking of the glory of democracy). But Meridor was mistaken and misguided;

the Jewish majority that our fathers indeed desired was not for "democratic reasons" or sought out of consideration of the "Arab problem (as it was called then), but in order to establish a Jewish state here that would remedy the curse of exile—antisemitism and persecution of the Jewish minority wherever it was.

¹⁶Yehezkel Dror, "Memo to the Prime Minister—The State of the Nation" (Aqadamon Press, Jerusalem, 1992), p. 168.

¹⁷[location not identified in text] In this vein, Knesset member Sharon some time ago proposed finding a possible consensus based on the "Alon Plan," which had always been the Labor party platform, but he was contemptuously rebuffed. And no wonder: The Labor Party itself no longer believes in its platform....

¹⁸Ala the famous caption by Y. Ben-Aharon, who bought about the unification of the labor parties.

Regional NBC, Missile Delivery Capabilities

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pp 12-15

[Article by Dani Leshem]

[Text] Negotiations can continue for months or years. However, at one moment, they end—in an agreement, but never in a sudden, unexpected explosion. A violent confrontation as a result of a failure of negotiations is likely to be more fear-inspiring and perverse than the state of war that the negotiations are intended to end. The Middle East, among the most unstable regions in the world, has seen such scenarios in the last generation. Many elements contribute to instability, including elements that are currently not parties to the negotiations, e.g., Libya, Iraq, Iran, and the rejectionist nationalist or religious movements. When one speaks of the next conflagration, the terms are extreme, sometimes apocalyptic.

Below is a rather unpleasant list. We can assume, with great certainty, that the list will become even more threatening if the peace process fails.

The Threat of Missiles

Especially salient are improvements in the area of chemical armaments, e.g., the completion of the development of chemical warheads for ground-to-ground missiles in Iran and Libya; the possible development of chemical warheads in Saudi Arabia, which has long-range, ground-to-ground CSS-2 missiles and is threatened by similar chemical weapons possessed by Iran and Iraq; efforts to develop proximity fuzes and other improvements to enhance the effectiveness of the diffusion of the chemicals contained in the chemical warheads of ground-to-ground missiles, at least in the countries that have developed and already produced chemical warheads, e.g., Syria and Iraq; the development and production of lethal and especially persistent chemical warfare agents,

e.g., VX, in countries which have not yet begun to produce it, e.g., Iran and Libya, and the expansion of its production in Syria.

Also expected are the development and production or continuation/expansion of the production of binary chemical warfare agents of the Sarin GF [as published] type, and perhaps the continued production of binary VX as well; the development of an improved binary chemical weapon, primarily one that is safer to use than that now present in Iraq and Saudi Arabia; expansion of the capability to produce chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons in Iran, Libya, and Syria; maintenance of the Iraqi ability to renew production of chemical warfare agents and chemical armaments in the event of the weakening or cessation of international control; maintenance of the existing ability to produce chemical warfare agents and chemical weapons in Egypt; the development and production or continued development and production of chemical warfare agents and biological weapons in Syria, Iran, Libya, and Iraq, and the maintenance of the existing ability in Egypt (it is difficult for UN supervision in Iraq to prevent development and production activity in the field of biological warfare).

Also continuing are intensified efforts to procure, develop, produce, and improve ballistic missiles (in Iran, Syria, Libya, and Egypt, which are threatened by Iran and Sudan), especially intermediate range missiles, including ground-to-ground missiles with a range of more than 1,000 km. It is expected that Iraq will attempt to secretly continue its development effort, and its improvement and production of intermediate range ground-to-ground missiles (which has been forbidden). Iraq is also expected to continue efforts to develop and produce ground-to-ground missiles with ranges up to 150 km, which UN resolutions permit.

Special attention should be given to the Nodong-1 missile, which has a range of 1,300 to 1,000 km (which suffices for it to be launched from Iran at Israel and more than suffices for it to be launched from Libya at Israel). This missile is now being developed and is undergoing final test firings in North Korea. Supply of this missile to Iran and Libya is supposed to begin in late 1993 or early 1994. In addition, Iran, apparently with the help of the Chinese, is developing a ground-to-ground missile in the Chinese family of M ballistic missiles, with an estimated range of about 1,000 km (with a solid fuel propulsion system). Libya has been involved now for in a number of years—apparently with great success and with the help of Western European companies and experts—in developing a ground-to-ground missile designated Fatah, which has a range of up to 1,000 km.

Syria and Iran are investing large sums and cooperating closely in the development of missile industries in their countries with technological assistance from North Korea and China. The Iranians have begun to assemble, and gradually produce in their factories, Scud C missiles (range: about 500 km). The Syrians are establishing a similar industrial infrastructure to assemble and produce the Scud C in Syria. This missile, with which Syria is

already equipped, enables Syria to attack targets anywhere in Israel from distant launch sites in Syria's depth.

The infrastructure established in Syria and Iran is also intended for the development and production of a ground-to-ground missile propelled by solid fuel. Russian intelligence under Primakov's leadership reports that the Syrians are already involved in developing a ground-to-ground missile of this type. The Syrians are also apparently cooperating with Iran in converting and improving Scud B missiles to increase their range to about 600 km. Egypt, which built a factory for developing and producing improved Scud C missiles with help from North Korea and a British company, has apparently begun recently to develop ground-to-ground missiles with a range of 1,000 to 2,000 km in response to the Iranian-Sudanese threat.

Finally, we must not forget the relatively precise S-21 ground-to-ground missiles made in the former Soviet Union. The Syrian Army is equipped with these missiles, which pose a threat to military and strategic targets in northern Israel, including air force and other bases.

Development of a long-range cruise missile of the U.S. Tomahawk type is currently in the preliminary stages in Iran and Syria. Those two countries are cooperating and enjoy help from China in this effort. China is interested in developing cruise missiles for its own purposes. This is a program spanning 10-15 years. This period could be shortened somewhat, because development may focus on guidance and navigation systems that are less complex than those of the U.S. missiles, especially given that satellite navigation systems are available to any interested party. Another serious factor that could help shorten development time is liable to be the technological assistance which Russia is currently providing to China to develop and produce missiles of different types, including ground-to-ground missiles.

Terror Weapons

The close military-security cooperation between Iran and Syria includes coordination in the area of terror. This coordination is liable to be expanded and strengthened further if political negotiations with Syria fail. In the event of a war between Israel and Syria, Syria is liable, as stated above, to receive Iranian help in the form of expeditionary forces and/or tank assaults and/or attack aircraft from Iran's territory. Similar cooperation between Iran and Sudan is causing difficult problems for Egypt. These problems are liable to worsen in the future (and not only with respect to Egypt) if the Iranians employ their fleet (Kilo submarines and Nacken submarines and speed boats for example), and perhaps even their naval commandos, from a Sudanese port to establish a presence and activity. Or, the Iranians could attempt to mine navigation routes in the Red Sea (the Americans are greatly concerned by similar mining activity in the Persian Gulf). Attention should also be given to the difficult focus of tension developing on the Egyptian-Sudanese border in the area of Halayib.

Another problematic factor is Iran's ongoing effort, in combination with fundamentalists and other terror organizations, to torpedo the peace process, especially through terror activity in the territories, Israel, and southern Lebanon.

In addition to all of the above-mentioned factors, the difficulties of different Arab regimes must also be considered:

- Internal pressures and criticism of the governments in different Arab countries, e.g., Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, regarding such subjects as corruption, civil rights, criticism in the area of religion, and demands for democratization.
- Economic difficulties due to relatively low oil prices; an oil market that is quite saturated; pressures and efforts to increase oil output on the part of different producers, e.g., Iran and Kuwait; and other economic factors, e.g., inflation, and the growth of governmental expenditures, imports, and foreign debts (economic difficulties are not only the lot of countries with rather limited economic resources such as Egypt, but also of countries that are rich in oil such as Iran and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia).
- The growth of the population in such countries as Egypt, Iran, and others.
- The health condition of Arab leaders. Asad's deteriorating health, for example, might prompt a renewed war over who is to succeed him, followed by a period of instability and uncertainty regarding the political line adopted by his successor/successors. There is no certainty, for example, that his successor will be interested in maintaining in its entirety a peace agreement signed by Syria with Israel if indeed we reach such an agreement with Asad.

The Nuclear Danger

The nuclear programs of different Arab and Muslim countries in the region are no longer a subject of speculation. They constitute the gravest potential danger to the peace of the region and the world. This is first and foremost a matter of Iran's tireless, expanding efforts to develop nuclear weapons and establish the nuclear infrastructure required for this purpose (regarding both the plutonium track and the uranium track), including the construction of power reactors for purely civilian purposes, as it were, with help from China and Russia, and major investment in uranium enrichment projects.

It is expected that Iran will complete development of a nuclear weapon within seven to 10 years. There is a danger of this timetable being shortened by the flow abroad of brains, material, nuclear equipment, and—in the worst case—tactical nuclear weapons from the republics of the former Soviet Union. An especially worrisome, newly added factor is the development and expansion of nuclear cooperation between Iran and North Korea. North Korea, which declared its departure from the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, might at any time transfer to Iran plutonium from the quantities that it is producing in its reactors and separating for its own

purposes. North Korea might also help Iran establish a nuclear "research" reactor, or a secret underground reactor to produce plutonium and a plutonium separation facility. It could also help Iran plan and develop nuclear weapons.

The danger of the flow of brains and nuclear materials and equipment, and—in extreme cases—nuclear weapons from the CIS, and the danger posed by North Korea's and China's provision of assistance to secret nuclear programs, are a source of great concern with respect to all of the Arab and Muslim states in our region which have nuclear programs. (In this connection, it should be noted that Syria and Libya have close connections with North Korea in various military areas, especially in the procurement, development, and production of ground-to-ground missiles).

Iraq may of course be very interested in obtaining what it lacks from secret sources of this type. And Syria, Libya, and Algeria certainly have no less of an interest in this regard. Regarding Syria, it is necessary to fear: the Syrian-Iranian cooperation that is developing in all areas of nonconventional weapons, including the nuclear area; and Syrian nuclear cooperation with China, Pakistan, India, and Argentina.

The cooperation of the Syrian Security Institute for Research and Development and the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission with countries such as Iran and Pakistan in an attempt to develop a nuclear infrastructure for military purposes in Syria is liable to lead to future cooperation in such areas as developing uranium enrichment equipment, and programs to build an enrichment facility and/or a secret nuclear reactor, or even an open reactor suited to the production of plutonium in Syria. Syrian cooperation with Iran is also liable to entail secret efforts to procure equipment, materials, knowledge, and perhaps even nuclear weapons.

Iraq, which is currently subject to the supervision of the Security Council (the special UN committee for disarmament and the destruction of its nonconventional weapons and ballistic missiles) and the International Atomic Energy Agency, continues apparently to conceal equipment, components, and materials. It also refuses to disclose the full list of the foreign suppliers, which helped it with respect to know-how, equipment, and materials. It is attempting even now to continue its nuclear program by maintaining a low profile. If and when supervision of Iraq weakens or is removed, Iraq will redouble its nuclear efforts. Some suspect that Iraq is even concealing an underground reactor for the production of plutonium and a certain quantity of nuclear materials, (especially enriched uranium). However, these suspicions have yet to be verified. Another unverified possibility is that the Iraqis are succeeding in concealing a semi-industrial installation or an installation on a limited scale for the enrichment of uranium by one of the enrichment techniques in which they have invested development and production efforts, especially centrifugalization and the separation of electromagnetic isotopes. Libya and Algeria are also interested in developing nuclear

weapons. One should also not discount the possibility of Egypt, despite all of its budgetary constraints, one day deciding to develop nuclear weapons secretly. Good motives for this happening are liable to be Iran's great investment and progress in its nuclear weapons development program, Iraq's major progress in its nuclear weapons development program until the Gulf war, Algeria's nuclear program, and so on.

In the meantime, Egypt is developing its own nuclear infrastructure for civilian purposes based on the thinking that this infrastructure will also be suited to military objectives if and when a decision is made to pursue such objectives. An instructive fact is that Russian foreign intelligence, which claims that Egypt currently has no military nuclear program, saw fit to remark that a laboratory (a hot laboratory whose existence has been known for some time—D.L.) has been built or expanded at the nuclear research center at Inshas, and that this laboratory could be suited in the future to the separation of irradiated gas from plutonium from the research reactor constructed at the site, if and when a decision is made to develop nuclear weapons.

Egypt is currently constructing at Inshas a 22-megawatt research reactor with Argentina's help. It is the largest research reactor built to date in the Arab countries, excluding the Osirak reactor, which has been duly destroyed. This reactor is indeed not suited to the production of enough plutonium to be significant for military purposes, based as it is on uranium enriched at a low rate. Consequently, it produces only a small quantity of plutonium as a byproduct (apparently several hundred grams per year). Nonetheless, it is liable to be used to produce plutonium through means of deception (irradiation of a blanket of natural uranium), if and when Egypt wishes to do so in the future. (It should be remembered that the Osirak reactor was also suited to the production of plutonium only through means of deception, and it is all only a matter of decision).

It is worthwhile to also keep in mind that Egypt continues to aspire to build a power reactor. It is acquiring the relevant technology to develop a domestic capability to: produce equipment, components, and parts for nuclear reactors; produce nuclear gas; enrich uranium; and produce heavy water. Its military industry is also apparently participating in the production of parts for the Argentinean research reactor. In addition, there is more than a slight danger posed by Egypt's examination of the possibility—and joint planning with Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Iraq in the framework of existing cooperation in the Atomic Energy Organization of the Arab League—of building desalinization reactors in all or some of these countries. Such a civilian program is liable to have military implications.

Egypt's development of nuclear weapons is serious and dangerous, but much less so than that of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya, or Algeria. However, there is no certainty that, at some time, however distant it may be, Egypt will not

have a different leadership, especially a different president, who will be much less moderate and friendly toward Israel and the United States.

One final remark regarding the possibility of nuclear insanity running rampant in the region: Despite the cautious statements of the rulers of Tehran, I would not rely particularly on the Iranians' reasoning and wisdom when they have nuclear weapons at their disposal. Even rulers of countries that are more responsible and balanced than the Iranians, such as the leaders of India and Pakistan, were on the threshold of a nuclear war several years ago (which was prevented to a great extent by U.S. mediation). It is worthwhile to bear in mind that India has a large Muslim population and Pakistan has a large population of Indian origin, both of which would be liable to be hurt if a nuclear war erupts. I am adding this remark to counter the claim that a Muslim country would not dare to use nuclear weapons against Israel because of the Muslim holy places and population located in it.

SAUDI ARABIA

New Cabinet Law Decreed by King

93LH0028B London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 21 Aug 93
p 6

[Article: "New Law for Council of Ministers Issued in Saudi Arabia, Consultative Council Members, Regulations"]

[Text] Jiddah—The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, issued four royal decrees yesterday: one concerning the Council of Ministers Law, one defining the term of those who hold ministerial or special rank in the Saudi Government, one appointing Consultative Council members, and one concerning regulations and rules for the Consultative Council.

The new royal decrees were issued to implement provisions of the three Saudi laws issued in March 1992: the Basic Law of Governance, the Consultative Council [Law], and the Districts Law. These laws inaugurated a period of political development in Saudi Arabia in the reign of Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz.

Here is the text of the decrees.

[Council of Ministers Law Promulgated]

With the help of God the Exalted,
We, Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—

Having studied the Basic Law of Governance issued by Royal Order A/90 of 27 Sha'ban 1412 [2 March 1992],

Having studied the Council of Ministers Law issued by Royal Decree 38 of 10 Shawwal 1377 [30 April 1958] and its amendments,

Having studied the Consultative Council Law issued by Royal Order A/91 of 27 Sha'ban 1412 [2 March 1992],

And having studied Royal Decree M/23 of 26 Sha'ban 1412 [1 March 1992],

Do order the following:

First, the Council of Ministers Law shall be promulgated in the form herewith attached;

Second, this law shall replace the Council of Ministers Law issued by Royal Decree 38 of 22 Shawwal 1377 [30 April 1958] and its amendments;

Third, all laws, orders, and decrees in force shall remain so when this law becomes effective until they be amended to conform thereto;

Fourth, this law shall be published in the official gazette and shall go into effect 90 days from the beginning of the Consultative Council term defined in the Royal Order issued first creating the Council.

Council of Ministers Law

General provisions:

Section 1: The Council of Ministers is a legal body headed by the King.

Section 2: The seat of the Council of Ministers is the city of Riyadh, but its sessions may be held at another place in the kingdom.

Section 3: A Council member must possess the following qualifications:

- A. He must be of Saudi nationality by origin and birth.
- B. He must be a person known for uprightness and ability.
- C. He must not have been convicted of a crime offensive to religion or honor.

Section 4: Members of the Council of Ministers shall commence their duties only after taking the following oath: "I swear by God Almighty that I will be faithful to my religion, king, and country; I will reveal no secret of the state; I will safeguard its interests and laws; and I will carry out my functions with honesty, trustworthiness, and sincerity."

Section 5: Membership in the Council of Ministers may not be combined with any other government job, unless the chairman of the Council of Ministers deems that necessity requires this.

Section 6: No member of the Council of Ministers shall during his term of office buy or rent directly, indirectly, or by auction any state property; nor shall he sell or offer for rent any of his property to the government. He may not carry on any commercial or financial activity or accept membership in the board of directors of any company.

Section 7: Meetings of the Council of Ministers shall be held under the chairmanship of the King (the chairman

of the council) or one of the chairman's deputies. Its decisions shall become final after the King approves them.

Section 8: Members of the Council of Ministers shall be appointed, dismissed, or their resignations accepted by royal order. Their responsibilities shall be defined in accordance with Sections 57 and 58 of the Basic Law of Governance.

The Council's internal law shall state their rights.

Section 9: The term of the Council of Ministers shall not exceed four years, during which time it may be reconstituted by royal order. If its term expires before it is reconstituted, it shall continue to perform its function until it is reconstituted.

Section 10: The minister shall be deemed the immediate head and final authority for the affairs of his ministry. He shall perform his activities in accordance with the provisions of this law and other laws and regulations.

Section 11:

- A. No one but another minister may serve as deputy for a minister in the Council of Ministers, and that only by order issued by the chairman of the Council of Ministers.
- B. A minister's deputy shall exercise the powers of a minister in case of the latter's absence.

Composition of the Council

Section 12: The Council of Ministers shall be composed of:

- A. The chairman of the Council of Ministers,
- B. The deputies of the chairman of the Council of Ministers,
- C. Active ministers,
- D. Ministers of state appointed as members of the Council of Ministers by royal order,
- E. The King's advisors appointed as members of the Council of Ministers by royal order.

Section 13: Attendance at meetings of the Council of Ministers shall be a right held only by members and by the general secretary of the Council of Ministers. At the request of the chairman or of a member, with the approval of the chairman of the Council of Ministers, an official or expert may be allowed to attend the Council's sessions to offer information or clarification, provided that the right to vote shall remain vested only in members.

Section 14: Meetings of the Council of Ministers shall be deemed valid only if two-thirds of the members attend. Its decisions shall become legal only after they are passed by a majority of those in attendance. In case of a tie, the vote of the chairman shall be deemed decisive. In emergencies, a Council session shall be valid with the attendance of one-half of the members; but in this case its decisions shall not be legal without the approval of two-thirds of the members in attendance.

Section 15: The Council of Ministers shall make no decision on a matter concerning the activities of any

ministry unless the minister of that ministry or his deputy be present, except in case of necessity.

Section 16: The deliberations of the Council shall be secret; however, its decisions normally shall be public, except those deemed secret by decision of the Council.

Section 17: Members of the Council shall be tried for violations they commit in their official acts under a special law containing a list of violations, indictment and trial procedures, and the composition of the court.

Section 18: The Council of Ministers may form committees from its members or others to discuss a matter on its agenda and present a special report on it. The Council's internal ordinance shall set the number of committees and the course of their activities.

Powers of the Council of Ministers:

Section 19: Taking into consideration the provisions of the Basic Law of Governance and the Consultative Council Law, the Council of Ministers makes domestic, foreign, financial, economic, educational, and defense policy and policy on all public affairs of the state, and supervises its implementation.

It examines decisions of the Consultative Council.

It has executive authority, and is the recourse in financial and administrative matters in other ministries and government agencies.

Organizational matters:

Section 20: Taking into consideration the provisions of the Consultative Council Law, laws, treaties, international agreements, and concessions shall be issued or amended by royal decrees after study by the Council of Ministers.

Section 21: The Council of Ministers shall study the proposed laws and regulations submitted to it. It shall vote on them section by section and then as a whole in accordance with the procedures defined in the Council's internal law.

Section 22: Each minister shall have the right to propose a draft law or regulation related to the work of his ministry. Each member of the Council of Ministers may propose, with the agreement of the chairman, anything he deems needs to be discussed in the Council.

Section 23: All edicts must be published in the official gazette and shall go into effect from the date of publication, if no other date be specified.

Executive matters:

Section 24: As the immediate executive authority, the Council shall have full control over executive and administrative matters. The following matters enter into its executive authority:

1. Overseeing implementation of laws, regulations, and decisions;
2. Creating and regulating public agencies;
3. Monitoring implementation of the General Development Plan;

4. Forming committees to investigate the operation of ministries, other government agencies, or a particular case. These committees shall submit the results of their investigations to the Council at the time it sits, and the Council shall consider the results of their investigations. It may form committees to conduct questioning in this light and decide the result, taking into consideration the provisions of laws and regulations.

Financial matters:

Section 25: The government may contract a loan only after the approval of the Council of Ministers and the issuance of a royal decree on the matter.

Section 26: The Council of Ministers shall study the state budget and vote on it section by section. The budget shall be issued by royal decree.

Section 27: Any desired increase in the budget shall be made only by royal decree.

Section 28: The minister of finance and national economy shall submit the state's final account for the preceding fiscal year to the chairman of the Council of Ministers for transmission to the Council of Ministers for approval.

Council of Ministers Chairmanship:

Section 29: The King, the chairman of the Council of Ministers, is the person who directs the state's general policy. He guarantees direction, coordination, and cooperation among different government agencies. He ensures harmony, continuity, and unity in actions of the Council of Ministers. He supervises the Council of Ministers, the ministries, and government agencies. He monitors implementation of laws, regulations, and decisions.

All ministries and other government agencies must submit to the chairman of the Council of Ministers within 90 days of the beginning of each fiscal year a report on what they have achieved, compared with what was set in the General Development Plan during the previous year; the difficulties they have encountered; and their suggestions for improving their operations.

Council of Ministers Administrative Structures:

Section 30: The following bodies shall be among the structures of the Council of Ministers:

1. The Bureau of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers,
2. The General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers,
3. The staff of experts.

The internal law of the Council of Ministers shall determine the structure, powers, and manner of operation of these bodies.

Section 31: The internal law of the Council of Ministers shall be issued by royal order.

Section 32: This law may be amended only by the same procedure by which it was issued.

[Law Fixing Length of Ministerial Terms]

With the help of God the Exalted,
We, Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—

Having studied Section 58 of the Basic Law of Governance issued by Royal Order A/90 of 27 Sha'ban 1412 [2 March 1992],

Having studied the Law of Ministers, Deputy Ministers, and Officials of Special Rank issued by Royal Decree M/10 of 18 Rabi' I 1391 [14 May 1971],

And based on the requirements of the public interest,

Do order the following:

First, appointees to ministerial or special rank shall hold that rank for no more than four years. Their service shall end at the close of this period, as long as no royal order is issued extending it.

Second, the service of those who hold ministerial or special rank at the time this order is issued shall end two years after its date of issuance, as long as no royal order is issued extending their service for a period not to exceed two additional years. Their service shall end at the close of this period, as long as no royal order is issued extending it in accordance with the first section of this order.

Third, it is the duty of the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and of the ministers, each as is relevant to him, to implement this our order.

Consultative Council Members Named

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Number: A/16

Date: 3 Rabi' I 1414 [20 August 1993]

With the help of God the Exalted,
We, Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—

Having studied the Basic Law of Governance issued by Royal Order A/90 of 27 Sha'ban 1412 [2 March 1992],

Having studied the Consultative Council Law issued by Royal Order A/91 of 27 Sha'ban 1412 [2 March 1992],

And based on the requirements of the public interest,

Do order the following:

First, the Consultative Council shall be composed of the chairman and members whose names follow for a period of four years starting from the date of this order.

Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim ibn Jubayr (chairman of the Consultative Council)

1. Dr. 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif (deputy chairman of the Consultative Council)
2. Professor Ibrahim ibn Qadhi al-Qadhi
3. Retired Lieutenant General Ibrahim ibn Muhammad al-Faris
4. Professor Ibrahim 'Abd-al-Fattah Julaydan
5. Professor Ahmad ibn Hamad al-Yahya

6. Dr. Ahmad Sayr Mubarak
7. Dr. Usamah ibn 'Abdallah Khayyat
8. Professor Bakri Salih Shatta
9. Professor Tawfiq Ibrahim Tawfiq
10. Dr. Jamil ibn 'Abdallah al-Jishi
11. Retired Major General Jamil Muhammad 'Ali al-Mayman
12. Dr. Hamad ibn Muhammad al-Firyan
13. Professor Khalid ibn Muhammad al-Qusaybi
14. Dr. Rida Muhammad Sa'id 'Ubayd
15. Dr. Zahir ibn 'Awwad al-Alma'i
16. Dr. Zuhayr Ahmad al-Siba'i
17. Engineer Zuhayr Hamid Husayn Fayiz
18. Dr. Ziyad ibn 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sudayri
19. Dr. Sa'id ibn Muhammad al-Malis
20. Professor Sulayman ibn 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Salih
21. Dr. Salih Zayni al-Shaybi
22. Dr. Salih ibn Sa'ud al-'Ali
23. Shaykh Salih ibn 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Mazru'
24. Shaykh Salih ibn 'Abdallah ibn Humayd
25. Dr. Salih ibn 'Abdallah al-Malik
26. Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman ibn Ahmad al-Ja'fari
27. Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Tayyib al-Ansari
28. Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman ibn Salih al-Shubayli
29. Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman ibn 'Abdallah Aba-al-Khayl
30. Dr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim al-Fayiz
31. Professor 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ahmad al-Rifa'i
32. Dr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Ali al-Na'im
33. Professor 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Muhammad Abu-Milhah
34. Major General 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd-al-Muhsin Al al-Shaykh
35. Engineer 'Abd-al-Qadir Hamzah Kushak
36. Professor 'Abdallah ibn Hamad al-Qar'awi
37. Dr. 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Munifi
38. Dr. 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Sultan
39. Professor 'Abd-al-Latif ibn Hamad ibn Muhammad al-Jabr
40. Dr. 'Ali ibn Ibrahim al-Namlah
41. Dr. 'Ali ibn Talal al-Juhani
42. Professor 'Ali 'Abdallah al-Juffali
43. Professor 'Imran ibn Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-'Imran
44. Dr. Falih ibn Zayd al-Falih
45. Dr. Fahd al-'Urabi al-Harithi
46. Professor Faysal Ahmad Zaydan
47. Retired Major General Kamal Siraj-al-Din al-Marghalani
48. Dr. Muhammad ibn Ibrahim al-Jarallah
49. Dr. Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Rashid
50. Professor Muhammad Ahmad Yusuf Zaynal
51. Dr. Muhammad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Mu'ammar
52. Professor Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Humayd
53. Shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Salim
54. Professor Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Sharif
55. Professor Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah al-Ghaliqah
56. Professor Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Nafi'
57. Dr. Mansur Ibrahim al-Hazimi
58. Dr. Mansur ibn Muhammad al-Nuzhah
59. Dr. Nizar 'Ubayd Madani
60. Dr. Hashim 'Abduh Hashim

Second, the chairman of the Consultative Council shall be responsible for implementing this our order.

[Consultative Council Regulations Promulgated]

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate.

Number: A/15

Date: 3 Rabi' I 1414 [20 August 1993]

With the help of God the Exalted,
We, Fahd Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud,
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia—

Having studied the Consultative Council Law issued by Royal Order A/91 of 27 Sha'ban 1412 [2 March 1992], we do order the following:

First, the following shall be promulgated:

1. The internal regulation of the Consultative Council in the form herewith attached.
2. The list of rights and duties of Consultative Council members in the form herewith attached.
3. Rules governing the financial and organizational affairs of the Consultative Council in the form herewith attached.
4. Rules and procedures for investigating and trying a member of the Consultative Council in the form herewith attached.

Second, these two lists and the rules shall be published in the official gazette and go into effect from the date of this our order.

Consultative Council Internal Regulation

Chapter 1: Powers of the Council Chairman, His Deputy, and the General Secretary

Section 1: The chairman of the Council oversees all actions of the Council. He represents and speaks for the Council in its relations with other agencies and bodies.

Section 2: The chairman of the Council chairs all Council sessions and meetings of the General Staff. He also chairs committee meetings that he attends.

Section 3: The chairman of the Council opens sessions and declares them closed. He directs discussions during them and participates in discussions. He gives permission to speak and defines the subject of discussion. He directs the attention of the speaker to staying within the bounds of the subject and the time. He ends discussion and moves subjects for voting. He may do whatever he deems appropriate and sufficient to maintain order during sessions.

Section 4: The chairman of the Council may summon the Council, the General Staff, or any committee to emergency meeting to discuss a particular subject.

Section 5: The deputy chairman of the Consultative Council helps the chairman of the Council if he is present, and assumes his powers if he is absent.

Section 6: The deputy chairman chairs Council sessions and General Staff meetings when the chairman is absent. If both are absent, someone chosen by the King assumes the Council chairmanship.

Either of the aforesaid has the powers granted the Council chairman in managing these sessions.

Section 7: The general secretary or his deputy attends Council sessions and General Staff meetings. He oversees writing the minutes. He gives members notice of session dates and the agenda, in addition to any other duties assigned to him by the Council, the General Staff, or the chairman of the Council. He is responsible to the chairman of the Council for the Council's financial and administrative affairs.

Chapter 2: General Staff of the Council

Section 8: The General Staff of the Council shall be composed of the Council chairman, his deputy, and the chairmen of the Council's specialized committees.

Section 9: No meeting of the General Staff shall be in order unless at least two-thirds of its members attend. Its decisions shall be made with the concurrence of a majority of the members in attendance. In case of a tie, the side with which the chairman of the meeting has voted shall prevail.

Section 10: Minutes shall be written for every meeting of the General Staff. They shall include the date of the meeting, its location, the names of those in attendance and those absent, a summary of discussions, and the text of recommendations. The chairman of the meeting and the members who attended shall sign the minutes.

Section 11: The General Staff shall have jurisdiction over the following matters:

- A. Setting the general plan of the Council and its committees, so as to enable the Council to complete its work and achieve its goals.
- B. Setting the agenda for Council sessions.
- C. Ruling on any objections referred to it by the Council chairman or the Council regarding the content of session minutes, the results of balloting and vote counting, or other objections raised during Council sessions. Its decision on such matters shall be final.
- D. Issuing the rules necessary to organize the activities of the Council and its committees, provided that such rules shall not conflict with the Council Law and its regulations.

Chapter 3: Sessions

Section 12: The Consultative Council shall hold a regular session every two weeks at least. The day and time of the session shall be set by decision of the Council chairman. The chairman may advance or postpone a session if necessity requires.

Section 13: Before a session is held, the agenda shall be distributed to members, accompanied by any reports relating to the matters on it and any other materials the General Staff sees fit to attach.

Section 14: A member of the Consultative Council must study the agenda at Council headquarters. Under no circumstances may he take with him outside the Council any papers, ordinances, or documents related to the Council's work.

Section 15: Any member who wishes to speak during the session must make a request in writing. Requests to speak shall be entered in the order of their submission.

Section 16: The chairman shall allow those who have made requests to speak, observing the order of their requests and the requirements of usefulness in the discussion.

Section 17: No member may speak on a single subject more than 10 minutes without the chairman's permission. In speaking, one must address only the chairman or the Council. No one but the chairman may interrupt a speaker.

Section 18: The Council may decide to postpone discussion of a subject or restudy it. The chairman may halt a session temporarily for a period not to exceed one hour.

Section 19: Minutes shall be written for each session, recording the place of the session, its date, the time it began, the name of its chairman, the number of those in attendance, the number of absentees and the reason (if any) for their absence, a summary of the discussions that took place, the number of votes in agreement or not in agreement, the result of the voting, texts of resolutions, anything relating to the postponement or halting of a session, the time it ended, and any other matters that the chairman thinks should be recorded in the minutes.

Section 20: The chairman of the Council and the secretary general or his deputy shall sign the minutes after they are read in the Council. Any member shall have the right to examine the minutes.

Chapter 4: Committees

Section 21: At the beginning of its term, the Consultative Council shall form from among its members the specialized committees necessary for it to exercise its powers.

Section 22: Each of the specialized committees shall be composed of a number of members to be set by the Council, provided that the number shall not be fewer than five members. The Council shall choose these members and name the committee chairman and deputy chairman from among them, paying attention to the member's specialty and the committee's need.

The Council may form special committees from among its members to study a particular subject. Each committee may form from among its members one or more subcommittees to study a particular subject.

Section 23: The Council may reorganize its specialized committees or form other committees.

Section 24: The committee chairman shall direct the actions of the committee and speak for the committee before the Council. The deputy chairman shall take his

place during his absence. When the chairman and his deputy are absent, the oldest member shall chair the committee.

Section 25: A committee shall meet at the summons of its chairman, the Council, or the chairman of the Council.

Section 26: Committee meetings shall not be public. They shall be in order only with the attendance of at least two-thirds of their members.

Each committee shall set the agenda for its work on the basis of the proposal of its chairman. The committee's recommendations shall be passed by majority of those in attendance. In case of a tie, the side with which the chairman of the session voted shall prevail.

Section 27: The committees shall study whatever is submitted to them by the Council or the chairman of the Council. When a matter concerns more than one committee, the Council chairman shall decide which committee is most appropriate to look into it, or he may submit the matter to a committee composed of all members of the relevant committees. Such a committee shall meet under the chairmanship of the Council chairman or his deputy.

Section 28: Any council member may express his opinion on any subject sent to one of the committees, even if he is not a member of that committee, provided that he presents his opinion in writing to the chairman of the Council.

Section 29: Minutes shall be written for each committee meeting. They shall contain the date of the meeting, its location, the names of those attending and those absent, a summary of discussions, and texts of recommendations. The chairman of the meeting and the members in attendance shall sign the minutes.

Section 30: When a committee finishes studying a particular subject, it shall write a report including the basis of the subject sent to it and its opinion on it. The report shall also contain its recommendation, the reasons on which the recommendation is based, and the minority opinion (if there is one).

Chapter 5: Voting, Passage of Resolutions

Section 31: The Council's resolutions shall be passed by the majority stipulated in Section 16 of the Consultative Council Law. If such a majority is not achieved, the subject shall be proposed again for a vote at the following session.

If the necessary majority is not achieved at that session, the subject shall be submitted to the King, accompanied by whatever study has been made of it, with indication of the results of the votes in the two sessions.

Section 32: Discussion or the expression of a new opinion is not permitted during voting. In all cases, the chairman shall cast his vote after the members have voted.

Chapter 6: General Provisions

Section 33: The chairman of the Council shall submit the annual report as provided in Section 25 of the Council Law before the end of the three months following the end of the year. The report must contain the studies and actions concluded during the year, the resolutions issued during it, and what stages have been reached in the study of matters submitted to the Council.

Section 34: The Council's financial and organizational matters shall be governed in accordance with the regulation organizing financial and functional matters.

The chairman of the Consultative Council shall issue the necessary regulations to organize the Council's administrative and financial operations, including the organizational structure and the duties of the Council's different administrations. Such regulations shall not conflict with the Consultative Council Law and its regulations.

Schedule of Rights and Duties of Consultative Council Members

Section 1: The character of membership for a Consultative Council member shall become valid at the beginning of the term of the Council, as set in the order forming it, in accordance with Section 13 of the Council Law. The term of an alternate member shall begin from the date set in the royal order naming him, and shall end with the conclusion of the term of the Council. In case the term ends before the formation of a new Council, the character of membership shall continue until the new Council is formed—all of this is as long as the character of membership does not become void for the member.

Section 2: During his term of membership, a Consultative Council member shall receive a monthly remuneration of 20,000 riyals and shall, during this period, be treated with regard to allowances, remunerations, compensations, privileges, and vacations as holders of level 15 are treated. This shall have no effect on any retirement pay to which the member is entitled.

Section 3: The rank that was held by a serving Council member who, before appointment to the Council, held a public office in the state shall be kept for that member. The period of membership shall be deemed part of service for purposes of periodic pay raises, promotion, and retirement. During the period of membership, the member must pay the retirement deductions on the salary of his original position.

One may not combine the remuneration and privileges fixed for Council members with the salary and privileges of one's [original] position.

If the salary of the [original] position exceeds the remuneration set for [Council] membership, the difference shall be paid to the member from the Council. If the position he held had privileges exceeding those set for [Council] membership, he shall continue to receive them.

Section 4: As an exception to Section 2 of this schedule, the Council member shall have a regular yearly vacation of 45 days. The chairman of the Council shall set the

time for the member to take this vacation. In granting vacations and permission for absence, care shall be taken that this not interfere with the legal quorum for holding Council sessions.

Section 5: The member must fully maintain neutrality and objectivity in all actions he performs within the Council. He must refrain from raising before the Council any subject related to his private interest or at variance with the public interest.

Section 6: A Council member must attend Council and committee meetings regularly. If any circumstance necessitates a member's absence from a Council or committee session, he must inform the Council chairman or the committee chairman thereof in writing. No member may finally leave a Council or committee session before its adjournment, except by permission from the chairman of the Council or the committee as the case may be.

Organization of the Council's Financial, Staff Affairs

Section 1: The Consultative Council's fiscal year shall be the state's fiscal year.

Section 2: The chairman of the Consultative Council shall prepare the Council's draft annual budget and submit it to the King for consideration of approval.

Section 3: After the budget is approved, its sum shall be deposited in the Saudi Arabian Monetary Organization. Disbursement from the sum shall be made with the signature of the Council chairman or his deputy.

Section 4: If the amounts entered in the budget are insufficient to meet the Council's expenses, or if an expenditure arises that was unforeseen when the budget was established, the Council chairman shall issue a statement of the required additional amount and submit the statement to the King for consideration of approval.

Section 5: The titles and salaries of Council positions shall be defined in the Council budget. Position titles may be changed and salaries reduced during the fiscal year by decision of the Council chairman.

Section 6: Positions at levels 14 and 15 shall be filled with the King's approval. Other Council positions shall be filled in accordance with the Civil Service Law and its schedules, except for the provisions for competition.

Section 7: The Council General Staff shall set the remuneration and rules for dealing with state employees, other than Council members, whose assistance is sought. These rules shall be issued by resolution of the Council chairman.

Section 8: The Consultative Council shall not be subject to the surveillance of any other agency. Among the Council's administrative bodies shall be a department for financial oversight before disbursement. The Council's General Staff shall be in charge of oversight subsequent to disbursement. The chairman of the Consultative Council may ask a financial or administrative

specialist to make a report about any of the Council's financial or administrative affairs.

Section 9: At the end of the fiscal year, the Council's General Secretariat shall prepare the final account. The Council chairman shall submit it to the King for consideration of approval.

Section 10: Without prejudice to the provisions of this schedule, the rules followed in regulating the accounts of government ministries and departments shall be followed in regulating the Council's financial affairs and accounts.

Rules, Procedures for Investigating, Trying a Consultative Council Member

Section 1: If a Consultative Council member violates any of the duties of his work, he shall be punished with one of the following punishments:

1. Written reprimand,
2. Loss of one month's remuneration,
3. Deprivation of membership.

Section 2: Investigation of a Consultative Council member shall be handled by a committee of three Council members to be chosen by the Council chairman.

Section 3: The committee shall notify the member of the violation attributed to him. It must hear his testimony and record his defense in the official report of the investigation.

The committee shall submit the result of the investigation to the Council's General Staff.

Section 4: The General Staff may form a committee of three of its members, provided that neither the Council's chairman nor his deputy shall be among them, to try the member accused of the violation. The committee may impose the penalty of reprimand or fine.

If the committee decides on deprivation of membership, the matter shall be referred to the chairman of the Consultative Council for referral to the King.

Section 5: Imposition of any of the aforesaid punishments shall not preclude a criminal or civil case from being brought against the member.

Biographies of Consultative Council Members

93LH0028A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
22 Aug 93 p 3

[Article: "Short List of Consultative Council Members"]

[Text]

Dr. 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif

He was born in Jiddah in 1358 [1939-40]. His father was a member of the Consultative Council. He earned a doctorate in geology from Leeds University in Britain in 1391 [1971-72] with a dissertation on the geology of the rocks of the al-Ta'if area. He taught in Saudi universities and served as rector of King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University in

Jiddah, then as general secretary of the Muslim World League. Afterward he was appointed deputy chairman of the Consultative Council.

Dr. 'Abd-al-'Aziz Ibn Ibrahim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Fayiz

A political writer known particularly for his interests in international conditions and the American political system, he is a specialist in international relations and comparative governments in the field of the Middle East, with a focus on the Arabian Gulf area.

Born in 1370 (1951), he earned a doctorate in political science from the United States in 1403 [1982-83].

He chaired the political science department in the College of Administrative Science at King Sa'ud University from 1407 [1986-87] to 1409 [1988-89].

He has experience in the field of information and international policy. He therefore works as a part-time advisor in the office of the deputy minister for information affairs in the Information Ministry. He also teaches political science at King Sa'ud University.

Dr. Zahir 'Awwad al-Alma'i

A researcher, poet, and Azharite, he earned a doctorate in exegesis and Koranic studies from Cairo's al-Azhar University in 1393 [1973-74].

He was born at Rijal Alma' in the 'Asir region in 1354 (1935).

He served as dean of the College of Shari'ah and Theology in Abha and has published several books and collections of poetry.

'Imran ibn Muhammad Bin Yusuf al-'Imran

A literary man and writer, he became editor-in-chief of the newspaper AL-RIYAD in 1385 (1965).

He received a diploma in literary and linguistic studies from the Arab League's Institute for Higher Studies in 1380 (1961).

Dr. Ziyad ibn 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Sudayri

The proprietor of a legal consulting office, he is the son of 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Ahmad al-Sudayri, the former amir of al-Jawf.

Dr. Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Rashid

A Saudi academic and educator, he served as dean of the Faculty of Education at King Sa'ud University and as general director of the Office of Arabic Education for the Arabian Gulf countries.

He earned a doctorate from Oklahoma University in the United States in 1972.

He was born at al-Majma'ah in 1363 (1944).

Dr. Nizar 'Ubayd Madani

He is director of branch administration at the Foreign Ministry.

Salih Sa'ud al-'Ali

He serves as trustee of Imam Muhammad ibn Sa'ud Islamic University. He was formerly dean of the Graduate Institute for Islamic Mission at the same university. He specializes in Islamic jurisprudence and comes from the city of Ha'il.

Tawfiq Ibrahim Tawfiq

He is deputy minister for supply in the Ministry of Trade.

He has done information work as well as academic work in this field.

He was born in the city of 'Unayzah in the al-Qasim area.

Major General 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Shaykh

He served in the army and held a cabinet post for religious education. He has authored nearly 20 books in literature and history.

Engineer Zuhayr Hamid Husayn Fayiz

He is the proprietor of an engineering consulting office.

Dr. Salih Zayni al-Shaybi

A university professor, he belongs to the Banu Shaybah family, the hereditary doorkeepers of the Kaaba.

Salih 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Mazru'

He worked as general director of general administration in the Interior Ministry. He participated in Islamic functions overseas, such as the Conference of Islamic Communities in India in 1981. He was born in the city of Riyadh in 1934.

Dr. Faysal Ahmad Zaydan

He holds an American doctorate and now serves as deputy minister for telephone affairs in the Ministry of Post, Telephone, and Telegraph. He is considered to have played a role in the launching of the Arabsat satellite.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman Salih al-Shubayli

He serves as deputy minister in the Ministry of Higher Education and a member of the Higher Council on Information. He holds a doctorate from the University of Ohio in America.

'Abd-al-Rahman ibn 'Abdallah Aba-al-Khayl

He was formerly minister of Labor and Social Affairs and served for a time as Saudi ambassador in Cairo.

Dr. Muhammad Ibrahim al-Jarallah

Now general director of the Real Estate Company, he formerly served as a trustee of King Sa'ud University. He is a professor in the faculty of engineering.

'Abd-al-Latif ibn Hamad ibn Muhammad al-Jabr

He is an owner of large commercial franchises and is from al-Ahsa.

'Ali 'Abdallah al-Juffali

A businessman; he belongs to a major trading family.

Muhammad Ahmad Yusuf Zaynal

He holds a master's degree and studied in America and Britain. Born in Jiddah, he is president of one of the Zaynal companies. Zaynal is one of Saudi Arabia's old commercial families.

'Abd-al-Qadir Hamzah Kushak

He currently serves as general secretary of the Organization of Islamic Cities and Capitals. He was born in 1357 [1938-39] in Mecca and has a Ph.D. in city planning from 'Ayn Shams University in Cairo. He has held a number of posts and is a member of many committees.

Dr. Jamil ibn 'Abdallah ibn Mansur al-Jishi

He has held a number of government posts, including general director of the al-Jubayl project in the Royal Commission for al-Jubayl and Yanbu'. He was deputy governor of the General Electricity Corporation and deputy minister for planning and development in the Ministry of Health. He serves as a member of a number of companies and has an industrial consulting office. He was born in 1357 [1938-39] in the city of Tarut in al-Sharqiyah province. He received a doctorate in 1966 from the University of Pittsburgh in the United States.

Dr. Hashim 'Abduh Hashim

He was born in the city of Jayzan in 1362 [1943]. At an early age he entered journalism and held various posts. He has headed the newspaper 'UKAZ since 1981. He is a lecturer at King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University in Jiddah and an assistant professor in the department of libraries and information at the same university. He has authored books and several learned studies in the field of libraries and information published in specialized journals.

Dr. 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Munifi

He was born in 1939 in the city of Shaqra'. He obtained a doctorate in government in 1973 and served in the Council of Ministers from 1973 to 1980.

'Abdallah ibn Hamad al-Qar'awi, man of letters

He currently serves as deputy minister for financial and administrative affairs in the Ministry of Industry and Electricity. He was born in the city of 'Unayzah in al-Qasim. He received his university education in Egypt, where he received a B.A. from the sociology department of Cairo University. He was sent on fellowship to complete his graduate studies at the University of Southern California (Los Angeles).

Dr. Salih 'Abdallah Mansur al-Malik

He was born in 1359 [1940-41]. He serves as deputy minister for municipal affairs in the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. He earned a doctorate from the University of Michigan in 1393 [1973-74] with a dissertation entitled, "The Development of the City of Riyadh: Its Relation to Rural Immigration in the Kingdom."

Dr. 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Muhsin Sultan

He was born in 1363 [1943-44]. He earned a doctorate in political science from the University of North Carolina in America in 1401 [1980-81]. He works in the Interior Ministry—the Internal Security Forces College—as assistant director for educational affairs for the education administration.

Major General (retired) Kamal Siraj-al-Din al-Marghalani

He was born in Mecca in 1355 [1936-37] and received his primary, middle, and secondary schooling at al-Falah School in Mecca, from which he received his Secondary Studies Completion Diploma in 1372 [1952-53]. He graduated from the Cairo Police College in 1376 [1956-57] and joined the public security forces. He advanced to the position of assistant to the general director for administration affairs. He retired at his own request in 1401 [1980-81].

Dr. Sa'id ibn Ahmad al-Malis

He earned a doctorate from Indiana University in 1400 [1979-80]. He was born in 1360 [1941-42] in the village of al-Rayhan, south of al-Bahah. He worked as assistant professor at the Center for Science and Mathematics from 1400 [1979-80] to 1401 [1980-81]. In 1405 [1984-85], he was promoted to assistant deputy minister for educational development in the Ministry of Education, and has held the position since that date.

Major General (retired) Jamil Muhammad al-Mayman

He was born in al-Ta'if in 1358 [1939-40] and graduated from the Police School in Mecca in 1374 [1954-55] with the rank of 2d lieutenant. He did graduate work at the Institute for Higher Studies for Police Officers in Cairo, and served for six years as general director of the Antinarcotics Administration.

Sulayman al-'Abd-al-Rahman al-Salih

He formerly served as deputy of the secretariat of the city of Riyadh. He is a businessman, a member of the board of directors of the Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and a member of the board of directors of the United Saudi Bank.

Dr. Rida Muhammad Sa'id 'Ubayd

He was born in Medina in 1355 [1936-37]. He earned a Ph.D. in chemistry in 1963 from the University of Birmingham in Britain. He has served as rector of King 'Abd-al-'Aziz University in Jiddah since 1404 [1983-84].

Dr. Mansur Muhammad al-Nuzhah

He was born in Medina in 1356 [1937-38]. He earned an M.D. in Britain in 1980. He held a number of academic posts and is dean of the medical faculty and overseer of hospitals at King Sa'ud University in Riyadh.

Dr. Ahmad Sayr Mubarak

He was born in 1368 [1948-49] and received a doctorate from al-Azhar University in 1397 [1976-77]. He now serves as lecturer in the Shari'ah Faculty at Imam Muhammad ibn Sa'ud Islamic University.

Dr. 'Ali ibn Ibrahim al-Namlah

He was born at al-Bukayriyah in al-Qasim in 1372 [1952-53]. After receiving the doctorate, he served as deputy of the College of Social Sciences. He worked as a researcher at the Institute for Arab and Islamic Sciences in Frankfurt, Germany, and joined the faculty of Imam Muhammad ibn Sa'ud Islamic University. He now serves as associate professor in the university's department of libraries and information.

'Abd-al-'Aziz Muhammad ibn 'Abdallah Abu-Milhah

He was born in 1358 [1939-40] in Khamis Mushayt. He earned a master's degree in management from Western Michigan University in America in 1393 [1973-74]. He served as director of the Planning and Programs Administration in the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs. He worked as general director of municipal and rural affairs in the southern region until 1410 [1989-90], and as deputy minister in the Ministry of Municipal Affairs.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Rahman Ahmad 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Ja'fari

He received a bachelor's degree in geology from Washington University in 1968. He served in the University of Petroleum until 1971. He received a master's degree in management in 1972, and continued to serve at the University of Petroleum and Minerals as assistant professor in the College of Industrial Management. He served as dean of the college from 1984 to 1989. Four years ago he was chosen to be general secretary of the Gulf Organization for Industrial Consulting. After his first term in the position ended, it was renewed last month for four years.

Ibrahim al-Qadhi Muhammad al-Qadhi

He was born in 1350 [1931-32] in Mecca. He received his primary and middle schooling in Mecca and his secondary schooling at the Scientific Institute. He received a bachelor's degree in social studies from Cairo University in 1384 [1964-65]. He has served as deputy minister for administrative affairs in the Information Ministry since 1396 [1976].

Dr. Zuhayr Ahmad al-Siba'i

He was born in Mecca in 1358 [1939-40]. He earned a doctorate in public health from Johns Hopkins University in the United States in 1969. He served as professor of community medicine and dean of graduate medical

studies in the Ministry of Defense and Aviation. At present he is professor and head of the department of family and community medicine at King Faysal University. He is a well-known name in medicine and the son of the famous Saudi author Ahmad al-Siba'i. For many years he has broadcast a health program on television.

Dr. Hamad al-Firyan

He currently serves as deputy minister for financial and administrative affairs in the Ministry of Justice. He was born in Riyadh in 1356 [1937-38] and earned a doctorate from the High Judicial Institute of al-Azhar University.

Dr. Salih ibn 'Abdallah ibn Humayd

A professor of Islamic jurisprudence, he serves as deputy for religious affairs for the chairman's office of the Council for the Two Holy Mosques. He is the son of the late 'Abdallah ibn Humayd, who was one of the Kingdom's great religious scholars, on par with such men as Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Baz.

Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Nafi'

He serves on the Gulf Cooperation Council.

Salih ibn 'Abdallah al-Malik

He served as deputy minister in the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs and also has worked in the private sector.

AFGHANISTAN

'Serious' Cholera Outbreak Reported

93LA0147A *Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English*
28 Jul 93 p 16

[Article: "Cholera Outbreak in Afghanistan Serious"]

[Text] Islamabad (AFP)—An outbreak of cholera in Afghanistan is serious, a UN report released here said Wednesday.

Cholera cases have been reported from 14 of Afghanistan's 29 provinces, according to the report issued by the office of the UN Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance of Afghanistan Sotirios Mousouris.

The report said a World Health Organization team which visited Kabul from July 14 to 16 found that 3,000 people showing cholera symptoms were admitted to hospitals in the Afghan capital during the period.

The Afghan government has officially declared a cholera outbreak and established a national coordination committee in which different UN agencies are taking part, the report said.

A UN task force was also set up by Mousouris last week to meet regularly and take action to address the cholera outbreak in Afghanistan, it added.

BANGLADESH

Opposition Unity Seen Changing Parliamentary Politics

93AS1053F *Dhaka HOLIDAY in English* 9 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by N.M. Harun: "Opposition Unity in Parliament Revamp Politics"]

[Text] It was a fortuitous development; but the die has been cast. Cutting across all political and ideological barriers and prejudices, the many-splintered Opposition has struck on a common cause to build up an anti-government agitation.

Exchanges of accusations and counter-accusations on the floor of the House are commonplace in the Parliament. So could it have been on June 26 when Awami League's Tofael Ahmed, M.P. [member of Parliament], alleged corruption against senior Minister Majidul Huq and his ministry. It was, however, ordained to be different.

Prompted both by the Treasury Bench and the Opposition, Speaker Sheikh Razzak Ali made a fateful decision to form a parliamentary enquiry committee, with himself as the chairman. When on July 7 he placed the proposed committee before the House, a history in the perverse sense was created.

On the face of the Speaker, the Opposition rejected the terms of reference of his proposed committee while insisting on the formation of the committee. The Treasury Bench, of course, defended him to the hilt. (Sheikh Razzak Ali is still an active leader of the ruling BNP

[Bangladesh Nationalist Party].) In the absence of consensus, the Speaker said that his proposal 'dies a natural death'.

The Speaker and the government leaders had, obviously, miscalculated the dynamics of politics. The Opposition has seized the situation as a gift from providence, by the grace of the Speaker.

First, it is for the first time in the Fifth Parliament that all the opposition parties (Salauddin Quader Chowdhury, M.P., of NDA [National Democratic Alliance] is now abroad) have acted together and sat together. Prejudices of some against the Jatiya Party, the second largest opposition party in the Parliament, and hate of many against the Jamaat, the third largest opposition party in the Parliament, were subsumed in the unity against the Government. In the context of parliamentary politics, it was a sort of tectonic movement.

Secondly, against the backdrop of divisive politics highlighted by pro and anti-Liberation trends and the legacies of the anti-Ershad movement in the '80s, none in the Opposition in the Parliament or outside would have hazarded an initiative to bring all the anti-government forces together on one platform. The Speaker's proposed committee eliminated that problem. No matter whether the Speaker or the members from the Treasury Bench would participate or not, the Opposition would improvise it as a plank for opposition unity in the Parliament.

Thirdly, the opposition parties have so long remained preoccupied with partisan or divisive issues. Corruption is a potent popular issue transcending all political and ideological differences. This would allow the opposition parties to combine parliamentary opposition and anti-government street agitation, and also to act in unison from one platform inside the House and from respective political forums outside the Parliament.

Fourthly, this tentative realignment of forces in the Parliament bringing the Awami League, Jatiya Party and the Jamaat together is likely to have a bearing on power politics.

Lastly, the very appearance of opposition unity in the Parliament is likely to create a general anti-government atmosphere boosting the morale of various pressure groups like the workers and the people in general while ventilating their grievances against the government.

Hence, the time for the government to remain complacent about its legitimacy to power and incumbency for the full term of the Fifth Parliament, ending in February 1996, is now apparently over.

Corruption Issue Said Uniting Government Opposition

93AS1053E *Dhaka HOLIDAY in English* 9 Jul 93 p 1

[Article by Ataus Samad: "The Rallying Issue for Opposition"]

[Text] The opposition parties appear to have found enough reason seriously to raise charges of the existence

of corruption in the "democratic, transparent and accountable" Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government headed by Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia.

They will be content at this stage if some of the Ministers are removed or at least if they are subjected to parliamentary inquiry. But should Khaleda Zia try to protect all her Cabinet colleagues, as was evident in the narrow, shallow, and at least on one point ludicrous, terms of reference proposed for the parliamentary inquiry committee on the activities of the Irrigation Ministry, the Opposition will try to see that the suspicion of corruption rubs off on the Prime Minister as well.

It is now evident that the Opposition will press charges of corruption against Ministers, BNP activists and civil servants inside and outside the Parliament till at least some of the inquiries demanded by them have started.

Yesterday (Thursday) prominent Opposition M.P. [member of Parliament] Suranjit Sengupta raised the same cases at the meeting of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on the Ministry of Irrigation as were mentioned by Awami League M.P. Tofael Ahmed in the Parliament and at the press briefing after the Opposition walk-out on Wednesday. There was a discussion but no decision whether the files relating to those cases could be submitted to the Standing Committee when the matters were being raised in the House as well. The meeting of the Standing Committee has been adjourned for a week during which a decision on the matter of bringing the files to the committee will be attempted.

Meanwhile, the Awami League working committee has decided to stage some street agitations across the country and hold a rally in Dhaka next Sunday to highlight the corruption issue and the Opposition's efforts at fighting corruption.

The Five-Party Alliance's steering committee has warned the government not to try to divert public attention from the corruption issue and also not to protect corrupt Ministers and officers. The alliance noted with anger the attempt by a Minister of State to bring accusations of business interest against Rashed Khan Menon, MP, where he had none, in order to deflect demands for an inquiry into a deal of the Civil Aviation Ministry. Rashed Khan Menon said at the Opposition's press briefing last Wednesday that he did not get adequate opportunity in the house to state his own position and therefore he would be quite willing to face a parliamentary inquiry in this regard.

Deputy Leader of the House Badruddoza Chowdhury said in the Parliament that the BNP government's dealings were above board and it had nothing to hide. But does he really know? For example, did he know that the BNP government would not honour the four-point agreement he and Chief Whip Khandakar Delwar Hossain had signed with the Opposition on the trial of Jamaat-e-Islami chief Golam Azam for his deeds in 1971 and the withdrawal of the sedition case against twenty-four eminent persons? Does he know how many assurances given by Ministers on the floor of the House have

not yet been honoured? Indeed, the House Committee on Assurances has decided to compile a list of such broken promises.

The BNP had decided to enjoy the fun of having it all and going it alone on the way to power and happiness leaving behind the fellow travellers of the pro-democracy struggle. It has not even shared thoughts with them on matters which relate to the whole country. Its actions and its constant promotion of known anti-Liberation elements and hangers on of the Ershad regime have already shown that it has so far cared little for the spirit of the pro-democracy struggle of the "Eighties." So, its frustrated fellow-travellers will quite expectedly inflict some pain on it, if and when they can, as punishment. The interesting thing is that they are still willing to spare Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.

Polygamy Said Rapidly Increasing

93AS1053D Dhaka HOLIDAY in English 1 Jul 93 p 5

[Article by Mohiuddin Ahmad: "Census Reports Show Polygamy Is Increasing"]

[Text] The practice of polygamy is increasing in Bangladesh, and to the surprise of many, at a fast rate. It has been generally perceived that polygamy is limited among a section of chauvinists and mullahs who are not too many in numbers and this number has indeed been decreasing. But the situation is contrary in reality. Here, we shall try to analyse the situation, not on the basis of sporadic observations or case studies, but based on empirical data collected periodically at the national level. To draw inference in this regard, we shall refer to census data.

The number of polygamous persons has increased in the successive census years. This has been revealed in the demographic statistics which show that the currently married female population has outnumbered the currently married male population to a significant extent. We shall try to develop our hypothesis on the basis of the following assumptions:

- (1) The Droupadees are mere mythological characters and no woman is allowed to practice polyandry under present-day circumstances;
- (2) The polygamous men usually do not have more than two wives;
- (3) There has not been any under-reporting of polygamous cases in the population census.

Polyandry is not socially acceptable (to men), nor legally. The law-abiding male citizens will not allow it to happen. Hence this is a safe assumption under present circumstances.

There may be some reservations about the second assumption as sometimes we hear about persons having three or four or even more than four wives at a time. A central character in Jahir Raihan's novel entitled "Hajar Bochhoi Dhorey" was a village matabbar having four wives at a time. But it is rather impossible to estimate the

number of such cases unless there is a door-to-door survey. For simplicity of analysis, we shall assume that polygamous persons do not "possess" more than two wives.

The probability of under-reporting of polygamy cannot be ruled out. As polygamy too is not socially acceptable (to women and some men of modern mind), though legally protected by the Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961, many people feel embarrassed to let others know that they have more than one wife. One may recall the incident where a senior member of President Zia's first Cabinet was angry with a section of the press who had published his life-sketch mentioning that he had two wives. The concerned Minister was very critical of bringing "personal matters" to public. In our society, having two wives at a time is perceived by many as a personal matter like owning a pair of shoes or a pair of bullocks.

Now let us highlight some statistics. According to 1961 population census, roughly 49,000 women were married to men who had already one or more wife(s). Under the simplistic assumption 2, it may be concluded that 49,000 men had more than one wife in the reference year 1961. This may be treated as a bench-mark data just before the promulgation of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance which was supposed to restrict polygamy. According to a provision of the Ordinance a man can marry for the second (third and so on) time with prior approval from his existing wife(s). It is interesting to note that married women have been "approving" such cases of their respective husbands at an increasing rate in the successive periods.

According to 1974 census, the number of men having more than one wife was more than 0.14 million, which increased to more than 0.73 million in 1981. During the inter-census period, of 1981-91, the number of polygamous men has almost doubled and their number increased to 1.4 million in 1991.

It may be mentioned that the population is increasing, and so the number of married population. But polygamy is expanding at a faster rate. In 1961, 0.5 percent of the married men had more than one wife. Their proportion increased to 1 percent in 1974, 4.3 percent in 1981 and as high as 6.5 percent in 1991.

It is likely that the actual number of polygamous persons would be slightly less as some among them have more than one wife. On the other hand, there are many cases of under-reporting where the people tend to hide information, and hence the actual number of polygamous persons would not vary significantly from the figures mentioned above despite many with three or more wives. All these figures have been quoted from published documents of the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) and their reliability have been officially ensured and acknowledged.

How would these data be analysed—by social scientists? The questions that may follow are: which sections of the people practice polygamy more than others, what are the

reasons behind polygamy and its expansion over time, why there are not enough protests against such practices and so on. All these questions need to be addressed.

Amidst the jargons of development, democracy, human rights and environment, our society has attained the fastest growth rate in polygamy. When the whole world is preparing itself for transition to the 21st century, many of us are still maintaining a medieval lifestyle and are trying to defend it on the pretext of the shariah. Are we civilised?

The Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961 should be reviewed and amended in line with the basic tenets of modern civilisation and perception of human dignity. The existing state of things cannot continue in the name of "our way of life." The situation must change. Our law-makers in the parliament should address this issue as a part of the democratisation process. They must bring amendment to the existing law and ban polygamy in all forms.

Control Over Population Growth Seen Essential

93AS1053B Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
13 Jul 93 p 5

[Editorial: "Population Time Bomb"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] All kinds of portents are hovering over Bangladesh. Environmentalists fear for the future of the country from several counts—green-house effects to natural disasters. But no less grim an environmental problem or socio-economic-political problem, by a wider implication, is the continually burgeoning population. The unenviable distinction of the world's most densely populated and also one of the largest countries in terms of population, was labelled on Bangladesh long ago. Our population size has swelled to well over 110 million and projections of demographers are that the population may double in about three decades' time at the current rate of growth of over two percent annually. They hope that by that time growth will start tapering off as a result of various population control measures now being applied and popularized. There would indeed be grave and compelling reasons to worry about the fate of the country if the population is allowed to double as an inevitability. Signs are that we are trying hard to take the bull by the horn. Our population control programme, although dubbed as 'the best in Asia', gives no cause the complacency because of the room it leaves for improvement.

Starting immediately, we must do everything in our powers to try and limit the population growth to below one per cent. Some quarters may find the goal an impracticable one considering present experiences with population control. But surely there can be no harm in fixing it as the most sought-after target and get on with the job of fulfilling it. As soon as we are able to cut down growth to one percent or below within a definite time frame, say five or ten years, we should then fix near zero growth as the next target and mobilize and direct all population control activities accordingly. We may or

may not reach these targets fully. But even trying to achieve these ends with a sense of paramount national urgency can give the population control objective a great boost leading hopefully to a substantial decline in fertility and hence numbers. An outcome of this sort will be no small investment in the all-round security and viability of the country which stands to be very seriously threatened with population doubling or nearly doubling in about thirty years' time. Moreover, the social mobilisation it will bring about may be harnessed in materialising other national objectives.

Unfortunately, there seems to have occurred not yet the kind of reaction which the knowledge of such a frightening prospect not many years away should have prompted. Our Ministers and others in endless rounds of seminars, meetings and other forums, address the importance of greater urgency of population control. But in the absence of execution of new and bold policies befitting the gravity of the problem, these verbiages boil down to nothing more than useless lip-services without the desired impact towards putting a brake on population growth. High-ups in the bureaucracy on being questioned on the issue point to increased allocations for population control activities. But we know that increased allocations for routine services, with much of these being spent on the pay and other upkeep of legions of officers and field-workers, translate little into actually attaining higher targets in reducing fertility.

To really start achieving the desired degree of results quickly on the population front, the first imperative is to mount an all-pervasive and long sustaining awareness building campaign, so extensive and intense in its sweep the likes of which this country has not ever known. The next imperatives are policies like announcing privileges in jobs for government employees with smaller families, higher cash awards for adopting voluntary sterilisation, etc. Only from pursuing the above very sincerely and at the soonest the nightmare of population can be contained significantly before it is too late.

What we are saving in effect is that whatever good work has been done so far has to be built upon extensively, in view of the magnitude of the problem facing us, so that the prospects for an economic breakthrough are not completely jeopardised.

Family Planning Called 'Race Against Time'

93AS1053A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
12 Jul 93 pp 7, 1

[Article by Mukarram Hussain Chowdhury: "Family Planning in Bangladesh: A Race Against Time"]

[Text] Bangladesh family planning (FP) programme has achieved maturity and has been acclaimed all over the world for its success despite socio-economic and cultural constraints. Family as a social unit has been undergoing tremendous changes since the 1950s. The size of a family, its role in the life of family members, its role in the society and its image, all have gone through rapid changes over the last few decades.

Against this backdrop to plan a family according to one's own desire has become an uphill task. Poverty, illiteracy, poor health condition, superstitions, misconceptions and old social values, all stand in the way of a planned family. If political disturbances, social unrest and social violence are added then it is a vicious circle of elements working against family and its members. The idea of planning a family, and then developing the country accordingly has thus, remained a very difficult task.

But in the context of population planning the scenario is almost a race against time. On the one hand, the consequence of population explosion, on the other, twin scourges of poverty and illiteracy make the task of population planner complex.

The challenge for the government of Bangladesh and NGO's [nongovernmental organizations], like FPAB [Family Planning Association of Bangladesh] in the field of population control, or for that matter family planning, need not be overemphasised. The daunting, and sometimes discouraging, task has to be faced courageously, and with proper strategies.

Despite all limitations, and the enormity of the task, the family planning movement spearheaded by the FPAB in the 1950s in collaboration with the GOB [Government of Bangladesh] and some NGO's has achieved some modest but tangible results. After, about forty years of the uninterrupted struggle some dents have been made in the growth of population in Bangladesh, although time has not come yet to declare that the monster has been harnessed.

But the time has arrived to announce that the wings of the monster have been clipped at least.

Out of a total of nearly 22 million eligible couples nearly 40 percent use some kinds of contraceptive. The contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) has increased in conjunction with the family planning awareness level. The awareness level now is almost 99 percent, while the practice level is 40 percent.

It means out of a total of about 55 million sexually active and married people nearly 22 million people or 9 million couples use contraceptives regularly. It is quite high in our context. But in Indonesia the CPR is 48 percent due to higher literacy and higher income level.

Gradually, the situation in Bangladesh is improving. According to the Bangladesh Fertility Survey, Contraceptive Prevalence Survey and other studies the CPR in 1975 was 7.7 percent, in 1981 it was 18.6 percent, in 1986 25.3 percent, in 1989, 31.4 percent and in 1991 it rose to 29.9 percent. Now the CPR is above 40 percent.

The CPR in Rajshahi Division is 46.1 percent, in Chittagong Division it is 27.1 percent, in Dhaka 41.8 percent and in Khulna 45.7 percent. The infant mortality rate per thousand is 103. The per thousand maternity mortality rate is 5.6 right now. The population growth rate, annually, is 2.16 percent. It was 2.8 percent in 1974.

The fertility rate in Bangladesh has also declined. In 1963 the fertility rate, per woman in life time, was 7.1, in 1987 it was 5.3 and now it is 4.6. The desire level of fertility rate among women themselves is 2.5 in a life time. Government policy is to achieve NPR-1 by the year 2005 which means one girl child per woman.

The girls get married at an early age of 15-16, while the males get married between 26 and 30. The Bangladesh population is young, that is, 50 percent of the population is between zero and 15 years of age. This population will join the sexually active group in future and the eligible couples will be simply doubled by 15 years. Though our CPR has increased manifold in the last couple of years, to have the desired impact of increased CPR we have to change our focus. Traditionally the vast majority of the contraceptive users are the older couples who have already completed the family cycles. Now our task is to motivate newly wed couples to delay pregnancy, to attach priority to low parity couple over high parity couple.

So, to have greater impact of increased CPR level, the national strategy is to delay the age of marriage, delay the first birth, increase the gap between first and second birth and increase the social awareness level through health education and health services.

The newly wed couples must be convinced that without planning for the food, education and health of children they should not go for children. The unwanted children sometimes become undesirable. If one wants a child, then only he should go for it. The clients have a right to know about the right things. They have the right to choose, make informed choices, so there is a programme called Information, Education and Counselling in short, IEC. Programme has to be strengthened and the present direction of programme has to ensure improved quality care in service delivery.

The government target is to achieve a level of 50 percent CPR within the next five years. This will mean a total of 12-13 million eligible couples out of a total of 25 million. The goal is modest but practical. It will slow the pace of population growth. At the same time sustained efforts will be there to hold the current level of CPR so that it does not decline. It will mean extra efforts at all levels.

The national goal is to expand family planning services from the vertical level to horizontal level. It will be functional expansion to include the underserved areas like new couples, low parity couples and young couples.

Bangladesh needs to become self-sufficient and self-dependent in sustaining its family planning programmes. That is why more organisational sustainability among different agencies involved are stressed, through mutual cooperation. Currently GOB along with NGOs are implementing the programme. But there is a felt need that the private sector should also be involved to create demand in family planning. Currently, we are providing door-to-door service to make wider service availability and increase accessibility. However, the door-to-door service delivery system has made the people overly

dependent on the service providers. Thus, the current community based distribution (CBD) has to be modified to encourage the couples to receive services for fees at their own interest.

To do that the education level shall have to be increased and health consciousness level shall have to be raised. Change of vision about life has to be made for that. Mothers should understand that frequent child bearing is damaging for health. It needs 3 years to recover health from one child birth. Too many, too early, too late and too frequent pregnancies are detrimental to women's health.

The philosophical change at the policy level is also taking place. Initially government's health ministry was formerly called "Ministry of Health and Population Control." Now it is called 'Ministry of Health and Family Welfare'. There is a greater understanding that family planning is not mere population control, it is for improved quality of life.

Family Planning Association of Bangladesh (FPAB):

The Family Planning Association of Bangladesh is a full member of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) London. The IPPF is a non-profit international organization of voluntary national Family Planning Associations of 132 countries of the world dedicated to the belief that knowledge of family planning is a basic human right and that a balance between the world's population and productivity is a necessary condition of human happiness prosperity and peace.

Achievement in the 80's:

Through its multi-dimensional activities, the Association in the eighties has reached with FP message to nearly 7 million fertile couples of which around 4.14 million have been provided with one or other form of contraceptives. Compared to the vast national programme commanding more than 35,000 field personnel and over 700 service centres, the Association with its limited resources of 250 field personnel, 3,000 grassroot level volunteers and 19 clinics shares roughly 7 percent of the national achievement.

Besides, the Association in the last decade has imparted population education to nearly 70,000 out-of-school youths in rural areas by utilising peer groups of youth leaders.

Again, 4,228 poor women living in villages have been provided with skill development training with functional literacy, including soft loan to 3,673 of them who are earning from Tk. [Taka] 300.00 to Tk. 500.00 per month. Acceptance of family planning among them is nearly 67 percent.

To neutralise the opposition of a section of a hard core Muslim religious leaders, 18,500 local level such leaders, besides 610 Imams of mosques have been oriented on problems of population and validity of family planning from the Islamic point of view through upazila (Sub-District) seminars.

Some 1,100 rural unregistered medical practitioners and 1,125 voluntary workers from 225 local level social welfare organisations have also been trained and involved in motivation and delivery of services for family planning.

Under community volunteer organization project, nearly 47,000 families have been imparted health and population education through 2,000 trained community volunteers.

About 556 journalists representing national and local dailies and other mass media from each district and metropolitan areas of the country have been oriented through regional workshops on the issues like socio-economic impact of over population, importance of population programme and the role of journalists in promoting national FP programme.

In 1993 FPAB reached its 40th Anniversary. At this stage FPAB has taken stock of its environment by recognizing the challenge of the issues confronting it and once again become a pioneer organization, adopting causes which others are shy to espouse, seizing opportunities to be innovative and preserving its capacity to advocate family planning as a basic human right. FPAB has gone through a strategic thinking process for last two years and has chosen its mission for next decade.

Mission statement of FPAB

To establish family planning as a basic human right, FPAB will continue its advocacy role: promote family planning information, education and communication with quality services to eligible couples emphasizing underserved areas; prepare young people for responsible parenthood; help women in development; support beyond family planning measures; foster balance between population, resources and environment; promote community ownership for sustainable development and complement the government's efforts in achieving its demographic goals.

The whole mission statement, plans and goals have been the result of long process of involving people from grass root level to the top. In this process grass-root level workers, volunteers, managers, policy makers, GOB representatives and NGO representatives were involved.

Mr Mukarram H. Choudhury, DG [Director General] of FPAB, is an M.B.A. with majors in Accounting and Finance; he also has MSc in Statistics including Demography and Population, from Dhaka University. His MBA in accounting is from Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. He served as Programme Officer, Assistant Regional Director and Acting Associate Regional Director, Asia Pacific Region, Family Planning International Assistance (FPIA), International Division of Planned Parenthood Federation of America (PPFA) FPIA Dhaka Sub-Office. As an international consultant he visited India and Sri Lanka. He has extensively travelled Belgium, UK, Germany, Holland, Luxembourg, France, Canada, USA, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,

Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines and Japan. He joined FPAB in 1990 as its Chief Executive. Mr Choudhury is in his mid-40s.

IRAN

Relations With Egypt, Afghan Arabs Discussed

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[Article by Fahmi Huwaydi]

[Text] In June 1992, a private Egyptian plane landed at Tehran Airport, the first to do so since the revolution began in 1979. It was carrying Egyptian businessman, Dr. Ibrahim Kamil, whose visit was apparently the start of remarkable dealings with Iran that culminated recently in the sale of four Russian planes to the Iranian domestic airlines, Mahan, which is owned by several businessmen in the Kerman Province.

To be accurate, his private plane was not the first of its kind. One month before his visit, two private Egyptian planes landed at the Mehrabad Airport. One carried medicine and aid for victims of the earthquake that had struck Iran, and the other carried Egyptians who had fled from Kuwait or left Iraq to seek refuge in Iran following the occupation of Kuwait in August 1992. However, the plane that arrived in June was the only one that carried a visitor coming from Cairo to meet with Iranian officials. The office looking after Egyptian interests in Tehran had asked the relevant authorities for permission for the Egyptian businessman's plane to land.

It is not known precisely whether the deal for the four planes was mentioned in Dr. Ibrahim Kamil's discussions. However, his first contact with officials in Tehran no doubt had another objective, namely to purchase Egypt's debts to Iran, which totaled about \$320 million at the start of the Iranian revolution. When Dr. Ibrahim Kamil met with Iran's deputy economy minister, he offered to purchase Egypt's debt. The sum he offered represented a compromise sum, which the Iranian Government could recover as an alternative to the debt remaining outstanding, making it as good as a write-off, or at least unrecoverable in the foreseeable future, for reasons that are understood.

According to Iranian sources, Dr. Ibrahim Kamil was informed that the Iranian Government is not worried about the debt, is not willing to concede any percentage of it, and is not in a hurry to recover the sum, which, in any case, would require a political decision that has not been made yet.

At that point, there began a protracted discussion that ended with Ibrahim Kamil's sale of four planes (two Ilyushin and two of the Tupolev type) to the Mahan Company. Some Egyptian sources say that he had obtained these planes in another deal to settle debts owed to him by Russia and several countries of the

former Soviet Union. It is well-known that Ibrahim Kamil was among the biggest exporters to the Soviet Union.

Information circulating in Tehran indicates that the value of the deal is \$100 million, of which \$60 million (the value of two of the planes) has been subtracted from Egypt's debt to Iran. The balance (\$40 million) became Dr. Kamil's share in the Mahan Company. It is well-known in Iran that the group of businessmen who own the company are involved in other economic activities, which are oriented toward the agricultural sector in particular.

Despite its importance, the deal does not reflect a turning point in Egyptian-Iranian relations. Those relations have been marked by political tension since Cairo hosted the shah of Iran during President al-Sadat's tenure, and the Iranian opposition engaged in some activities directed against the Tehran regime from Egypt. At the most, the deal points to a fundamental attempt to lighten the effect of the political tension on Iranian-Egyptian relations, or on the economic interests shared by the two countries.

It is thus difficult to say that the two countries are moving toward an economic opening to each other. Nonetheless, Dr. Ibrahim Kamil enjoys a special position that transcends his status as a major businessman in Egypt, inasmuch as he is a favorite of the regime and closely linked to its elite circles; his name was mentioned in the Cairene ROSE EL-YUSUF magazine as a candidate to succeed Egyptian Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi.

Iranian Tourists in Egypt

In addition to the commercial relations with Iran begun by Dr. Ibrahim Kamil, there are signs that Egyptian economic organizations are attempting to enter the Iranian market through different doors. The desire of these companies to do so was conveyed recently to Iranian Government officials. These developments have been paralleled by the Egyptian Sugar Company's submission of a bid in an international competition to build seven to 10 sugar plants in the Khuzestan area, where a large sugarcane cultivation project is under way. The Egyptian company apparently came in with the lowest bid (about \$1 billion), and the Iranian authorities are now studying the technical specifications of the project offered by the Egyptian company. Egyptian experts have gone to Tehran four times during the past year to track the process.

Also, last year, Iran imported a quantity of raw cotton from Egypt for private-sector factories.

In another area, Egyptian tourism companies made an effort to attract Iranian tourists, following the relative improvement in relations and the restoration of diplomatic relations in 1991 at the level of interest offices. These efforts resulted in an agreement to organize weekly trips to Egypt via Damascus or Cyprus for Iranian tourists. From January to December 1992, these trips proceeded very quietly. Egyptians were unaware of

them, and the Egyptian newspapers did not report on them. Each weekly trip involved 50 to 100 Iranian tourists. However, the deterioration in political relations between the two countries in late 1992 led to a suspension of tourist activity in December 1992, when the Egyptian authorities prohibited 16 Iranian tourists from entering, even though they had obtained visas earlier from the office looking after Egyptian interests in Tehran. Since then, the tourism companies in the two countries have stopped these activities and are waiting for signs that the process can be resumed.

Contrary to what many believe, Egyptian-Iranian economic relations have not ceased throughout the years of political "deadlock." Paradoxically, the Iranian-Egyptian relations that developed during the rule of the shah and al-Sadat (which we will elucidate below) created a foundation of close ties and interests whose suspension was never practical during the years of the rupture in Iranian-Egyptian relations after the Iranian revolution began. Although these ties have weakened considerably since the revolution, they have nonetheless been maintained in one way or another.

The current picture of Iranian-Egyptian relations, in addition to the above-mentioned aspects, consists of the following:

- In the area of banking, Cairo continues to operate the Egypt-Iran Investment Bank, which was founded during Sadat's tenure with \$20 million in capital. Both states have participants in the bank's board of directors, which has continued to meet periodically and manage the bank's activities over the years. There is also a branch of the Iranian Export Bank, which supposedly encourages export activity between the two countries. Although its activity has been affected by the political tensions, it nonetheless has an executive director who has resided in Cairo since the bank was established 17 years ago, and his staff of Egyptian employees collect their salaries from the bank's headquarters in Tehran. The unrecovered debt owed to the bank by Egyptian merchants now totals about \$1 million.
- The two states have joint ownership of a factory near Suez named Egypt and Iran Miratex for spun thread and textiles. It is a successful project, inasmuch as it exports its output, some of which is sold in the Iranian market.
- In Alexandria, there is an Iranian-Egyptian Shipping Company whose capital was \$3 million. Its founding agreement contains a clause that stipulates that it obtain another \$2 million from the Iranian shipping company, Arya] as a soft loan. This company is still active in maritime transport, and its management is of course Egyptian-Iranian.

The Boom of the al-Sadat Period

Hopes were much greater in the al-Sadat period, which witnessed a boom in Iranian-Egyptian political and economic relations after those relations had been severed for a decade.

It is well-known that President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir severed Egyptian-Iranian relations in 1960 in the context of the clash with U.S. plans in the region, which were being implemented by the shah, among others, especially in the sphere of military alliances. During that period, Iran's recognition of Israel aroused the resentment of the leaders of the Egyptian revolution, which adversely affected Egyptian-Iranian relations. However, the Iranian foreign minister's condemnation of the Israeli aggression against Egypt in 1967 paved the way for a review regarding the resumption of relations in August 1970. After relations were restored a month later, President Jamal Abd-al-Nasir died. Thus, al-Sadat took power when the Cairo-Tehran road had already been opened and paved to a large extent.

Iran's prime minister participated in President Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's funeral. This significant gesture improved the atmosphere for generating more progress in relations. Key figures in both countries exchanged a number of visits, which culminated in a visit to Cairo by the shah and his wife at President al-Sadat's invitation. In the spring of 1975, al-Sadat visited Tehran. Less than two months later (in June 1975), the crown prince of Iran was in Egypt to participate in a ceremony to reopen the Suez Canal. In the following year, President al-Sadat made an official visit to Tehran. At that time, he announced that "relations between Iran and Egypt had reached the height of improvement."

The Egyptian president's remarks truly expressed the reality of the rapid development of relations. The mutual understanding between the shah and al-Sadat produced a number of results in different areas, including the formation of a joint economic cooperation committee. At the first meeting of this committee in 1976, the two sides agreed on an economic and commercial protocol, pursuant to which \$850 million in Iranian investments was to be channeled into rebuilding areas damaged by the tripartite aggression against Egypt.

The articles of the protocol cover broad areas of cooperation, including:

- The establishment by the two parties of a construction and engineering consulting company in Egypt to help rebuild the city of Port Sa'id. Iran paid \$250 million for this project, and the two parties agreed to establish the Egypt-Iran Bank in Cairo to implement joint projects.
- The establishment of a plant to produce up to 100,000 tons of chemical fertilizers daily in Egypt, using Egyptian phosphates and Iranian sulphur.
- The implementation of a joint project to produce 300,000 tons of ammoniac in Egypt per year, using Egyptian natural gas.
- Iran agreed to participate in laying oil pipelines from Suez to Port Sa'id to convey oil for shipment to Europe.
- The establishment of a factory in Egypt to produce 100,000 spools of spun thread.

Iran agreed to provide \$400 million in financial facilities to implement these projects.

- Iran agreed to cooperate with Egypt to implement a plan to exploit the unused capacity of various Egyptian factories. Priority was given to cooperation in the petrochemicals industry, in the paper industry, and in the production of rubber and industrial fibers and threads. For this purpose, Iran set aside \$100 million.
- Egypt announced its willingness to purchase machinery, tools, spare parts, and road building equipment made in Iran to implement reconstruction projects. Egypt also expressed a desire to purchase 1,000 passenger buses made in Iran and some consumer goods.

Following that meeting, other contacts were held, which resulted in the beginning of air travel between the two countries; Iranian planes began making trips to Egypt in January of 1975. These contacts also resulted in the signing of an agreement on tourism cooperation, which opened the door to the exchange of groups of tourists between the two peoples.

In view of the preceding, it was natural that commercial and economic cooperation between the two countries would expand. In 1974, Iran's exports to, and imports from, Egypt totaled 683 million and 64 million Iranian rials, respectively.

During the first nine months of 1975, Iranian exports to, and imports from, Egypt totaled about 789 million rials and about 65 million rials, respectively.

Between Cyrus and Pharaoh

If this development seems quite remarkable, one must not forget that it reflects not only the positiveness of the relationship between the shah and al-Sadat, but also the profitable use of an old balance of warm relations between the two countries going back to before the common era. It has been established that these relations existed as early as the 7th century BCE, during the period of the Achaemenids. There is evidence of extensive relations between the court of Cyrus and the pharaoh of Egypt. The Greek historian Herodotus (5th century BCE) states that Cyrus asked the pharaoh of Egypt, Amaseia, to send him the most skillful eye physician in Egypt. Those physicians continued working in the Persian court until Cambyses succeeded his father, Cyrus the Great. Herodotus relates that Cambyses betrothed the pharaoh's daughter, with the encouragement of the said physician, before advancing with his armies to invade Egypt and occupy the city of Memphis, the Pharaonic capital, in 525 BCE, within the scope of the rivalry that existed then between Persia and Greece.

The relationship became stronger after Islam appeared. The emergence in Egypt of the Fatimid state, which lasted for two and a half centuries (from the 10 to the middle of the 12th century CE) was among the manifestations of that phase with the Iranians, inasmuch as the Fatamids were in close contact with Iran, which opened the door to many cultural ties at that time. In this regard,

we should mention that the famous Fatimid propagandist, the Iranian writer and litterateur, Nasir Khosrow, toured Egypt at that time and wrote a valuable book on his trip. In that book, he mentions that several Dailamite princes (from Persia) were working in the administration of the Fatimid caliphate at the time. He also provides us with early evidence of trade between the two countries in his report about seeing, on the bank of the Nile in Asyut, quantities of the precious woolen cloth that was then being exported to Iran.

An Iranian emigre community existed in Egypt until the early 20th century. Its members continued to publish magazines in Persian in Cairo after the 1906 provisional constitution revolution in Iran. Three of those magazines gained renown: Parvaresh, which means education; Hekmat (Wisdom); and the illustrated Jahnama.

Thus, the marriage in 1939 of the crown prince of Iran (Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi subsequently) to Princess Fawziyah, the sister of Egypt's King Faruq, was not a surprising development in the context of the close, enduring relations between Cairo and Tehran.

Only Seven Islamists in Tehran

At the end of a long talk with an Iranian official, during which we reviewed the development of Egyptian-Iranian relations, I asked him: Could you comment on the assertion that Iran's links with the activities of Egyptian extremists were among the strong factors which adversely affected relations between the two countries?

He responded by saying: The denial of such a relationship is nothing new. That denial has been issued repeatedly on numerous occasions by officials in Tehran. It would also be nothing new for us to say that we challenge anyone to provide a single piece of real evidence that proves that alleged role. We are confident that the talk, which is being uttered along these lines, is based on a mere political disagreement and does not rest on any material facts that prove this allegation.

He added: To clarify the matter further, I reaffirm that Iran has no relations of any type with any of the groups accused of extremism. (A diplomatic source in Tehran told me a few weeks ago that an Egyptian submitted an application for an entry visa to an Iranian embassy abroad, and that the Egyptian said that he was sent by Shaykh 'Umar Abd-al-Rahman, who resides in the United States. The request was denied and the visa was not granted).

An Iranian official said that several news agencies are speaking of the transfer of some of the so-called Afghani Arabs to Iran.

[He said:] This has not happened. Tehran has not received any of them at all. As for those who speak of the presence of Egyptian extremists in Iran, they are either ignorant of the facts or exaggerate them greatly, because there are only seven Egyptians in Iran. Six of them study in a theological seminary in the city of Qom, and one works as a broadcaster on Tehran Television's Arab Program. All of them are well-known to the Iranian

authorities, who realize that they present no danger of any type and are not involved in any political activity. Also, the office looking after Egyptian interests knows each one individually, and we have no doubt that the Egyptian authorities are well aware of these facts.

I said: Is that the entire picture?

He said: Whoever alleges otherwise, must provide proof and evidence!

Reported Trade Relations With Yugoslav Firms

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p 4

[Article by Safa Ha'iri]

[Text] Paris—Well-informed Iranian sources report that a number of companies of the former Yugoslavia have transferred some of their international commercial activities to Tehran to avoid international sanctions, despite Tehran's daily criticism of the Serbs' perpetration of crimes of "genocide" against the Muslims in the Republic of Bosnia.

Iranian-Yugoslav relations, which have always been close, developed considerably immediately after the "Islamic revolution" began in Iran. These relations continued to exist after Yugoslavia dissolved and the Serbs carried out "ethnic cleansing" in large parts of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Among the Yugoslav companies that are basing their international commercial activities in Tehran are the General Export Genex Company, the Progres Company, Invest-Import Company, Energo-Invest Company, Inksport (as published) Company, and others. These companies are involved in iron, steel, precious metals, machinery, cars, tools, oil, gas, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, agriculture, technological equipment, communications devices, electricity plants, textiles, leather clothing, paper, printing materials, construction, and banking. Thanks to the complex network of contacts commanded by these companies of the former Yugoslavia, "good amounts" of embargoed Iranian and Iraqi oil are reaching the Serbs in their country in exchange for Serbian goods needed by Tehran and Baghdad.

An Iranian source, who declined to disclose his identity, reports that "Iran, which is isolated from the external world, is a difficult place for international agencies to monitor violations of the international sanctions imposed on Belgrade and to ascertain the activities of Serbian and other companies operating in Tehran." The said source has been working for a number of years with at least two companies of the former Yugoslavia. He also reports that the Yugo-Arab Company (headquartered in Nicosia), the Yugo-Import Company (headquartered in Baghdad), and other Serbian companies in Cairo, Tripoli, Amman, Beirut, Moscow, Peking, and Karachi, "are in constant contact" with their offices in Tehran.

The Iranian Bank of Tejarat [bank of commerce], and to a lesser extent, the Bank of Mines and Industries, are helping the companies of the former Yugoslavia—e.g.,

the Genex Company and the Progres Company—through its branches in the large Western countries, such as France, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. Also, the Iraqi al-Rafidayn Bank and the Arab Bank (headquartered in Amman) had close ties with the companies of the former Yugoslavia before the Iraqi-Iranian Gulf war.

Bani-Sadr on Elections, Rafsanjani, Dictatorship
93LA0089A London AL-HAYAH in Arabic 19 Jun 93
p 2

[Interview with Abolhasan Bani-Sadr by Najat Harb, place and date not given]

[Text] After the fall of the shah in Iran, Abolhasan Bani-Sadr was chosen to be the first president of the republic of Iran. However, the honeymoon between the president and the "jurist" of the revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini did not last for long, and Bani-Sadr wound up in France as a political refugee. Najat Harb conducted the following interview with him on the occasion of the recent elections in Iran:

[Harb] A decline in voter turnout was recorded in the Iranian elections compared to previous elections. How do you view that?

[Bani-Sadr] Before the elections occurred, I bet Western journalists that, even though we are strictly controlled, we would dispatch a call appealing to the Iranian people to refrain from voting. It seems that I won the bet. The call appealed to Iranians to empty the streets as a statement of their rejection of the dictatorship of the clerics.

As Western media cameras conveyed, the main and secondary streets all appeared empty. When a senior official said that the Iranian people did not participate heavily in voting because it has no fear of the regime, it seemed farcical.

We are not the only Iranian opposition party. Many calls were made, including, do not participate in elections, do not vote. We said, do not leave your homes. I believe that our call was the most effective. In my opinion, the reaction to this announcement indicates that the Iranian people has become ready to practice real democracy. This democracy requires four factors in order to be best achieved:

1. The people must declare their desire for it (which is what happened in the elections on Friday).
2. There must be cadres that are ready and willing to manage democracy. The inability of the clerics to develop cadres suited to managing democracy has been apparent for a long time. I believe that, for the first time in Iran's history, and in the societies of the southern group, this large number of effective cadres is emerging.
3. The democratic concept must be accompanied by a political, economic, and social plan and program to establish a democratic system in accordance with what the Iranian democratic groups have declared.

4. Political ethics. I believe that the Iranian opposition may be the only opposition in the world that attacks corruption. No one can accuse it of corruption.

[Harb] Why was the Western media allowed to witness elections in Iran?

[Bani-Sadr] Some say that it was an error in judgment on the part of the clerics, who believed that the domestic economic crisis and the declared American position would prompt the people to rally around the regime. Others said—and I am inclined to believe this account—that Rafsanjani was aware of what the precise voter turnout would be, and he wanted to expose to the world the magnitude of [support for] his rivals and thereby prove that only he is suited to negotiate and is able to marginalize adversaries.

Clerics and Rebellions

[Harb] Which currents are now active in Iran?

[Bani-Sadr] There is the clerics current. They are in power. However, they are becoming aloof and increasingly cut off from the popular base that forms the base of their rule. There is also the democratic Islam current, whose concept of democracy differs completely from the Western concept of democracy; they are strong.

[Harb] But the clerics continue to remain in power.

[Bani-Sadr] They own the people through food. They are using the shah's method. They are importing only enough to suffice for two weeks. No popular movement can reach its goals within the space of a week without hunger quickly ensuing.

However, acts of rebellion are occurring in different areas of Iran. At times these acts are peaceful. On many other occasions, they assume a violent form. Another weapon used by the government of the clerics to remain in power is its list of wanted persons located throughout the world, and the prisoners it holds, whose number is unknown to us. All that we know is that a number of them have died as a result of torture in Iranian prisons.

[Harb] The economic situation has monopolized the conversation of many. Could you please speak about several of its causes on which the Western media has not dwelt at length?

[Bani-Sadr] The government in Iran has no tax program. Its revenue is limited to what it brings in from the sale of oil, which it sells for 22 times higher than the exchange rate [as published]. Our economy depends entirely on imports. Also, the government has abandoned the banking system, which I established during my tenure as president, and it put the shah's law back into effect. We started the revolution. We were not satisfied with slogans, but had a working plan about which Kissinger said at the time: The United States cannot tolerate the presence of two Japans in Asia. This explains the coup against me, which was more vicious than the coup against Mosaddeq in 1953.

[Harb] Now, after all that has happened, how do you define your political Islam?

[Bani-Sadr] My Islam frightens the Islamic authorities in Iran.

Have you ever heard the clerics in Iran base their decisions on the Koran? Their only authority is the Hadith [sayings of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions]. Even Khomeyni did not adopt the Koran as an authority in his writings or preaching. Let us take as an example the sentence issued against the writer, Salman Rushdie. Which Koranic verse permits this religious ruling? The Prophet decreed death against one who fights Islam with weapons, not words. If we permit ourselves to kill anyone who attacks Islam, we would kill many in the world.

The Fundamentalists and America

[Bani-Sadr] I believe that the events in Egypt today and the racist fundamentalist movements in the Islamic world are the doing of American intelligence. President Mubarak failed to manage his country's affairs. Then came the American response and Mubarak's statements regarding Iran's involvement, which are merely a palliative for his failure. This talk reminds me of the shah's regime, which accused Abdel Nasser's Egypt of creating discord inside Iran.

[Harb] Based on this scenario, do you believe that American intelligence may be intentionally creating events leading to the demise of the clerics' regime in Iran?

[Bani-Sadr] The West does not want us to develop. When the shah was toppled, and when presidential elections were held, not a single violent attack occurred. There were no dictatorial practices. We liberalized the economy. A phase of peaceful development began. America did not like this reality. It activated the fundamentalist factor to topple us. When Islam came to power in Iran, a climate of liberation and happiness pervaded the world, a trend that the Islamic world set loose toward the West. Something like this happened in the Middle Ages, when the Islamic current clashed with the oppressive dictatorial current in the West, and the result was that the West took our freedom and we took its dictatorship. We are now continuing this. We are colliding with the dictatorial oppressors of the Middle Ages. If these oppressors did not reside within us, the West would be unable to control us.

[Harb] How can it be that a dictatorship has been imposed on the Iranian people?

[Bani-Sadr] Seventy-six percent of the Iranian people voted for Bani-Sadr and his reform program. On the day before the coup against me, I proposed to Khomeyni the idea of a referendum pursuant to Iranian legislation. I said, let us allow the people to choose between his way of governing and my way. His response was: Even if 90 percent of the people vote for your program, I will refuse. In this way, a dictatorship was imposed on Iran.

[Harb] However, how could a dictatorship be imposed on a people that mounted a revolution to get rid of the shah's dictatorship? Why did you abandon your role so easily?

Two Wars Together?

[Bani-Sadr] At that time, Iran was involved in a foreign war with Iraq. Could I play this destructive game and be the cause of a civil war at the same time? Khomeyni exploited the war to impose his dictatorship. The other reason for his success is the elite with which he chose to surround himself. They ranged from Stalinist-Marxists desiring a dictatorship of the proletariat to a group of clerics who rejected freedoms. The problem of the elite is that it believes that the people are ignorant and must be developed forcefully. However, circumstances have changed today, and the elections are the greatest indicator of that. The democratic Islam current has become the most popular, and it connects the people to the elite.

[Harb] Do you now represent this current in Iran?

[Bani-Sadr] I did not represent it when I was elected president of the republic. The minorities that want order are permitted to practice their own religious rites, and the workers and the cadres, we established a base for a productive economy, not an economy limited to the consumption of imports.

[Harb] Do you think that you will return to Iran some day? Is that day near?

[Bani-Sadr] Of course, I do not doubt it for a moment. We in Iran have tried every political, economic, and religious theory. All of them have failed to transform Iran into a growing, flourishing country. History will prove that my experiment is the only successful attempt. However, before it was able to bear fruits, it was cut to shreds. It is now experiencing a new spring. Simply, if I were to find among the Iranian clerics one of a Richelieu character, I would not rule him out.

[Harb] Has the West's view of you changed?

[Bani-Sadr] Despite appearances, the West continues to support the government of the clerics in Iran. The greatest indication of this is the \$5 billion in economic assistance. The West cannot continue to disregard the Iranian people's will. The situation may change tomorrow, and the West may begin to support rebel movements. The West cannot disregard public opinion in the Western countries.

Reasons for Defeat of Free-Trade Zone Bill Detailed

93LA0180J Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
3 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] Tehran—IRNA. Hasan Ganji, general manager of the Guardian Council and this council's public relations official, discussed the reasons for the Guardian Council's rejection of the Free-Trade Zone Administrative Procedures Bill. He said: The Guardian Council's opposition to this bill and its conflict with the Constitution of the

Islamic Republic is in the area of the quality and the duties of the free-trade zones supreme council, which is established in Articles 5 and 6 of this bill.

He added: In these articles the supreme council, some of whose members are also members of the board of directors, has some kind of involvement in all the affairs of these zones and in the formation of the Free-Trade Zones Organization.

Ganji said: This is intervention by the supreme council in the work and duties of the government. This council is mentioned in 26 of the bill's 29 articles.

The Guardian Council public relations official also said: This council's opposition to the aforementioned bill is not a rejection. Rather, this Majles measure is being returned to the Majles so it can be returned to the Guardian Council for final approval after its conflicts with the Constitution are removed.

Lack of Specialists, Experts, Problem Facing Industry

93LA01801 Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
10 Jul 93 p 2

[Text] The problem with our industries now is the lack of trained and specialist manpower such as experienced engineers, researchers, and designers.

Dr. Mohammadi, consultant to the Ministry of Heavy Industries, announced the above on Thursday in an interview with IRNA's correspondent. He said: Despite the existing problems, in view of the changes that have been made in the nation's economy, the path before our industries is both difficult and clear.

He discussed the fact that we have enough resources and hardware technology to industrialize. He said: The creation and reinforcement of a comprehensive applied engineering and technology university and on-the-job training for industrial managers and workers can help us reach these goals.

Dr. Mohammadi said: Recently six projects in succession have been welcomed by the ministry, including the creation of a center for industrial information and technology, the Iran Center for Technological Innovation and the formation of creative groups.

In conclusion, Dr. Mohammadi, inventor of Hadi Plastic, said: The managers of our industries will be successful making innovations in the industries of the Center for Development Research and Engineering, in Iranian welding technology and in the creation of heavy industry consulting groups in the Ministry of Industries when they are aware of today's industrial advances in the world and when they make use of the experience of the world's successful managers.

Official Says Lack of Funds Hurting Heavy Industries

93LA0180H Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
13 Jul 93 p 3

[Text] IRNA. The shortage of currency in circulation has brought the nation's industries, especially the vehicle manufacturing plants, against a serious problem with the procurement of the raw materials they need.

Dr. Seyyed Mohammad Hadi Nezhad-Hoseynian, minister of heavy industries, made the above statement yesterday while visiting various parts of the Saipa Company and while opening its new electro-dip painting line. He added: The policies of economic adjustment have raised the prices of raw materials, and this has created problems for factories such as the shortage of currency in circulation, some of which have been solved by reducing production and extra costs.

He added: The nation's banking system should make more means available to the industrial units in order to solve the problem of the shortage of currency in circulation.

The minister of heavy industries also criticized the current method of computing and collecting customs levies and commercial profits for import goods. He said: The government should approve as soon as possible the new tariffs the industrial ministries have prepared for this purpose.

He added: In implementing the current tariffs, no protection is provided for domestic industry, and for this reason they are facing the problem of stagnation.

At these ceremonies, Engineer Gharavi, executive director of the Saipa Company, discussed the manner of implementing this company's new electro-dip painting production line project. He said: This project was designed under license from the German [?Dur] company at a cost of 10 billion rials.

He said: About 80 percent of the work of installing this project was done by Iranian specialists, and the technical knowledge needed for this work was also transferred. Henceforth it will be possible for Iranian specialists to carry out projects of this type.

Among the characteristics of the Saipa Company's new painting production line is preventing body rust on vehicles built by this company and giving their bodies a uniform color. On this line the paint thickness for vehicles will increase from the current 20 microns to 35 microns, which meets international standards.

This production line has the capacity to paint 16 vehicles per hour.

Ground Forces Officer University Entrance Exam Held

93LA0142E Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
26 Jun 93 p 2

[Text] News Department. The entrance examination for the Islamic Republic of Iran Infantry Officer University was held.

Our correspondent reports that this examination was given yesterday (Friday) simultaneously in Tehran and in seven of the nation's other cities.

Brigadier General 'Abdollah Najafi, commander of the army infantry forces, who was present at the test site, said: This test has been held to select students for the Infantry Officer's University. After demonstrating academic and religious competence, the participants will also undergo medical examinations and tests for bodily immunity, and then they will go to the university. After the necessary testing they will begin studying at the journeyman and expert levels in one of the fields in mechanical engineering, development, electronics, computers, physical training or management.

It is necessary to note that the results of the examination will be announced at the test site in Tehran on 4/15/1372 [6 Jul 1993] and in other municipalities on 4/19/1372 [10 Jul 1993].

First Quarter Figures Released

Khorasan Exports

93LA0179A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
4 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] During the first quarter of the current year 25,000 tons of nonoil commodities were exported to 25 countries from Khorasan's customs houses. In this connection over \$16.7 million in foreign exchange was earned for the country.

According to IRNA's correspondent, quoting the assistant director of Khorasan's Customs Department, the value of the exported goods amounted to 1.342 billion rials[RIs], which showed a 30-percent increase over a similar period last year.

The exported goods consisted of: saffron, cumin seeds, dried and fresh fruits, fruit juices, canned foods and canned fruits, biscuits and confectionery, garlic, henna, plastic products, shoes, handwoven and machinemade carpets, blankets and short-napped coarse carpets (Gelims), wood flooring, various kinds of cloth and cotton threads, knitted garments, building materials, soft wool, goat's hair and sheep's intestines, melamine and chinaware, handicrafts, scales, electrical appliances, kerosene water heaters, and health products.

The above-mentioned commodities were exported to Canada, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, India, Russia, Switzerland, Italy, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Germany, Turkey, Afghanistan,

Sweden, Syria, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, the United Arab Emirates, and Japan.

Similarly, during the same period 20,298 tons of commodities with a value of RIs1.838 billion were imported by the Customs Department of Khorasan Province from Ireland, Italy, Germany, the Central Asian Republics, Russia, and Saudi Arabia.

The imported goods included industrial machinery, cement, glass, electrical appliances, extracts of coca-cola, raw materials for plastics, and more than 5,000 motorcycles and bicycles.

Hamadan Exports

93LA0179B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
6 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Hamadan—JAHAN-E ESLAM's correspondent. Following the direction of the expansion of nonoil exports, during the first three months of the current year, such commodities as raisins, garlic, and sausage prepared from sheep mutton and intestines with a total weight of 1,541,971 kg and a value of 357,972,072 rials were exported from Hamadan Province to Italy, Poland, Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Dubayy. It should be mentioned here that the proper certificates for export was issued by the General Department of Standards and Research of the province.

Gonaveh Exports

93LA0179C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
10 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] During the first three months of the current year 2,892 tons of nonoil commodities with a total value of more than 237,007,000 rials were exported from the customs house of Gonaveh port to the Persian Gulf littoral Arab states.

Jahromi, director of the Customs Department of Gonaveh Port while making the above statement also told IRNA's correspondent: During the same period 832 tons of goods with a total value of more than 182,464,000 rials were also imported through the said customs house as well.

He added: The major export items included ceramic and plastic products, gas stoves, and clothing, while such articles of merchandise as rice, fishing nets, teas, and automobile spare parts comprised some of the major import items.

Abadan Exports

93LA0179D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
11 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] During the first four months of the current year a total of 3,771 tons of commodities were exported to the Persian Gulf littoral states from the port of Abadan.

The supervisor of the Shipping and Port Authority of Abadan told IRNA's correspondent: The aforesaid

commodities, which consisted of various types of building stones, fresh and dried fruits, ceramic products, and furniture had a total value of 5,260,000 rials.

He added: During the same period 498 tons of merchandise such as household utensils and electronic equipment with a total value of 26,173,000 rials were imported through the said port as well.

He went on to say: With the addition of a new pier to the three existing ones in the port of Abadan, six more merchant ships with various tonnage capacities can now simultaneously use the landing piers. On a daily basis, currently about 500 to 600 tons of various items of merchandise are loaded or unloaded in the port of Abadan.

Tribal Leaders To Participate in Security Activities

93LA0180A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
4 Jul 93 p 3

[Text] The tribes in the Jiroft area will work with the police to provide regional security, and security in the region will be turned over to tribal leaders.

In an interview with IRNA, Hamidollah Jalali, public prosecutor of Jiroft, said: With the implementation of the security belt project, which was successfully implemented in the municipality of Jiroft, through the use of local forces the border running between the municipalities of Kohnuj, Bam, Baft, and Minab has become a strong fortress against insurgents and narcotics smugglers.

He added: With the implementation of this project, the entry of insurgents and narcotic smuggling caravans into the area has been prevented, and during this period two insurgencies were observed and suitably dealt with in the municipality of Kohnuj.

The Jiroft public prosecutor discussed the fact that in the past a number of the villages in this municipality were staging areas for insurgents and they came and went freely in these areas. He said: The decisive encounters by the police forces have already deprived the wrongdoers of the required capabilities and complete security has been established.

He said: Three months after the implementation of the disarmament project in the municipality of Jiroft, so far more than 300 people have turned their weapons in to the judicial officials, and many of them who have engaged in insurgency and disruption for years in the area have received letters of amnesty from the government.

With reference to the implementation of this project, he said: At a time when the police military organizations and popular bases are working hard around the clock to establish security, there is no reason for individuals to keep hot weapons.

He added: All authorizations to carry weapons were voided by this public prosecutor's office as of the month

of Farvardin [21 Mar-20 Apr] this year, and no one in the region has the right to keep and bear arms.

The Jiroft Public Prosecutor's Office has given all individuals who still possess authorized or unauthorized weapons one month to turn their weapons over to the judicial officials, and if they do not do so they will be dealt with vigorously under the law.

During this interview he discussed activities that have been carried out. He added: During the last three months, through the diligent efforts of the police forces 198 kg of heroin and 300 kg of narcotics have been obtained, and in addition to the destruction of several gangs of narcotics smugglers more than 30 narcotics smugglers and insurgents have been killed.

Yazd Residents Mourn Governor-General's Death

93LA0180B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
12 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Following the death of the governor-general of Yazd in a traffic accident, by order of Minister of the Interior Hojjat ol-Eslam Nuri, Gholam'ali Sefid, deputy governor-general of Yazd for administration and planning, was appointed supervisor of the governor-general's office and will retain his current position.

IRNA's correspondent reports that the cleansed body of the late governor-general of Yazd was carried in a funeral march amid public weeping and mourning to the Safdar Khan prayer site, and after prayers were held was taken to the Khaladbarin martyr's burial ground.

In this regard statements of condolence were issued by organizations, institutions and offices, and telegrams of condolence were sent by national figures and province officials.

Likewise, on the occasion of the tragic passing of Engineer 'Ali Hamidia, the province's hard-working and sacrificing sincere basiji, today a general mourning is taking place throughout the province of Yazd.

On Saturday 'Ali Hamidia, governor-general of Yazd, was on administrative mission on the Arak-Qom road when he had a traffic accident and was killed.

New Bafq Mayor Named

93LA0142B Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian
22 Jun 93 p 11

[Text] Yazd—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI. In ceremonies attended by Engineer Olia', deputy governor-general of Yazd for development, Engineer 'Alavi was introduced as the new mayor of Bafq and assumed his duties.

At these ceremonies, attended by Mr. Akhiri, governor of Bafq, Hojjat ol-Eslam Soleymani, temporary Friday imam, and a group of officials from this municipality's offices and revolutionary organizations, Mr. Olia', deputy governor-general for development, gave a talk in which he praised and thanked Mr. Shari'ati, mayor of Bafq, for his services. He discussed the position of local management and the elections for the city's Islamic

councils, and he emphasized the need for more public participation in the city's development issues.

As this meeting continued, Hojjat ol-Eslam Soleymani gave a talk in which he praised the service of the former mayor and wished success for the new mayor.

In conclusion, gifts were given to the former mayor by the governor-general's office and city officials.

Appointment to East Azarbaijan Customs Office

*93LA0180C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
4 Jul 93 p 3*

[Text] The public relations office of Iran Customs announced: In separate orders from Engineer Morteza Aqakhan, chief of Islamic Republic of Iran Customs, Hasan Arvari was appointed supervisor of customs for the province of East Azarbaijan, Hoseyn Farrokhi was appointed general manager of West Tehran Customs, and Mehdi Anis ol-Dowleh was appointed chief of commercial customs at Mehrabad, and they assumed their duties.

New Commander Named

*93LA0142C Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 27 Jun 93 p 10*

[Text] Sari—JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI Correspondent: In ceremonies attended by the commander of the revolution guard infantry forces, the governor-general, clergymen, exalted families of martyrs, officials from the chief jurisconsult's representative office and group of personnel from the 25th Karbala Army, Brigadier General Guard Commander Sodagar was introduced as the new commander of the 25th Karbala Army, and the efforts of Brigadier General Guard Commander Kamil, this army's former commander, were praised.

Dye Unit To Begin Operations in Hamadan

*93LA0180E Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
8 Jul 93 p 5*

[Text] The nation's first textile dye production unit, with a production capacity of 10,000 tons annually, is going into operation this year in Hamadan.

Engineer Kowkabi, general manager of industries for the province of Hamadan, announced during an interview: When this unit goes into operation the needs of some of the nation's textile plants will be met, and the volume of imports of this material will be reduced.

He said: 90 percent of the construction work on this project has been completed by the private sector, and the aforementioned unit is now being equipped and having its machinery installed.

He said that the province of Hamadan has 885 active production units. He said: In the last three years \$140 million in foreign exchange and 400 billion rials has been invested in the province's industrial sector. With this investment, employment has been provided for 54,000 workers in this province.

Official Details Gravel, Sand Mining Activities

*93LA0180G Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
6 Jul 93 p 7*

[Text] Five thousand five hundred sand, gravel, and common clay mines are being operated in the country.

Engineer Bahman Yazdani, an official from the Ministry of the Interior's Central Sand and Gravel Staff, spoke at a seminar held today in Khezrabad of Sari. He said: The revenues obtained from the above mines last year were more than 7.3 billion rials.

He noted that last year's production of sand and gravel was 360 million cubic meters. He added: 65 percent of the revenues earned from sand and gravel is spent on development work, 30 percent is spent on national divisions affairs and village upkeep, and 5 percent goes into the government's treasury.

Engineer Jahangirian, an expert from the Ministry of the Interior's technical office, discussed the quality of the sand and gravel produced in the country and its importance. He said: The quality of the sand and gravel produced in the country is quite low and undesirable.

In view of the fact that the strength of construction and its resistance to unexpected events, especially earthquakes, depends on the construction materials, he emphasized the production of quality sand and gravel.

He added: One of the goals of the seminar for sand and gravel officials in the nation's governor-general's offices is to talk and exchange views about raising the quality of construction materials.

As examples of the seminar's goals, Engineer Jahangirian mentioned improving the quality of materials, observing the selling price and the base price, talking about ways to operate mines, using the experience in the provinces and how to protect river beds and mines from destruction.

The national seminar for sand and gravel officials in the nation's governor-general's offices will continue for two days in Khezrabad of Sari.

Electricity Outage Damages Aluminum Factory Equipment

*93LA0180D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
4 Jul 93 p 5*

[Text] As the result of a power failure at the Arak Aluminum Plant, major damage was done to a number of this factory's aluminum reclamation pots.

Engineer Sirus Rasa'i, acting director of the factory, said the reason for the power failure was problems with the factory's electrical transformer power booster.

He added: In view of the fact that this plant's Production Line 2 for repairs had stopped, this line was not damaged by the power failure, it will soon be brought into the production circuit with 120 pots.

According to the acting director of the Arak Aluminum Plant, the question of how the accident happened is being studied by experts from the Tavanir Company and the Arak Aluminum Plant.

Plans Under Way To Establish Cypress Reserve

*93LA0181B Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
13 Jul 93 p 5*

[Text] To protect and propagate the cypress tree, construction has begun this week on the first reserve for these trees in Shahrud's Chaharbagh forest preserve.

Engineer Hatamian, an expert in the municipality of Shahrud's Office of Natural Resources, said: In implementing the aforementioned project, 600 hectares [ha] of the land in this forest area have been fenced and the entry of human beings and livestock and damage to these rare forest species will be prevented.

He said: So far the Forests and Pastures Organization has allocated more than 14 million rials credit to implement this project.

He added: Shahrud's Chaharbagh area is covered with cypress pines. It is considered the best plant stand in Iran and one of the best plant stands in the world, and if it matures and is revitalized, it will play a unique role in preserving nature and pastures for the survival of the ecosystem.

He discussed the fact that it is quite expensive and difficult to propagate cypress trees under artificial conditions. He said: Experts on natural resources consider natural planting through the creation of preserves and protected areas and carefully guarding the area to be the best and easiest way to propagate various kinds of cypress trees.

Various types of cypress trees cover about 18,000 ha of land in Shahrud's Chaharbagh River basin.

Airplane Charger Apparatus Built Domestically

*93LA0142D Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 29 Jun 93 p 14*

[Text] Chargers and dischargers for advanced military aircraft have been manufactured by the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force's Center for Engineering Research and were put into service in ceremonies at an Air Force base.

This device, which can measure one-tenth of a volt, is much more advanced than its foreign counterparts in terms of warning, control and precision systems.

The price of manufacturing a charger and discharger by the Air Force of the Islamic Republic of Iran is 1/20th the price of the foreign version.

The new charger generates electricity for the F-7 and MiG-29 aircraft, and if the aircraft's generator fails to operate, it immediately reinforces its battery.

According to the manufacturer of this device, the aircraft charger built in Iran is digital and fully automatic, and at

the same time it is capable of charging and discharging an aircraft's electrical system.

This device has six external lines which operate in pairs when charging and discharging.

He said: The Iranian-made charger is highly efficient compared to its foreign counterpart, and an effort was made to minimize defects such as noise and increased heat, which were in the foreign counterpart.

The parts used in the aforementioned device, other than the 10 percent made in the embargo world, are made inside the country.

New Transport Route Via Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine

*93LA0180F Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
10 Jul 93 p 2*

[Text] Iran and the Ukraine, in signing a note of mutual understanding and three agreements, are cooperating in the areas of road, maritime, and air transportation.

These documents were signed last night in Tehran by the ministers of roads and transportation and shipping of Iran and the Ukraine.

Based on the road transportation agreement between Iran and the Ukraine, a new route for shipping goods between Iran and Europe is being opened using overland roads in Azerbaijan, Russia, and the Ukraine.

Using the new route, the Islamic Republic of Iran will bring some of its import and export goods into the country over this road from central and western Europe.

Based on the air transportation agreement, there will be at least one direct flight between Tehran and Kiev by the aircraft of the two countries.

Based on the maritime shipping agreement, the two nations will use each other's ports to import, export, and transfer goods.

During the signing of the documents for this cooperation, the ministers of roads and transportation and shipping from Iran and the Ukraine told correspondents: The new overland shipping route from Iran to Azerbaijan, Russia and the Ukraine to central and western Europe is shorter than the first route for transporting goods between Iran and Europe.

This contract will make it possible for Iran to ship its imports and exports without the existing problems on the route the former Yugoslavia and at lower cost.

In this regard, the Ukrainian minister of shipping said: Based on this agreement, it will be possible to ship goods through the Ukraine to Europe without paying any kind of fees or taxes.

It is to be noted that to use the roads in Azerbaijan and Russia, separate agreements have already been signed between Tehran and those two countries.

Over 590 Kg Narcotics Seized in Fars

93LA0181H Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
12 Jul 93 p 3

[Text] Five hundred ninety kg and 635 g of opium and 550 kg and 4 g of hashish were seized in the last month in the province of Fars.

Commanding General Abol-Fathi, commander of the Fars Police District, gave a press conference yesterday. He said: In this regard 102 smugglers and 330 addicts were arrested and turned over to the judicial authorities.

He said: These substances were obtained from several large narcotics distribution gangs stashed in vehicles passing through the police precincts of Shiraz, Larestan, Estehban, Tabriz, Darab, Abadeh, Aqalid, and Jahrom.

He said: During this period 106 war weapons, 174 video devices, 299 liters of alcoholic beverages, 8,819 pictures, and 722 videocassettes and vulgar films were seized.

The commander of the Fars Police Precinct said: Likewise during the current year several gangs of professional automobile thieves, gamblers and distributors of weapons of war were destroyed in the province of Fars.

Illegal Weapons Distribution Network Destroyed

93LA0181I Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
13 Jul 93 p 3

[Text] Police personnel in the Javanrud area destroyed a gang active in the procurement and distribution of unauthorized weapons in the provinces of Kermanshah, Ilam and Lorestan, and seized 61 combat weapons.

Colonel Qaderi, commander of the municipality of Javanrud regional police, told IRNA's correspondent: In an operation Sunday night, the police forces in this area seized the aforementioned weapons and arrested two of the main members of this arms smuggling network in the village of Zalvab in the district of Ravansar.

He said: This gang procured weapons at the nation's western borders and distributed them in the nation's other provinces. They fell into the agents' net during an undercover transaction, and efforts to arrest the other members continue.

The commander of the Javanrud Police Region added: In the first three months of the current year [20 Mar-21 Jun] Javanrud police personnel seized a total of 89 unauthorized combat weapons and arrested 21 smugglers in this regard.

Narcotics Gangs Disbanded in Hormozegan, Kerman

93LA0181G Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
10 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Bandar 'Abbas—IRNA. Three days ago a large narcotics procurement and distribution gang was destroyed in the general area of the provinces of Kerman and Hormozegan, and all its members were killed. IRNA's correspondent reports that this was announced

at a gathering of news correspondents on Thursday by the general manager of intelligence for the province of Hormozegan.

He said: The operation to destroy this gang was carried out 110 km from the municipality of Jiroft in the vicinity of the 'Ali Hozuran village on 14 Tir [5 Jul] by the Hormozegan General Office of Intelligence and with the cooperation of the general office in Kerman, after extensive intelligence and reconnaissance of the insurgent staging area.

He said: In this clash, nine members of this gang were killed, and no damage of any kind was done to the intelligence forces.

He added: The leader of this gang, named Nur Mohammad Bamari, was killed. He was known as "commander," was one of the filthy criminal elements of the Bamari clan located in Hudian of Iranshahr. He created much terror and fear in the area by recruiting a group of people and forming a gang that engaged in kidnapping, obstructing roads, armed robbery, attacking the chastity of the people, theft of government and private vehicles on the roads, and martyring a number of police and military personnel.

The general manager of intelligence in Hormozegan discussed the fact that Nur Mohammad Khan's gang was involved in the distribution of tens of tons of narcotics. He added: This gang took tens of people in the area hostage, and it killed a number of them while demanding ransom.

He said: Eleven weapons of various kinds were seized at this gang's mountain hideout, including Kalashnikov rifles, G-3s, Siminovs, RPGs, one wireless device, ammunition, hostage-taking equipment including chains, leg irons, and locks used to keep hostages, and clothing in the form of the police forces, which was used in the municipality.

He added: The destruction of Nur Mohammad Khan's gang brought joy and happiness to the area's residents, who were fed up with the crimes of him and his colleagues. They gave the forces a warm welcome when they came back carrying the bodies of the dead criminals.

The Hormozegan general manager of intelligence added: During the previous month of Tir [22 Jun-22 Jul] the provincial office of intelligence destroyed a gang of insurgents and buyers and sellers of narcotics in the Kerman, Fars and Hormozegan area, led by Mojtaba, the leader known as "Tarzan."

He said: The clash with these insurgents took place when he was planning to take a number of people hostage in the Kusha Ahmadi area, and consequently he and two of his cohorts were killed.

Among the crimes of leader Mojtaba and his gang, he mentioned making hostages of a number of residents of the areas of Baft, Kerman, Hajiabad, and Kusha Ahmadi and one resident of Shiraz, tens of instances of road

obstruction and armed robbery on the roads of Hormozegan and Kerman, attacking the chastity of the people and martyring the supervisor of the China Rock (Abshui'yeh) mine.

Water Lost Annually Due to Worn Distribution Network

93LA0142G Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI
in Persian 29 Jun 93 p 4

[Text] Bushehr—IRNA. Due to worn-out conditions and high losses in the networks of the province of Bushehr, every year at least 6 million cubic meters of drinking water is wasted.

In announcing the above, Engineer Jalali, executive director of the province of Bushehr Water and Sewage Company, said: This has meant that every year 1 billion rials of the nation's capital is lost without being used.

He added: The worn-out condition of the urban networks, high water losses, the high level of underground water in the coastal cities, and the lack of any way to drain winter surface water and consumer water in the province has caused infrastructure installations to sustain huge annual losses.

The executive director of the province of Bushehr Water and Sewage Company discussed the fact that annually the province of Bushehr needs 73 million cubic meters of water. He said: Currently, with the final completion of the third water delivery line, annually 51 million cubic meters of the water needed in the province is being procured.

He discussed the need in the cities of the province for water reservoirs. He said: Right now 10 cities in the province lack water reservoirs, and in view of the 830-km length of the transfer line, the necessary preparations must be made to store enough water for at least two to three days.

Eng. Jalali discussed the assignment of water service lines and their price in the province. He said: In view of the poverty and deprivation of the people in the area, currently the company collects only 50 percent of the actual price of the water service line, in the form of installments.

Foreign Doctors Leave Ilam Province

93LA0181F Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
10 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Following the unification of the foreign exchange rate in the country, in the last three weeks 27 foreign physicians who worked in health care and treatment centers in the province of Ilam have left this province for their own country.

Dr. 'Abdol-Khaleq Kaykhvandi, executive director of the province of Ilam Health Care, Treatment and Medical Education Organization, gave an interview yesterday to IRNA's correspondent in which he announced the above.

He discussed the shortage of physicians in the province's deprived areas. He said: So far a number of health care messengers and physicians subject to the manpower project have been sent to the rural areas.

He said: By the end of the current year [20 Mar 1994], through the use of Iranian physicians subject to the manpower project, the shortage of physicians will be alleviated in most of the province's health-care centers.

Polluting Industrial Units Closed in Gilan

93LA0181A Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
13 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Eleven polluting industrial units have been closed in the province of Gilan for not observing environmental regulations.

IRNA's correspondent reports that this decision was made at the sixth meeting of the province of Gilan Environmental Protection Office's Expert Committee.

According to Engineer Pirasteh, general manager of the province of Gilan Environmental Protection Office's Expert Committee, these units include construction paint production, clay brick manufacture, slaughterhouses, block manufacture, cement warehouses, and radio manufacture.

He added: The experts from this organization continue to monitor and observe the activities of industries and to prevent them from polluting the environment.

Plant Disease Affects Bandar-e Anzali Rice Farms

93LA0181C Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
5 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] Five hectares of rice paddies in the Bandar-e Anzali village of Khamam have been infected with a leaf plastid disease.

The leaf plastid disease has now spread to the villages of Chu Koteh, Siyah Estakhr, Varasteh va Siyas Motakhar, Mirza Rabi'i, Alan, Sarkheshki, Tamil, Shirkuh, and Amir Kandehe in the district of Khamam.

The leaf plastid disease, known colloquially among farmers as *porsuz*, appears initially as brown stains on the rice stalk and when it has spread the rice grains take on a burnt appearance.

Vahaji, an official in the Bandar-e Anzali Office of Agriculture, said: This disease has recently spread in some of the region's rice fields, and the fight against the plastid disease continues over a wide area with the mobilization of all forces.

He added: So far over an area of 550 hectares of land in the area about 500 liters of the needed pesticide has been used.

Sewers Threaten Public Health in Shahr-e Kord

93LA0181D Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
5 Jul 93 p 5

[Text] The executive director of the Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari Water and Sewage Company said: The emptying of sewage and polluted industrial and nonindustrial waste water is threatening the general public health in Shahr-e Kord.

On Saturday Morteza Tamadon gave an interview to IRNA's correspondent. He said: In addition to creating an unpleasant sight in the city, currently waste water, which is dumped into open sewers or absorbing wells, is also polluting the underground water.

He said: To create a sewage network in Shahr-e Kord, this year 3.5 billion rials [Rls] credit has been provided and it is expected that by the end of the current year [20 March 1994], the city's old makeup will be replaced by this project.

The executive director of the Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari Water and Sewage Company estimates that the implementation of the Shahr-e Kord sewage system project will cost Rls6.7 million.

He added: The equipment for this project is being purchased from Austria and will be shipped to Shahr-e Kord in the coming months.

The executive director of the Chahar Mahal va Bakhtiari Water and Sewage Company called for health-care education for citizens and industrial owners on how not to pollute surface and underground water in this area in order to prevent the spread of contagious diseases.

Decrease in Infant Deaths From Diarrhea Reported

93LA0181E Tehran JAHAN-E ESLAM in Persian
10 Jul 93 p 3

[Text] In implementing the government's health-care programs to combat diarrhea, the mortality rate from this disease for children under age 10 has fallen to 70 percent.

During a reeducation seminar on controlling diarrhea held in Qom on Thursday, the chief of the Qom Health Care Center said: At the beginning of this project in the years 1360 [21 Mar 1981-20 Mar 1982], 1363 [21 Mar 1984-20 Mar 1985] and 1364 [21 Mar 1985-20 Mar 1986], there were 34,000 deaths of children under the age of 10, and as the result of measures taken, this figure has dropped to 10,000.

Dr. Tamoli said that this reduction is the result of the comprehensive cooperation of the World Health Organization with Iran to control and prevent diarrhea. He said that in this project patients were treated with the drug URS and the excessive use of drugs and antibiotics was prevented.

Among other measures taken by the Ministry of Health Care, Treatment and Medical Education, he mentioned the campaign against acute child respiratory diseases and noted: Immunization against acute respiratory disease under these circumstances is the primary factor in the deaths of 12,500 of the nation's children in the year 1370 [21 Mar 1991-20 Mar 1992]. [sentence as published]

On the same occasion the one-day reeducation seminar for physicians and specialists in children's diseases was held in Qom, with the cooperation of the Martyr Beheshti Medical Sciences University and with the assistance of the province of Tehran Health Care Office.

At this scientific meeting, attended by the general manager of family health care and members of the faculty of the Medical Sciences University, participants became familiar with the latest scientific advances in fighting diarrhea.

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